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After the evacuation of a transcendental ethic as a universal yardstick or law for action, notions of 
justice, morality and the law nevertheless remain policed, and are still invested in by strong 
systems of belief and prejudice. This thesis sets out to analyse the tradition and prevalence of 
“idealising” moments of consequence, judgement and decision and their specific relation to a 
transcendental-style aesthetics of violence. 
 
In this written thesis and in my studio-based work I examine the themes of “naturalised justice” 
and “decision” as means to achieve autonomy, hinged as they are upon critical, theoretical and 
cultural representations of, and responses to, the problem of the ubiquity of violence. As such, my 
thesis also asks how the rhetoric of this apparently mutual or shared conviction of autonomy as 
aggression, violence or force, produces judgement within culture in general, upon and within the 
condition of absolute finitude. 
 
It is through the empirical examination of my studio practice that I consider the universalising 
forces of individual authorities using the “worn out metaphors” of the post-tragic hero genre. Here, 
I create movie poster type images and pop-music style videos in which my appropriation of the 
powerful propaganda of Hollywood movies lives out the impossibility of exteriority, that is, the 
difficulty of separating this use of the medium from my being caught up within it. These 
apparently abstract and generic narratives of agency are the focus of my practice throughout. 
Through them, I investigate (i) the rhetoric of “violence as decision” as something which 
undermines its own determinism; (ii) the political force of such rhetoric in relation to the 
naturalisation of belief, (such as traditional, conventional and assumed agreements in the social); 
and (iii) the procedures and consequences of performances of the rhetoric of violence practiced in 
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1. Post-tragic Subjectivity 
 
There is war only after the opening of discourse, and war dies out only at the end of 
discourse. Peace, like silence, is the strange vocation of a language called itself by itself. 
But since finite silence is also the medium of violence, language can only indefinitely 
tend toward justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it. Violence 
against violence. Economy of violence.1     
Jacques Derrida 
 “Violence and Metaphysics” 
 
 
In the epic adventures of Hollywood action movies, television network dramas, and the “dead air” 
territory of cheap late-night weekly television slots, death-defying stunts, scenes of violation, 
“criminality”, and “immorality” are dutifully combined with the themes of “law and order”, 
“justice”, and “truth”. Whether these narratives are made for the cinematic “fantasy genre” or as 
“real-life” documentary television, both are framed by the use of similar generic conventions that 
accept violence as an intrinsic feature of agency. The central figure of this agency is successful 
because he/she can associate decision with acting violently and because he/she does not even 
consider the practices of transgressive or unlawful actions as actually being against the law. In 
“real-life” TV shows such as World’s Wildest Police Videos, we are entertained by a 
sophisticated gung-ho narrative of justice, where felons are chased down through city streets, 
made ever more epic by the keen voice-over of a voyeuristic narrator. Such scenes of “everyday 
police-justice” remind us that violence and autonomy are ubiquitously hinged upon both the 
upholding and the surpassing of the law, in which acts of breaking and enforcing the law are 
situated in the spectacular, heroic and sensational performances of power and desire. This 
“pluralist” understanding of law and freedom risks not only cynicism or nihilism, because we are 
not able to categorically separate these terms, but also problematically, the immanence of 
violence to decision risks a mechanistic comprehension of violence as a necessary ingredient to 
getting power.  
 
Fundamental to the institution of this “postmodern” hero-genre is that the production and 
repetition of “violence as decision” articulates our philosophical, cultural, socio-political, and 
                                                     
1 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writing and Difference, Routledge, 1978, 117 
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historical understanding and identification of violence as hinged upon our autonomy. This thesis 
takes up the problem of this contemporary figure of knowledge and power in order to assess the 
tenability of a politics of subjective agency and the status of the subject and the law within 
pluralism. Consequently, to begin, I will briefly sketch out some of the guiding characteristics of 
the figure that organises this critique. 
 
Action films such as Steven Segal’s Out For Justice (dir. John Flynn 1991), Marked for Death 
(dir. Dwight H Little 1990), and Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Commando (dir. Mark L Lester 1985), 
deliver an action hero who does not experience autonomy through a recognition of his limits, or 
by tragically failing to live up to some criteria for heroic status. Instead the protagonist has an 
innate sense of right and wrong which is absolutely his own. The hero is “light”, energised, and 
pro-active, and does not second-guess the “rightness” or “wrongness” of his/her actions, nor 
suffer guilt or anxiety about action already done, or choices already made. These are stories of 
heroes who have no overt moral conscience as to the harm they may inflict upon their “victims”, 
for this is all in the course of justice and indeed, anyone who should become a victim, deserves 
what’s coming to them. In such narratives, there is neither an identification with a Big Other, nor 
with a concept of fate, or destiny. Crucial to this is that such subjects do not have any 
consciousness of a physical or mental limit capacity.  
 
In fact, the actions of these heroic subjects are not without knowledge of a judicial law; it is 
simply that the law has no direct bearing upon, neither does it impel his or her actions. However, 
despite their apparent self-interest, these narratives occupy a world of habits and norms that we 
can associate with, and one that we are included within.2 Even though we can never say “I am 
like that” or even think that we would behave the same way in any given situation; in that we 
know that these are unlived narratives; we can’t ignore the fact that when we watch them we 
emote an idealising sense of autonomy. This “complicity” could be variably construed as an 
identification with, an agreement with, and an anticipation of violence, so much so that watching 
                                                     
2 In film narratives the script and the camera work invariably foreground an intimacy with the lead 
characters. Not only are we able to empathise with the character through such intimacies but these 
narratives also feature the everyday back-drop to the narrative as a homely or even banal location. Crucially 
the scenes of action are set in places that we occupy everyday, from shopping malls to bars. The same goes 
for the TV documentaries of law-breakers, who manage to commit the most brazen of stunts in the most 
average of vehicles, in places that we have been to, or at least recognise. It is also significant that the value 
placed on these heroics are situated in the subject’s ingenuity in limited circumstance. In other words, the 
subject occupies the same territories as the rest of us, and has the same limited means or tools available for 
action, but is always inventive with them. In this way realism is a requirement for narratives of such 
fantastic agency, because it is through this that they are not only believable but also special. 
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these films, we can even sense ourselves “egging on” the protagonist, in expectation and demand 
for more.  
 
The action-hero characters often played by Arnold Schwarzenegger are typical of this conception 
of agency. Narratives are re-played in sequel after sequel, where the vigilante-style brutal 
individualism of the character does not act with a sense of “the social” in mind, even if the ends 
or outcomes of this action always benefit society by ridding the world of evil. Because of this 
lack of social interest a postmodern or post-tragic heroic is problematic in a number of ways. 
Firstly, by understanding the heroic subject as “above the law”, or even a law unto him/herself, 
we could say that this figure institutionalises immorality or at least threatens our values of right 
and wrong. In this case, the post-tragic hero glamorises or aestheticises transgression as a means 
to an end, which is autonomy. Secondly, and resulting from this is the problem that the 
institutionalisation of a heroic anti/modern agency banalises judgment because now this subject is 
not able to recognise power by dissenting from the norm, rather, the subject is the norm. By 
embodying the law, the post-tragic (postmodern) heroic evacuates and disables the modernist 
notion of freedom as being “free from” the constraints of the law.  
 
Russell A. Berman remarks precisely on the aestheticisation of the modern character in 
postmodern aesthetics in his essay “The Routinisation of Charismatic Modernity.” Here, he 
claims that the postmodern heroic subject produces “neo-conservative values, beginning with [a] 
shared hostility to the revolutionary experimentalism of historical modernism.”3 For Berman, this 
subject characterises a postmodernity in which “discussions of emancipation are prohibited as 
vestiges of an anachronistic Western metaphysics.”4 Significantly, Berman’s delineation of the 
postmodern subject’s limited potential is based on an understanding that this violent post-tragic 
hero represents a politics of subjective agency under pluralism. As such, my inquiry takes up the 
various relationships between the practice and the representation of the subject and the law. This 
includes representationalist demands such as Berman’s, that the subject can, and should, 
recognise the law, notions of an embodied practice of the law familiar to non-emancipatory 
political theories, and between these two; theories of the law as being paradoxically both inside 
and outside politics. This problem of identification is more relevant when we know that the 
institutionalisation of heroic agency may render the anti/modern attack on tradition and 
normativity obsolete, yet nevertheless, its iconoclastic and heroic language remains invigorated in 
                                                     
3 Russell A. Berman, “The Routinisation of Charismatic Modernity” in Modern Culture and Critical 
Theory, Art, Politics, and the Legacy of the Frankfurt School, University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, 134 
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the postmodern. It is this problem, of the normativity and legitimacy of heroic agency, that 
motivates this thesis. 
 
Written through the “postmodern heroic” is the problem that the immanence of violence to 
decision could be predicated upon any figuring of a “desiring agency.” Here, we can see that in 
the act of acknowledging or identifying violence in decision, or, the aestheticising of action that 
is premised upon decision as violence, we are enticed towards the problematic and dangerous 
assumption that by behaving violently we will achieve power, autonomy or some sort of self-
knowledge. This also can be conceived as violence as fate-object, the absolute identification of 
autonomy, or, a Nietzschean-style “will to power”. It is this absolute relation between autonomy, 
violence and power, also drawn out in my introductory quote from Derrida, where we can 
acknowledge that this contemporary identification of subjective agency (laid down in this 
description of the postmodern heroic) has a direct involvement with both a rhetoric and a theory 
of violence.  
 
As I have already shown, the “postmodern heroic” has a non-tragic relationship to violence, 
however it also can be seen to comply with the classical schema of associating autonomy with an 
expression of finitude. The necessity (and we could also say; the banality) of violence in these 
narratives of agency evacuates the use of violence as a metaphor for remorse, guilt, or for the 
good or bad. Furthermore, the concept of a suffering humanity is relinquished for an altogether 
more robust or “light” version of the self. This “unselfconscious” subjectivity accordingly upsets 
the status of demarcations such as “irrationality” or “rationality”. In other words, the 
naturalisation of decision as violence produces the impossibility to separately identify the finite 
and the infinite, the concrete from the abstract, or the immortal from the mortal. This is because 
the task of discriminating between self-aestheticisation as a rational thinking state of self-
empowerment on the one hand, and, on the other, violence as an unreasonable unthinking force of 
desire, are shown to inextricably rely upon an identification with the (in)finite as violence. 
Intrinsically, the condition of identifying violence as decision is significantly underscored as a 
problem when we look to postmodern versions of agency, because these narratives tend to 
incorporate a concept of suffering as something that the subject agrees to.5  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 Ibid., 131 
5 I will describe such instances in greater detail later, particularly with the Hollywood action movie. 
 9
On these accounts, this thesis considers related and varying responses to the immanence of 
violence to decision specifically within the territory of the post-tragic subject under a pluralist 
condition. This includes a study of the strategies and consequences of critiques and 
condemnations of violence and also an examination of the structure, organisation and application 
of foundational tropes within the social. By employing the term “violence”, I hope to stay within 
the realms of debating the aesthetico-political aspects of knowledge and power, where violence is 
indicative of a poetic and vivid passion of desire, aggression and physical force. For Jean Luc 
Nancy violence is an unlawful move against the normative that tears apart the established order - 
it is “figure without figure” - having an inherent ambiguity and is also something that “shows 
itself as image.”6 Violence, for Nancy, is the fundamental character of an image, in that the image 
is an exercise of force, and a product of violence’s manifestation. However, what is most 
significant to this thesis is that the project of truth, in its many forms, is inherently linked and 
often reduced to the role of violence.7 Consequently, the post-tragic subject underscores the 
problem of identification and the problem of condemnation, in that the terms of our agreement 
and disagreement seem to be always already structured by an aesthetics of violence. This 
simultaneous concretisation and ubiquity of violence in relation to linguistic practices determines 
a critique of conscious manipulations of an aesthetics of violence as power (whether this is 
conceived of as passive or aggressive) and also a study of a cultural and political conception of 




2. Violence and Justice 
 
As I have written, the post-tragic subject calls into question many problems of theories of 
subjective agency under pluralism, and with those problems we also see the increasingly 
foundational aspect of violence as relational to subjective autonomy. However, even after the 
evacuation of a transcendental ethic or Categorical Imperative, as a universal yardstick or law for 
action, this contemporary heroic subject shows us that notions of justice, morality and the law are 
not left un-policed, and are still invested in with strong systems of belief and prejudice. It is with 
                                                     
6 I am quoting from Jean Luc Nancy’s lecture on “Violence and Image” at Tate Modern, London. March, 
2002 
7 By this I mean that “truth” can be conceived of socio-politically as justice and the law, but also 
theologically and philosophically as relative to a project of Enlightenment and knowledge as a (Hegelian) 
task of self-recognition, which of course impacts upon the political. 
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the politics of these agreements in mind that the following chapters set out to analyse the tradition 
and prevalence of “idealising” moments of consequence, judgement and decision and their 
specific relation to a transcendental-style aesthetics of violence. It is here where I can begin to 
consider the problems of making choices under and as the law, when the systems by which we 
police and identify justice are subject to the same forces and powers by which we would classify 
and understand injustice. The post-tragic subject displays the law as a violent justice. In this sense 
the logic of this argument would be that to avoid violence or to lead the “quiet life”, we must 
conform to the violence of the law. Contradictorily, what is implied with this “postmodern” 
subjectivity is that to act, we act as the law, where our alignment with it is not conformity or 
complicity but an unnegotiated, uncontracted mutual contingency. In this we are bound to 
violence and justice and only able to recognise them as our own.  
 
Consequently, within this text, and what I will return to frequently, is a concept of violence as a 
banal or normalised territory and the notion that this post-tragic heroic subject retains an 
idealising moment within this. This duality describes a notion of ubiquity, normativity, tradition 
and exteriority. It describes a culture of violence, underscores a tradition of metaphysics, but also 
highlights the problem of the relation between the practice of justice (the demonstration of our 
beliefs) and what we believe (the place of our convictions). 
 
For that reason, a theme that recurs throughout this text is a question between aesthetics and 
politics. This critique hinges upon a discussion regarding the relationship between philosophy and 
literature and influences a methodology which transfers from inquiries into, and examples of, 
literature and film to those of critical theory, philosophy and pragmatism, where throughout I 
underline the contingency of thinking and language upon each other. In each chapter this takes 
the form of my making readings of narratives of decision from various “heroic” texts, such as 
Sophocles’ Oedipus The King, Shakespearean tragedy, the “fascistic” literature of Ernst Jünger’s 
1930’s heroic realism, and also contemporary narratives of decision such as action adventure 
movies and war films. This is interspersed with comparative readings from philosophical and 
critical texts that centre upon studies of agency and aesthetics, such as the work of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Stanley Cavell, Thomas Hobbes and Stanley Fish. 
It is from this Nietzschean-style subject that I make links between the work of Ernst Jünger and a 
post-tragic subject under pluralism. Jünger’s description of the subject and power influenced by 
both Heidegger and Nietzsche proves to be an important model for this discussion because what 
is proposed in Jünger’s literature is a subject that has a rationalising power over violence, knows 
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no limits, is not self-conscious, and fulfills the role of the protagonist. Intrinsically, Jünger’s 
“anti-modernism” invites further discussion around the equation between autonomy and violence 
and, of course, a central question between the subject of heroic realism (the post-tragic subject as 
a totalitarian subject) and the post-tragic subject in pluralism. By associating or even predicating 
decisive action on violence and risk this subject at all costs seems to institutionalise violence and 
at the same time underscores its immanence in any choice.  
 
Here, in Jünger’s politicised metaphysics, the identification of ideals is situated around a 
ubiquitous violence that seems to be both within language, in that we identify with it constantly, 
and simultaneously outside of our consideration, in that due to its encroaching character our 
actions are guaranteed a relationship with it and are subject to it. In identifying this figure of a 
Jüngerian-style worker and warrior - the heroic realist - as proximate to the “postmodern heroic”, 
we can see that this ideologically driven subject raises problems regarding the aesthetic and 
political identification of our autonomy in contemporary culture. With this problem of proximity 
in mind, I examine the relationship between the totalitarian and the postmodern when it would 
seem that this unselfconscious post-tragic subject becomes the identification of our autonomy. 
And, following from this, I ask what this non-tragic subjectivity tells us about the consequences 
of our productions and identifications of the normativity of violence and decision under a pluralist 
condition. In other words, can a critique of the rhetoric of heroic realism at work in contemporary 
culture (which I am asserting as the postmodern heroic) assist in an understanding of the 
violence-metaphysical relation? 
 
The difficulty of understanding the normativity and ubiquity of violence as a condition to and for 
agency is a problem inherent to postmodern subjectivity. Because we are no longer able to 
identify the ethical law of justice as informing the subject (for instance telling the subject if 
his/her actions are right or wrong) we are faced with a refreshed coincidence between violence 
and the individual practices of law or “truth” in general. As a result we can see that this subject 
troubles modernist conditions for agency and critical theories of agency. This is in terms of both 
criticism (as a move away from an institutional law or an action of separation) and the act of 
“behavioural complicity” as a means to criticism (as a conformity with the normative), because 
we can no longer provide clear and stable recognitions of normativity.  
 
As such, this inability to recognise what could be seen to be the “normative” or the “institutional” 
could in many senses be linked to a crisis of critique or autonomy. This problem of understanding 
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subjective autonomy under pluralism is then made more perceptible by the “postmodern heroic”, 
as I have called it, in that it demonstrates the difficulty for understanding the status of the subject 
and the law as separate. Most crucially perhaps, the subject’s blatant unselfconsciousness presents 
an ambivalence towards emancipatory politics, and any task of self-recognition; this subject does 
not consider him/herself to be “in crisis”, but instead just keeps on going. 
 
Since the status of this subject problematises any attempt to organise choice making, and even 
underscores judgment as a brutal exercise of knowledge and power, we are left with the problem 
of how we understand the difference between a critique of violence, or an understanding of 
violence (something that already determines a consensus within this structure), to actually 
behaving violently in an “acting out” of this identification. When thought and language come 
together, or, when we can’t tell the difference between meaning and image, and when we could 
say that when dealing with this subject that we in turn are subject to an aesthetic and political 
totality, why then are we not involved with or politicised by a theory of the totalitarian? The 
establishing of and acting upon “universals” and “foundations” is hinged upon the workings of 
law and power and here we are once again faced with the awful possibility that by being 
identified as immanent to all action, the trans-historical and “foundational” “universal” of force, 
power and aggression are now free to operate as grounds for it.  
 
 
3. Chapter Outline 
 
The first question that I address in this thesis is of how the rhetoric of decision in both tragic and 
post-tragic narratives relates to theories of autonomy. Terry Eagleton argues in his book Sweet 
Violence, The Idea of the Tragic that the tragic is essential to the political, and it has a trans-
historical aspect that should be celebrated rather than attempted to be changed. This is because it 
is in these moments that we identify ourselves as victims, and therefore are provided the 
equipment to empathise with others. He writes: 
 
Tragedy deals with the cut and thrust of historical junctures, but since there are aspects of 
our suffering which are also rooted in our species-being, it also has an eye to these more 
natural, material facts of human existence…The contrast between the weakness of 
humanity and the apparent infinity of the cosmos: these are the recurrent features of 
human cultures, however variously they may be represented.8  
                                                     
8 Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence, The Idea of the Tragic, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, xiii 
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 In his text he attempts to underline a concept of the tragic as a means to re-define an 
emancipatory political strategy. Eagleton wants to look at the universalised, naturalised and 
globalised facets of representations of humanity as tragic. In this way, by accruing a biological 
theory of the “material body of suffering” upon a theory of the tragic as a necessity to cultural 
knowledge, Eagleton dodges the poststructuralist “dynamic theory of self-fashioning” where he 
argues that the “light body” (or even the unselfconscious body) that is proposed in 
poststructuralism is somehow unnatural to the workings of community. For Eagleton a discourse 
of the post-tragic is therefore absolutely related to poststructuralism; it is a single-minded 
entrepreneurial project, viewed as something that not only evacuates subjectivity as self-
recognition but also social culpability. Conversely, Eagleton looks to a politics of self-recognition 
as being structured around the tragic in order to understand contingency. At this point, however, it 
is significant to mention what Eagleton does not consider. First he does not discuss the possibility 
that a notion of the post-tragic does not necessarily mean that we are post-ideological and second, 
that a discourse of the post-tragic subject does not in any way distanciate what we could call an 
inter-subjective empathy. Without a concept of the tragic, or in other words, the ability to identify 
limits, is “autonomy” only established as an identification and a production of the suffering of 
others? Does the unavailability of the tragic in contemporary “postmodern” narratives of agency 
really spell disaster for critical autonomy and inter-subjectivity? 
 
Eagleton, also moves rather too quickly through an inscription of the relationship between the 
tragic as discourse and the natural and universal recognition of the suffering of others as a bad 
thing. This proves to be important, especially because the difference between the tragic as a 
writing of human suffering as something that is negative, and our ability to recognise this in our 
everyday lives are often at odds.  
 
In light of this call for the tragic and its apparent importance to the task of both philosophy and 
politics,9 my first chapter will draw upon traditional notions of the tragic-heroic and will look to 
how the tragic narrative in both philosophy and culture intends to overcome and demonstrate the 
problems of making choices after the evacuation of an identifiable ethical order. Certainly, it 
would seem that a theory of the tragic subject offers redemption for both philosophy and politics, 
in the manufacturing of a space where the “human” is understood in relation to the bigger picture 
                                                     
9 And perhaps even in that as it has been called the highest expression of art! 
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and as an aim to recoup the task of philosophical knowledge, precisely by identifying the tragedy 
of its demise.  
 
Focussing on this redemptive aspect of the tragic narrative, and drawing particularly from the 
play Oedipus the King, I examine how the recognition of limits is understood as a moment of 
subjective autonomy. Here, I take up the character of Oedipus as the figure for a Hegelian 
dialectics, and at the same time identify a Nietzschean-style figure of Oedipus that is left behind 
or even identified as a product of the limits of Hegel’s symbolism. By drawing upon these two 
figures for knowledge, I introduce the problem of choosing either the tragic or the non-tragic 
Oedipus to be the figure for a particular autonomy, in that both are subject to rhetoric. From 
Oedipus the King I turn to examine how these tragic and the non-tragic figures impact upon the 
work of Stanley Cavell. Cavell’s work on both philosophy and literature is important to this as he 
sits at a crucial juncture between Hegel and Nietzsche, in that he attempts to identify a rhetoric of 
metaphysics in what appears to be an anti-Hegelian stance only to recover it. Cavell argues that 
the Nietzschean trope of “eternal return” rescues a concept of the tragic in postmodernism, 
because it implicitly acknowledges the death of philosophy. This inquiry into the relationship 
between an image of violence as decision in the tragic and post-tragic is important because what 
we could perhaps call “post-tragic” violence could still be seen to underscore a question of 
finitude much associated with definitions of the tragic, in that it articulates a nearness to and the 
impossibility of death. This provokes a questioning of if the images or narratives of the post-
tragic (as the rhetoric of active nihilism) are essentially tragic in themselves? Is the post-tragic 
tragic?  
 
Central to this staging argument is an initial drawing together of cultural and philosophical 
narratives that attest to aesthetic identifications of horror or violence as autonomy (even if, such 
as in the case of Stanley Cavell’s Romantic philosophy, they attempt to overcome this problem of 
identification). Continuing from this, I consider how and under what conditions the tradition of 
decision as violence (and something that I have claimed as perpetually relevant to the post-tragic 
condition in pluralism) is best subjected to scrutiny. This is in order to assess the possibilities of 
the relationship between subjectivity and the rhetoric of the heroic agent and to ask the 
motivating question for this thesis: whether a study of the rhetoric of active nihilism, the post-
tragic, or even the sensationalised theatricalisation of heroic realism evidenced within 
contemporary cultural genres, can assist in putting violence into question, and to do this without 
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repeating a Nietzschean-style nihilism already familiar in the orthodoxy of antifoundationalist 
discourses. 
 
Chapter Two continues to focus on the above questions, and specifically around the trans-
historical ubiquity of violence. In concentrating upon the normativity and exteriority of “decision 
as violence” I look to the ways in which theories attempt to deal with the post-tragic subject as 
something that threatens morality and politics. From here I re-consider the mutual contamination 
and incompatibility of ethics and politics. Whereas Chapter One discusses the tragic 
characteristics of a Nietzschean figure of agency via Cavell, Chapter Two resumes this critique 
by assessing the relations between a Nietzschean-style metaphysics and aesthetic and political 
practices. The political problem of this aestheticised Nietzschean subject is sketched out in Axel 
Honneth’s text “Pluralisation and Recognition: On the Self-Misunderstanding of Postmodern 
Social Theorists” where he prefers a Hegelian critique of acknowledgment over and above a 
Nietzschean-style politics of identification. First, I will briefly sketch out some of the issues in 
Honneth’s argument as it is important for my text before the argument proper to situate the 
relevance and indeed the importance to pursue a Nietzschean-style subjectivity and its 
consequences over and above a Hegelian dialectical critique. This is not merely because the post-
tragic subject smacks of a Nietzschean-style violence but also because it is my intention to 
demonstrate a non-dialectical aesthetico-political contingency.  
 
Honneth critiques Nietzschean politics as requiring a polemical or “divisionary” move, which is 
described as; “where the standard for freedom, which the individual can reach in experimental 
self-creation, is measured according to the distance he can establish between himself and the 
cultural value sphere of his time.”10 It is in this requirement of Nietzschean politics that Honneth 
identifies his main problematic: “As soon as the idea that subjects can solipsistically achieve self-
realisation independent of normative bonds is contested, it is also invalidated which makes it 
permissible to see in the dissolution of the social a chance for the unfolding of individual 
peculiarities.”11 Honneth identifies both the ease of invalidating the subject’s aestheticised self-
realisation and the danger that the dissolution of the social is identified as a positive cultural and 
political effect, used by such theories as the identification of self-invention or power.  
 
                                                     
10 Axel Honneth,. “Pluralisation and Recognition: On the Self-Misunderstanding of Postmodern Social 
Theorists” in Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernity, Ed. Peter Beilharz, Gillian Robinson and John 
Rundell. MIT press, 1992, 167 
11 Ibid.,168 
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In brief, Honneth’s objection is situated in the claim that the Nietzschean concept of freedom 
demands the requirement to make recognitions in or against “normative bonds”. This inevitably 
leads to the indifference and self-absorption of the individual in opposition to it. Honneth’s 
assertion, that that social is at risk through the subject’s inability to make recognitions or even, 
that identifications cease to carry meaning is at issue here in the sense that we can initially 
deliberate what is being described as “the social” and secondly how or what exactly are the 
politics of such recognitions? In other words on what basis does Honneth find a Nietzschean-style 
politics of identification so troubling?  
 
Honneth’s critique is based on an interpretation of an external power structure such as the 
“culture industry” that acts as the producer of the experience of a superficial freedom. The 
politics of the recognition of ones own freedom clearly has a distinct relation to what Honneth 
calls the “lifeworld.” The subject does not, or possibly cannot identify itself in opposition to it, 
but occupies an ambiguous relationship through it, with it and as it. It is in this location that 
Honneth identifies the central problematic of subjective freedom as a problem of intersubjective 
recognitions. Honneth identifies this primarily in the “pluralisation of individual life forms and 
that everyday cultural praxis is freed step by step from its received value commitments and 
traditions without them having been replaced by encompassing orientation patterns, within which 
the individual subjects’ attempts at self-realisation could find intersubjective recognition.” He 
continues: “It is this recognition vacuum which first brings about the growing willingness to 
accept life-styles prefabricated by the culture industry as aesthetic substitutes for socially 
depleting biographies.”12  Crucially, Honneth’s complaint recognises the inability to make any 
recognitions which would facilitate self-knowledge and intersubjectivity. However, he also 
moves to produce a clear distinction between the individual biography and the culture industry, 
wherein he insists that the one aestheticises and thereby assimilates and artificialises the other. 
Already, what Honneth is identifying is, firstly a strict demarcation between a mediated cultural 
experience and a direct communicative speech act, or moral value in a labour process, and 
secondly, a differentiation between power structures, notions of responsibility, and experiences of 
power; as there are those who have power and those who are subject to it. 
 
                                                     
12 Ibid., 171 
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Following the logic of Honneth’s claim against (Nietzschean) postmodernists such as Richard 
Rorty - that the individual is at the cost of the dissolution of the social13- we are presented with 
the exposure of society as the truth of relative power differentials and a hierarchical and even 
brutal social system. Thus, if we are to identify the social as the masking of the hegemonical 
structure of power, then the dissolution of the social in this instance is surely the concretisation of 
such demarcations, where powers are unmasked?  
 
For Honneth, the Nietzschean concept of freedom exposes the social as the place where 
individuals play out political power games, and therefore could be seen to be akin to a 
conservative Thatcherite society of individuals where everybody is theoretically enabled or even 
institutionally prompted to get power. What this risks for Honneth is not only that the truth of the 
social is a Nietzschean natural genealogy of power, but also and perhaps more realistically, that 
this concept of the social, revealed as truth, abstains from communicative or inter-subjective 
relations.  
 
However, this social is only a fearful brutal space if power itself is maintained as the property of 
anonymous forces. In this sense, the “truth of the social” exposes powers such as the “culture 
industry”, not so much as a dominant powerful force having maintained its power through it 
being unnameable, but as a system of productions that exist socially and publicly, and in which 
we participate. The critique of the Nietzschean “divisionary move” advanced by Honneth as the 
impossibility of intersubjectivity is read as such through the self-definition of the subject as a 
transgressive character. What Honneth does not take into account, therefore, are the politics of 
aestheticised transgression where transgression itself is an affirmative, communicable and public 
assertion and that is moreover inscribed as a cultural tradition, namely, the rhetoric of critique. 
Consequently it is apparent that Honneth overlooks the experience of cultural and social 
acknowledgment within such aesthetic identifications. Honneth’s consternation at the violence in 
the social, identified as being concretised by postmodernism’s Nietzschean parlance, is preserved 
through his maintenance of the anonymity of power structures such as the culture industry, where 
the place for such unprincipled acts of violence is kept hidden and is therefore kept powerful 
through his assumption that the aesthetic experience has no bearing upon real-life experiences. 
 
                                                     
13 Honneth claims that an aesthetic model of human freedom indebted to a Nietzschean theory of self-
creation underlies all “postmodern” theory, 167  
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In light of this, Honneth’s identification of the “culture industry” as an externalised manufacturer 
of our experiences of critical choice becomes questionable when we assess the problem of 
identification, which Honneth claims to be the root of our being fooled by it. In other words, if we 
are to follow the logic of the vacuum of identification then we would be unable to identify and 
determine the false aesthetic substitutes provided by the culture industry from what Honneth 
values as the “real-life” experience of labour.  
 
The various problems that I have drawn out in this critique motivate my interest in analysing the 
experiences of autonomy produced within, as Honneth calls it, the “culture industry” – or, more 
generally, something which I would take to be the sites where we encounter the meaning and the 
process of these identifications within and through the media, politics and entertainment. And it is 
here that I can recall my description of the post-tragic subjectivity as something that is not only 
relegated to the “culture industry” but that it also has a political use within general practices of 
power in society. What Honneth’s question of the social interestingly poses is the problem of the 
relationship between a culturally inscribed mediated biography and that of our sense of 
autobiography. This includes the problem of the politics of our experiences of autonomy that I 
will continue to situate, as Honneth does, in a critique of the orthodoxy of a postmodern 
antifoundationalism. 
 
Chapter Two will review theories similar to Honneth’s in their identification of the rhetoric of a 
Nietzschean-style active nihilism as a problem for inter-subjective politics. This includes the 
critical theory of Roger Shattuck and Jennifer L. Geddes in the text Evil After Postmodernism, 
which attempts to construct a vigilant political strategy vis-a-vis Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Departing from this I will critique responses to Michel Foucault’s poststructural 
politics of self-aestheticisation, which can be seen to reclaim and figure the post-tragic, self-
legislating and self-aestheticised subject as the archetype of a Californian-style liberalism. Both 
Chapters One and Two assert a problematic of politics and aesthetics when considering the status 
of this Nietzschean influenced subjectivity. In defining a territory of absolute finitude in language 
in the first chapter, this second, then moves to define the problems of the political aspects of this 
type of subjectivity by describing violence as contingent upon any critical theory - even those 
which demand a vigilance over it. Accordingly, these chapters stage the problem of the ubiquity 
of force and power in the political in that they show that the performances of decisions have a 
universalising force which are also predicated and contingent upon aesthetics identifications. It is 
here, once more, where we are face to face with the post-tragic heroic. 
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After having made a case for this discussion to be situated around a concept of absolute finitude 
and a confirmed aesthetic and political relation in Chapter One, and by establishing the 
immanence of violence to theories of subjective autonomy (whether it is their intention to control 
or resist violence) in Chapter Two, it is in the following chapters that I address the conditions of 
an aesthetico-political subjectivity in relation to the immanence of violence. From this position I 
discuss how this “doing and thinking” subject not only forces a political practice by rooting 
transcendentals as elements in language, but how in doing so this paradoxically destabilises and 
undermines a theory of the political. In this, the impossibility of exteriority can be read as 
undoing the political and only leaving the state of politics open. To consider this problem, 
Chapters Three and Four concern themselves with two strands of this argument around the 
immanence of violence as decision, weighted respectively towards both politics and aesthetics. 
Chapter Three looks to the problems of representing power in the social from Thomas Hobbes’ 
abstinence from figuring individual power to Stanley Fish’s avoidance of figuring a central 
ethical power, whilst Chapter Four considers the legitimacy and consequence of ethical rhetoric 
within the political centrally through Ernst Jünger’s heroic realism. Intrinsic to this is that both 
chapters contemplate a comparable quasi-transcendental identification of violence; from 
Hobbes’s recognition and fear of rhetoric as inevitably exposing the natural violent disposition of 
human nature, to Jünger’s inscription of metaphysical and violent rhetoric as the target for 
autonomy. 
 
First, in Chapter Three, I deal more centrally with the structure of a non-emancipatory politics in 
relation to social and hegemonical systems. This is done by examining Hobbes’s concept of the 
political, the social, subjectivity, law and consensus from his texts The Elements, On The Citizen 
and The Leviathan. Here, I make a closer examination of the rhetoric of individual authorities of 
power in terms of Hobbes’s sovereign who speaks the word of God, and the universal or truth of 
violence as immanent to language through rhetoric. This introduces the question of how we begin 
to organise a critique of what appears to be an established consensus of violence as decision 
(where violence is at once a necessary dominion over the social and understood as the truth at the 
root of the social), when any attempt to think through or rationalise violence produces its double, 
in that we are bound to a contingency within the same political rhetoric.  
 
I continue to analyse Hobbes’s work on the problem of the use of rhetoric, where the natural 
violence of the pre-political, pre-social contract is immanent to the art of rhetorical re-description. 
Here I take up Hobbes’s identification of pluralism as producing a political state of “Perpetual 
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War”, and his solution - that of the overriding authority of the sovereign. Significant to this is that 
Hobbes acknowledges dominion as a necessity. However, it is also important that although 
Hobbes’s theory has no emancipatory model in mind, he can be seen to situate a humanism where 
we see an admittance of the necessity of rhetoric and the mastery of language as central to the 
demonstration of truth and the practice of law.  
 
Following this, I look to Stanley Fish’s ideology based pragmatism upon which I construct a 
critique of inter-subjectivity, consensus and power as and within representation. Here I examine 
the way the nightmare of perpetual war for Hobbes is the moment of a democratic success for 
Fish. This also includes another comparative study of interpretative and hegemonical practices in 
relation to abstract forms of language bringing the question of politics back to a question of 
aesthetics. This takes the form of a reading between Ernesto Laclau’s theory of 
“unrepresentability”, Fish’s theory of “general iterability” (from Derrida) and this also prompts a 
critique of Fish’s identification of an original and unprincipled law as metaphor without object as 
reproducing similar quasi-transcendental questions of immanence as shown by Hobbes. 
 
Chapter Four is concerned finally with the relationship between aesthetics and agency. This 
chapter takes up my ongoing concerns of philosophy’s relation to a language of violence by 
looking to how the aesthetics of violence as an everyday or neutral territory is written as the locus 
for freedom. As such, crucial to this chapter is an analysis of the political legitimacy of the 
rhetoric of realism and also an inquiry as to the tenability of philosophical theories to political 
practices. The narratives in this chapter understand violence as an empty space, but clearly we 
can see that it is a space that is filled with symbolic figures which are predicated upon political 
practices. In Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, Ernst Jünger’s literature and Terence Malick’s film-
making, the territory of the natural or the everyday as the aestheticised notion of neutrality, is 
collapsed with an aestheticised conception of violence, that in turn acts as grounds for the 
autonomous experience. This also picks up on Cavell’s “everyday romanticism” from Chapter 
One and levels Romantic philosophy once more as a linguistic genre.  
 
Consequently, in this final chapter I question the status of violence demonstrated by different 
modes of realism to be the foundation for subjective decision. First, in Jünger’s political 
literature, where violence features as the technology of war, and secondly, in Malick’s war film, 
where nature’s ubiquitous power takes on the properties of the ethical experience. Here, I take up 
the question of the hierarchical relation of force and rhetoric formulated in Chapter Three, by 
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means of a practical criticism of the uses of language in narratives that mingle philosophy, 
politics and literature. In looking to Jünger and Malick’s manipulation of an aesthetics of violence 
as an ambiguous and ubiquitous terrain, I analyse the politics of the production and authorship of 
these narratives and think through how the rhetoric of freedom is relative to political practices. 
From this I consider the consequences of the forces of such demonstrations in order to discuss the 
differences between an aesthetics of violence as foundational to experience and an experience of 
an aesthetics of violence under the conditions of total representability. In other words, does an 
identification of violence as decision under total representability concretise power as a procedural 
and mechanistic practice? Do the idealising forces inherent in the rhetoric of violence as decision, 
seen here in the post-tragic subject, insinuate a categorical force that antagonises any possibility 
for a local and temporal critique of violence? Such questions are underscored when as my 
previous arguments move away from a theory of subjectivity that seeks freedom as being free 
from representation it is here in the final chapter that I look to the productions of autonomy 
within language without strategic fissures between form and content or the real and the 
representational. It is through this analysis that I ask if these narratives of violence re-invite the 
essential transcendental problem around violence and language that Heidegger originally poses. 
 
This dual analysis covered in the final two chapters repeats the problem that this post-tragic 
subject entertains for politics, philosophy and critical theory. In conclusion I return to examine 
this subject contingently, in narratives of epic action and subjective violence as power, 
considering violence as contingent to rhetorical practices and how these practices are understood 
intersubjectively. From here I take up Fish’s practice of theory as ideology once more by 
returning to the problems of the violent force of rationalism identified in the act of theorising, 
taking up criticisms leveled at relativism as either producing the brutality of “perpetual war” or 
settling for the banality of the status quo of a non-emancipatory politics.  
 
This final comparative analysis tests the rhetoric of theorising as something that retains and 
produces emancipatory ideals without transcendental identifications or guarantees. This leads me 
to further critique the political differences between a philosophy of finitude and a pragmatics of 
absolute finitude. Here, I analyse how language and justice are understood within the production 
of the post-tragic subject. This re-establishes a final ethical and political question in relation to 
processes of power and negotiations of language where, having agreed upon the convergence of 
aesthetics and politics, or thought and language, we are left finally with questions of their 
separation and, duly, the shadow of metaphysics, always written as a problem of power. 
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1 The Heroic:  
Narratives of tragic and non-tragic contingency,  
Hegel, Nietzsche and Cavell 
 
 
Late Romantics still thought that one must tell the story of global decline in terms of 
larger than life heroic narrative, while modernism asserted the metaphysical potential of 
the most common and vulgar bits of our daily experience - and perhaps, postmodernism 
inverts modernism: one returns to big mythical themes, but they are deprived of their 
cosmic resonance and treated like common fragments to be manipulated; in short, in 
modernism we have fragments of common daily life expressing global metaphysical 
vision, while in postmodernism we have larger-than-life figures treated as fragments of 
common life.14 
     Slavoj Zizek 




1. Oedipus the King: Two Figures for Knowledge 
 
The theme of subjective autonomy as being defined by and in relation to an ethical order can be 
seen to be consistent within the tragic genre. This relationship is most particularly put into 
question in Sophocles’ play, Oedipus the King where we can clearly see that Oedipus doesn’t 
fulfill the criteria for the classical tragic-heroic - he doesn’t die. Oedipus, therefore, doesn’t take 
on the heroic responsibility of his actions, neither does he accept the death fate of the hero, the 
absolute alignment with the order of the gods. Despite and because of this impossibility of a 
heroic death Oedipus’s plight can be seen to definitively underscore the tragic experience, and we 
could even say that the character of Oedipus characterises tragedy as we know it; autonomy 
expressed as the recognition of our own limits; the “double tragedy” of modern man.  
 
However, what is also crucial to Oedipus’s immortality and also to this chapter is to pay attention 
to the form that this autonomy takes. Oedipus’s moment of refusing a classical tragic-heroic 
status and becoming “Oedipus” is lived out in the act and image of the violence of his self-
blinding, a defiantly self-motivated self-perpetuated act against the gods.15 Considering this it 
14 Slavoj Zizek, Did Someone Say Totalitarianism? Verso, 2001, 29. 
15 The classical heroic subject achieves absolute autonomy by means of a “self-recognition” that is lived out 
in the initial process of “tasks” and a final acceptance to willingly meet his/her own death, in order to 
become “as one with the higher order of the law. The classical heroic narrative describes the heroic as a 
would seem that the elevated status of a tragic Oedipus is contradicted somewhat by the violent 
and self-asserted means of his perpetual existence. In other words, a theory of Oedipus as tragic 
differs from an understanding of his life as a lived experience. This calls into question first, the 
means by which we identify something or someone as tragic, and second, how this identification 
of the tragic is linked to an experience and expression of autonomy. Because of this, the tragedy 
of Oedipus introduces two lines of related questions, one centred on Oedipus’s immortality and 
the other upon his moment of self-mutilation. I ask later how these two understandings and 




A result of Oedipus’s decision to live, or more accurately his refusal to die, is that we are faced 
with a theory of tragedy of the impossibility of the tragic death. Here, Oedipus’s tragic state is not 
so much described within the text, but results from his story never ending. His immortality equals 
tragedy. Oedipus fails to live up to the tragic-heroic narrative and as such is confined to Earth and 
to the realms of a “lack” of knowledge, never knowing the absolute knowledge of the gods. His 
autonomy read as self-recognition is only performed through the experience of a momentary 
glimpse of self-knowledge. Oedipus’s immortality performs a tragic relationship with the ethical 
order, and is equated with an understanding of his “true self”, something that he will always be 
divorced from. Oedipus is only able to act when he is “blind” - when he is unable to differentiate 
between subjective action and the will of the gods. In his violent moment Oedipus recognises 
himself as a tool of the gods and objectivises himself within the narrative realising that that 
particular destiny was his alone and that he is that destiny. This is the recognition of himself as 
the other becoming the self, culminated in the cry, “I am Oedipus!”  
                                                                                                                                                              
symbol of power and proactive force, and this invariably occupies a typical structure, wherein the hero is 
ultimately guided by the supreme other. More often than not the story consists of a man being set a task by 
a King, whereupon there is a monster that he must vanquish. The gods or a wise man/woman would assist. 
Ultimately, the hero would come close to loosing his life and then, of course, wins, to return to said 
kingdom to marry the daughter of the King. 
Significantly, the classical hero, in the stories of Hercules or Agamemnon for example, takes on the 
responsibility of his actions, bearing the weight of all the obstacles the gods put upon him whilst also 
bearing the responsibility of the consequences of his actions. However, the hero does not necessarily live 
his own life, moreover he is set on the path by the gods and then in circumstances which are offered to him, 
has the potential to act heroically. Importantly, the heroes are not made heroic by wavering from this set 
path, they are made heroic by accepting it as their own. In Lectures on the Philosophy of History, London, 
1902, Hegel identifies the force of the great tragic characters in history in their having “no choice”; they are 
what they will accomplish from their birth on. In other words, their life accomplishes their destiny. The 
classical heroic narrative concerns itself more with the proceedings of the events of the heroic quest and it 
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In this way we can see that Oedipus models for the philosophical subject, in a Hegelian sense and 
this crucially demarcates Oedipus the King as the philosophical-metaphysical narrative. It is the 
work of subjective knowledge as a tragic enterprise. However, such a dislocating move that is 
intrinsic to the experience of self-knowledge is not only played out within the text but ultimately 
and most significantly is expressed about the text. The play operates from a position of 
knowledge where the audience is always aware of Oedipus’s condition of “not-knowing”. 
Oedipus’s tragedy is doubled or even made actual or consequential from our distanciated space (a 
theatre audience sitting in “the gods” if you like) where we can personally draw upon, and 
identify with Oedipus as the tragic figure, the figure of desire coupled with the awful reality of 
the impossibility of finitude. Hegel describes this anterior position of knowledge as a position that 
is articulated by and as “world history”: 
 
World History occupies a higher ground than that on which morality has properly its 
position, which is personal character and the conscience of individuals. […] Moral claims 
which are irrelevant must not be brought into collision with the world historical deeds 
and their accomplishment. The litany of private virtues - modesty, humility, philanthropy, 
and forbearance – must not be raised against them.16  
 
Hegel distinctly separates moral practices of knowledge from the writing of history as the ethical 
task of a path to absolute knowledge, where self-recognition or subjective autonomy is absolutely 
relative to a transcendental conception of history. Theorising the condition of Man as the writing 
of history (or even Man’s autobiography), for Hegel, is a tragic account of knowledge as both a 
failed and a desiring task. This is conceived as such in that Man’s pre-destination to language is 
always expressed as a desire for an “essential” knowledge, but paradoxically it is the very thing 
that keeps it at bay due to the inherently superficial quality of writing. In this, the “will to 
knowledge” – Man’s essential task - is a tragic narrative because it demands the understanding of 
a split self-consciousness; first a recognition of the superficial nature of language, whilst another 
consciousness of the necessity of language as a practice of knowledge, in that we live out a 
concrete investment in the application of it.  
 
Crucial to this tragic account of knowledge is that the application of language as the “will to 
knowledge” is understood as a meta-discourse, a thematised and elevated space of autonomy 
power and authority from which history is written. More to the point, we can see that this meta-
                                                                                                                                                              
is the passage of the action that offers up the tragic collision of the known world (what the hero does) and 
that of the unknown world (what is demanded of him). 
16 GWF. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, London 1902, 34 
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discourse operates as discourse, most significantly because Hegel’s theory of history 
characterises a rhetoric of self-recognition and goes on to write itself as its own tragic genre. 
Autonomy after Oedipus therefore no longer operates mechanistically towards death, but more on 
its contingency to violence. As a result, the identification of decision is made resolutely violent 
because the transcendental and foundational character of decision is not in opposition to its 
aesthetic, thematic and discursive dimension. Bearing this in mind, it is important to understand 
how autonomy is understood and experienced in relation to a tragic recognition of (in)finitude. 
Consequently, I consider the tenability of this contingency in philosophical discourse, where it 
would seem that the tragedy of knowledge is the basic and underlying condition for knowledge.  
 
Oedipus’s “doubly tragic” moment (in that he doesn’t die) is seen in the sequel Oedipus at 
Collonnus. What we see instead of a tragic subject is a move to farce, and we can see clearly that 
Oedipus’s character confounds the audience by “refusing” to fulfill the prophecy itself written in 
the tradition of the classical heroic. What type of hero is produced is one that stands outside of a 
typical classical tragic-heroism. The hero lives, is alienated, stupid, and even comic. 
Consequently, in the sequel, where the story catches up with Oedipus later, he has become unable 
to move, quite literally through his blindness, and is also stunted in terms of action as the gods 
have forsaken him. 
 
Oedipus is therefore sustained as “immortal human”; a tragic figure who articulates the 
philosophical experience in that he is humanity in general - a universal figure who demonstrates 
on the one hand our precarious existence and on the other hand the facticity of our immortality. In 
this sense, Oedipus draws attention to our fragility in the face of our own self-knowledge as the 
“ubiquitous other” and in terms of this we see that the problem of knowledge is understood as not 
exactly a question of the identification of limits that we recognise say between the ethical order 
and the subject, but instead as self-recognition. Consequently, in Oedipus the King tragic 
autonomy is lived out as recognition; a knowledge of “not knowing”. Here, autonomy is written 
as doubt and expressed as violence, where one lives to experience the terrible consequences of 
decision, and death is situated in a territory of impossible exteriority. However, it is only from 
this vantage-point, from this “death-space”, that we are privy to the tragedy par excellence; the 
tragic impossibility of the tragic. In allowing ourselves this “impossible” position outside the text 




Recognising the tragic 
The unavailability of the tragic-heroic or the heroic death means that to define the tragic moment 
of Oedipus we are asked to define ourselves as tragic. We are compelled to not only establish a 
bird’s-eye view of Oedipus’s tragedy but also to narrate our task of self-knowledge as 
conditioned upon the same plight, in as much as “we are Oedipus”. Consequently, we can identify 
ourselves as the writers of humanity’s task of knowledge, as philosophical autobiographers who 
can recognise this “tragedy of tragedy”.  
 
However, as I have argued, and as we shall see further, what is clearly problematised is the 
possibility of granting this meta-discourse, or, the privileged position of self-recognition as 
exteriority. Crucially, tragic self-recognition demands the figuring of Oedipus as representative of 
the practice and the consequence of knowledge. This demand for self-knowledge and a 
predilection for a discourse of exteriority clarifies the Hegelian identification of the tragic as a 
rhetoric of metaphysics. What’s more, the impossibility of a critical space over and above the text 
equally describes another practice and application of knowledge; another discourse of exteriority. 
From this we could ask why it is necessary or even helpful to make the “task of knowledge” such 
a tragic labour around the demand for this god-like position of exteriority. I ask this because what 
remains after recognising Oedipus as a tragic figure is another Oedipus. This is the figure of 
Oedipus as an actor, and as a speaker; essentially someone who applies his own knowledge. As 
such, although I have argued that Oedipus’s transcendental claim is evacuated, in actuality what 
is recovered is the legitimacy and consequence of his earthly autonomy, no matter how banal or 
ridiculous it may be. 
  
Oedipus’s refusal to die binds him very much to the world and that in his moment of self-
recognition Oedipus is the perpetrator of justice, not a god-like justice of death, but an earthly 
justice of violence. What this opens up is an examination of a non-tragic conception of 
immortality based around the facticity of his existence and the success of meaning without a 
conception of the tragic. This is current throughout the play and is seen not only in Oedipus’s 
defiant refusal of the gods’ gift of self-knowledge but also in that he already has the use of his 
knowledge - he solves the riddle of the Sphinx and manages to successfully rule a kingdom.  
 
Oedipus’s ultimate decision to act “with knowledge” can be seen in the final scene of the play 
where Oedipus blinds himself. A palace messenger recounts the scene: 
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He rips off her brooches, the long gold pins holding her robes - and lifting them, looking 
straight up into the points, he digs them down the sockets of his eyes, crying, “You, 
you’ll see no more the pain I suffered, all the pain I caused! Too long you looked on the 
ones you never should have seen, blind to the ones you longed to see, to know! Blind 
from this hour on! Blind in the darkness- Blind!”17  
 
The momentous act, as portrayed by the messenger, seems to concern itself with the tragedy of 
Oedipus’s circumstance. However, this tragedy is distinctly human. It does not deal with the 
world of the gods, but describes a griping bitterness and complaining mingled with a selfish 
feeling of being forsaken and, of course, the absolute horror of the act itself. Instead of following 
the orthodoxy of the classical maxim of the heroic, whereby it is “better to die than to lose one’s 




Autonomy without suicide 
Oedipus actively rejects the possibility of heroic death out of selfishness. Even in life he looks 
upon his “destiny” with a sense of selfish injustice. Oedipus does not shoulder the responsibility 
for his actions as he now begrudgingly acknowledges himself as “fused” with destiny, always 
within the order of the gods’ whims. He is alienated from the gods, as he is no longer the tool for 
their amusement; alienated from the order of the (classical) heroic genre in his defiant act against 
the gods, and alienated from society as a stumbling blind freak.  
 
So, already it is clear that Oedipus’s violent action of self-mutilation and the general banalities of 
his personality are not the typical characteristics of the tragic-heroic subject. In addition to this 
Oedipus’s actions never move beyond the narrative space. By this I mean that although we see 
evidence of the gods on earth, as it were, we are never privy to Oedipus’s journey to the 
underworld of Hades and his redemption is played out in his self-mutilation. As such, in the end 
Hades is a place where Oedipus can still freely choose not to go. This territory of death in 
Oedipus the King is an awful place, but it hasn’t the mark of inevitability. Oedipus already knows 
what is waiting for him in Hades, and it is this knowledge that determines his actions.  
 
                                                     
17Sophocles, “Oedipus the King”, in Three Theban Plays, trans. Robert Eagles. Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Classics, 1984, 237, verses 1402-09. 
18 For an account of Oedipus’s self-interest; from tragedy to farce, see Alenka Zupanic’s  Ethics of the Real, 
Kant, Lacan, Verso, 2000, 175-181 
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Oedipus is as “real” as the will of the gods and the gods are as much in “existence” as Oedipus. It 
is only in his momentary violent refusal where we see Oedipus make differentiations - a violent 
separation between himself and the ethical order - only to demarcate his own actions as another 
system of justice. Here, Oedipus’s self-blinding could be likened to the extreme action and 
defiance only a god could muster - that in violence his acts are paralleled with a transcendental 
authority, but are absolutely motivated by earthly and selfish concerns. Consequently, in light of 
this relationship between the gods and Oedipus, the presence of an objective justice is 
undermined. In this we can see that his final cry – “I am Oedipus”, is a mark of subjectivity, born 
out of self-pity and constitutive of his self-determination. In his violent moment of autonomy 
Oedipus separates himself from the gods, whilst simultaneously duplicating their actions on earth 
by showing the upper reaches of autonomy not as a death that aims beyond the narrative, but as 
violence expressed within it. In other words, death is the productive autonomous moment for the 
tragic-heroic, whereas, in the anti-heroic narrative of Oedipus, violence is autonomy without 
suicide. 
 
Oedipus, as these two figures of knowledge, is discussed in Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe’s text 
“Oedipus as Figure” where he draws upon Oedipus as both a subject who desires and uses 
knowledge. By looking to Hegel’s dialectics and Ernst Jünger’s thematising of the worker,19 
Lacoue-Labarthe asserts that the identification of Oedipus as figure “reveals the truth of the 
mythico-political use of the figure of Oedipus.”20 Crucially, this is understood regarding a 
diversity of applications, moving through Schlegel to Hegel, Freud, Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
However, I will concentrate first on Lacoue-Labarthe’s response to Hegel’s tragic conception of 
Oedipus as figure, where, citing the Philosophy of History, Lacoue-Labarthe writes:  
 
Hegel sets out to demonstrate how the subject or Spirit gradually emerges, moment by 
moment, from its non-knowledge (ignorance, superstition, magic, confused religions and 
all the forms of the non-knowledge of the self), wrests itself away from or escapes the 
materiality that submerges it, gradually wins its own essence (which is to be knowledge, 
intellection - and self knowledge) by freeing itself from its sensory and corporeal 
servitude, and succeeds in accomplishing and realizing itself as such.21  
 
                                                     
19 Ernst Jünger will be discussed at grater length in Chapter Four. For now, it is sufficient to note that 
Jünger’s notion of the subject translates the philosophical pre-occupation with self-knowledge to the 
facility to use one’s knowledge.  
20 Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Oedipus as Figure,” Radical Philosophy, No.118, March April, 2003, 17 
21 Ibid.,15 
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Lacoue-Labarthe describes how Oedipus is, for Hegel, the figure of the philosopher and that 
essentially this practice of knowledge is tragic. It is a path to essence, the realisation of absolute 
knowledge and as such self-consciousness. As we have seen in Oedipus the King, it is the self-
conscious recognition of the impossibility of absolute knowledge that characterises thinking as 
tragic. However, as I have written above and still following Lacoue-Labarthe we can also see a 
non-tragic Oedipus written through the work of both Heidegger and Nietzsche. This is the 
Promethean Oedipus, the subject whose central task is the forgetting of self-consciousness and 
the move to mastery. Lacoue-Labarthe writes regarding Nietzsche: “Perhaps it is this that allows 
Oedipus to go on representing - beyond or beneath the way consciousness relates to itself through 
self presence, or beyond self identity - a desire to know of which consciousness knows nothing, 
and of which it can know nothing.”22 This is Oedipus as the figure of a very different form of 
knowledge - a practice that does not organise itself around the immanence of self-consciousness 
as death, but significantly, however, it is a practice that is characterised by an immanent 
violence. 
 
In a response to Heidegger’s work on Oedipus (in The Introduction to Metaphysics), Lacoue-
Labarthe describes how the figure of Oedipus is based around a passion for knowledge: 
 
The story of Oedipus does not simply symbolise or (re)present the destiny of aletheia, or 
the unveiling of being (in which case, the West is more Oedipal then ever); because his 
determination is so savage, Oedipus is the figure of the Greek Dasein to the extent that it 
embodies the basic and inaugural “passion” of the West; the passion for knowledge.23  
 
He continues:  
 
Oedipus has nothing to do with the subject (self-consciousness), or in other words with 
knowledge (theory) as subject; but it has everything to do with knowledge as techne, and 
that is the starting point for the whole of Western metaphysics. And that is why modern 
technology is the Oedipal realisation of the metaphysical.24 
 
Crucially, this describes something almost like a Nietzschean-style rule of self-preservation, a 
Promethean refusal of anything outside of the self or even that there is only the self and that this 
is only made up of desire and self-sustained knowledge. This is a question of how Oedipus’s 
                                                     
22 Ibid.,15 
23 Ibid., 17 
24 Ibid. For Jünger, the use of knowledge is ideologically aimed towards encountering the “facelessness” of 
knowledge: concretised as a modern, violent and ambivalent technology. The aesthetics of technology take 
centre stage in Jünger’s political literature as the metaphysical substitute 
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immortality is related to his earthly and self-interested concerns - a man without God. And if, and 
how, this Nietzschean-style subject after the tragic, or without self-recognition, re-invites the 
tragic limits that Oedipus represents as “last philosopher.”  
 
Crucial to this chapter and returning to the path set down by Lacoue-Labarthe, it is the use, techné 
and application of the figures of knowledge that I will continue to focus upon. Here I turn to the 
of problem of how and upon what terms political activity begins after the exhaustion of tragic 
theory. Having traced the figure of Oedipus as moving through Hegel and Nietzsche and thus 
figuring both a tragic and a non-tragic identification of knowledge, I would like to rehearse this 
argument by looking at theories that attempt to overcome the philosophical demand for self-
consciousness as an absolute demarcation of autonomy, in particular the work of Stanley Cavell. 
Here I discuss the following issues: first, I examine Cavell’s attempts to overcome the demand for 
a metaphysical identification as a symptom of self-consciousness whilst persisting with a notion 
of self-consciousness as autonomy. The means by which a recognition of “no-knowledge” or 
“undecidability” is made available to us is pertinent to this, especially when thinking through the 
act of philosophising, for which a notion of subjective knowledge and finitude is crucial. In the 
following argument I ask, through a reading of Cavell’s concept of self-consciousness without 
philosophical scepticism, if these apparently mutual figures of self-consciousness and 
metaphysics can be pulled apart.  
 
After examining the case between philosophy and self-consciousness, as an aesthetics of 
ambiguity, the third part of this chapter “Undoing the Tragic” looks to the identification of 
“philosophy as genre” or the “end of philosophy” as the tragic philosophical narrative. In this 
critique of a discourse about and upon language I again look to Cavell’s self-conscious narrative 
of the death of philosophy, where it would seem that we still are asked to believe in a 
differentiation between what we do know and what we don’t. Contra Cavell I argue that the 
means by which to access what we don’t know are constantly made available to us and by us and, 
as such, require a procedure of interpretative analysis.  
 
Following this logic I argue that the tragic philosophical narrative remains in the territory of 
genre because the tragic recognition of its death is not only available to us as a self-conscious 
moment of recognition of it as a universal fact, but only as a theory. What follows in the fourth 
and final section of this chapter entitled, “Practices of Return” is an inquiry into the nature of 
 31
practices which seem to forget the philosophical task which proposes a further examination of 
practices of the post-tragic subject under a pluralist condition. 
 
By concentrating upon the non-tragic genre such as it is laid out above, it does not simply follow 
that this critique seeks redemption in violence. Indeed, this thesis as a whole is not looking for 
redemption per se, but, more to the point, this chapter in particular tries to demonstrate the 
limitations of theories that substantiate a complaint about “bad Nietzscheanism” (which I am 
reading as the rhetoric of active nihilism) at work in contemporary culture and which then go on 
to ignore it in favour of an aesthetics of the tragic. As I have argued, both heroic realism and the 
tragic operate around violence and, I could write an experience of one onto or within the other in 
many areas. However, a self-conscious theory of active nihilism brings violence into a pragmatic 
area that manages to articulate its “metaphysical” aspect as a common or everyday experience, 




2. Claiming the Tragic 
 
Knowledge as tragic circumstance 
Stanley Cavell’s philosophy witnesses the act of philosophising as a tragic genre in that he is 
predominantly concerned with the unavailability of being able to “philosophise”, since the 
identification of anything concretely defined as being either reality or existence that is central to 
the philosophical task is no longer a possibility. It is in this de-realisation that he recognises the 
history of scepticism to be a romantic history of the subject and violence. Crucial to Cavell’s 
theory (which attempts to move past the problems of violence as decision and vice-versa in 
scepticism) is that this very crisis of decision or aporia is translated and concretised in Cavell’s 
work as the identification for subjective decision.  
 
Cavell makes no apparent difference between the writing of philosophy and the writing of 
narratives, where the work of philosophy is identified as “autobiography”. In The Claim of 
Reason he describes the experience of choice making through Shakespearean tragedies such as 
Othello and King Lear and also in autobiographical-style fictions that are interwoven through, 
and as, his philosophical arguments. It is in the genre of tragedy that Cavell identifies a public 
and social contingency through philosophical allegories, believing that “tragedy is the story and 
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study of the failure of acknowledgement”, and, “the form of tragedy is the public form of the life 
of scepticism with respect to other minds.”25 In this we can see clearly that Cavell delineates a 
collapse between the tragic narrative content of the genre and understands the work of philosophy 
to be a self-consciously tragic pursuit. Hence, the practice of knowledge is essentially a tragic 
affair and tragedy as a genre gives life and consequence to the work of scepticism. 
 
Cavell’s romantic philosophy identifies a “suffering” of the human in the face of the horror as the 
success of scepticism’s inscription of the other. It is by understanding that we suffer in aporia that 
Cavell inscribes philosophy and tragedy as a universal condition, in as much as we see Cavell’s 
attempt to recognise tragedy as “an epistemological problem, or the outcome of the problem of 
knowledge - of the dominance of modern philosophical thought by it.”26 For Cavell, the act of 
writing or inscribing the other in an aesthetics of horror, in culture in general, attests to the true 
(metaphysical) horror of not being able to choose, or not being able to explain or understand 
adequately the specifics or “reason” of a situation. By identifying the history of scepticism as a 
tragic narrative Cavell looks to the opening up or even the closing down between the public and 
private performance of this “philosophical” genre as means by which one experiences self-
recognition and where philosophy as a self conscious allegory of itself can constantly test its 
limitations in a social forum. Tragedy for Cavell, therefore urges individual responsibility and 
individual culpability without inscribing the universal subject, or requiring a foundational ethic. 
 
Already there can be seen to be a problem of identification within Cavell’s theory, which in turn 
can be seen to re-invite a typically philosophical line of questioning. This is available in Cavell’s 
genre distinction of philosophy identified as a “fragmentary narrative” dislocated from its central 
“philosophical” task of self-immanence. Cavell asserts this by replacing an aesthetics of death 
and finitude with an aesthetics of ambiguity - a plane between meaning and meaninglessness - as 
an indicator of a subjective recognition of self-doubt. What arises from this is the problem that 
the “philosophical”, sceptical or metaphysical character that Cavell attempts to overcome is 
retained in Cavell’s theory, first through the very process of this identification or aestheticisation 
and, second, through his loyalty and investment to the task of self-knowledge.  
 
Cavell transports his philosophical theory to the realm of the everyday, and it is in this realm of 
“mediocrity” that we are to experience self-recognition in and as moments of ambiguity, namely, 
                                                     
25 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy, Clarendon Press, 1979 
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in instances when we think we are right but then we discover we are in fact wrong. By looking to 
daily or even mundane situations he writes of instances of how we experience “crisis” in doubt as 
a moment of self-consciousness within the uses of language. This could take the form of 
misunderstandings, or when someone is late for a meeting or such like. In this moment of anxiety 
Cavell articulates an existential philosophical reflection on the subject who is faced with a 
recognisable void of recognitions, understandings, communications and agreements. Instead of 
maybe being frustrated or just merely bored, Cavell organises moments like this as instances of 
self-consciousness that approach us from a mystical mix of circumstances. In these banal 
“flashes” that are beyond our control, Cavell allows us a moment in which to experience 
autonomy. 
 
Following this it is then important to ask if a theory of the tragic based in an aesthetics of 
aporetics solves the problem of thinking within an absolute finitude of language, or without the 
knowledge of transcendental guarantees, and puts into question subjective identifications of 
freedom, judgment or autonomy with and as violence. 
 
 
Everyday philosophising as a tragic genre 
Cavell recognises the history of scepticism understood in terms of idealistic investments in the 
face of ones limits as a romantic allegory:  
 
To speak of our subjectivity as the route back to our convictions in reality is to speak of 
romanticism. Perhaps romanticism can be understood as the natural struggle between the 
representation and the acknowledgment of our subjectivity (between the acting out and 
the facing off of ourselves, as psychoanalysts would more or less say). Hence Kant, and 
Hegel; hence Blake secreting the world he believes in; hence Wordsworth competing 
with the history of poetry by writing himself back into the world. A century later 
Heidegger is investigating Being. By investigating Dasein (because it is in Dasein that 
Being shows up best, namely as questionable), and Wittgenstein investigates the world 
(“the possibilities of phenomena”) by investigating what we say, what we are inclined to 
say, that pictures of phenomena are, in order to invest the world from our possessions so 
that we may possess it again.27  
 
Cavell’s philosophy attempts to look to the behavioural, interpretative and linguistic aspects of 
understanding and is developed through his work on Austin and Wittgenstein, shown in where he 
recognises a problem with philosophy to be that it asks questions about “whether we know things 
                                                                                                                                                              
26 Ibid., 482 
27 Ibid., 22 
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can exist, are real, are actually there, not to ask if we know what they are.”28 He associates this 
traditional philosophical question of the “real” and of “essence” as being specific to violence. 
Cavell uses an example of a bird sitting in a tree at the end of a garden, where, in order to 
establish the bird’s true existence, i.e., that it is a real bird, not a dead bird and not a stuffed bird, 
the philosopher is compelled, at some point, to pierce the bird’s flesh in order to discover the 
truth. Here, the violence of scepticism is deliberated as a necessity to pro-active action as the 
moment of this discovery rests upon a violent act. Cavell’s description of this violence of the 
desire for knowledge (specifically around essence) can be seen to be absolutely contingent upon 
an “everyday experience.” Cavell’s brand of philosophy is not undertaken in some “dusty 
library”; instead, the site for this question of “essence” is situated in a place that we all know, the 
normalised territories of our everyday lives. Importantly, Cavell identifies scepticism’s tragic 
position in relation to this, that philosophy’s idealism is always identified in terror, and this terror 
approaches us in the most banal of circumstances - in fact whenever we choose to think of 
essentialising philosophical questions. It is here that Cavell recognises the danger of such a 
scepticism, that is, a scepticism that associates finitude or transcendence with knowledge. Instead, 
as we have seen, Cavell acknowledges a quasi-transcendental uncertainty as contingent upon the 
autonomous experience, wherein the experience of this crisis of knowledge is in itself knowledge. 
Quite clearly we can see that although Cavell evacuates the mechanistic problems of scepticism 
the same procedural thinking lies in his conception of “crisis as autonomy”. In this we are left 
wondering about the availability of knowing or identifying crisis upon the same terms as we 
would know death – as a rhetorical and concrete theme of freedom.  
 
 
The aesthetics of ambiguity 
In dealing with the problem of scepticism, Cavell attempts to incorporate the (philosophical) 
limits of knowledge into an everyday experience of the effects of “criteria”; the information we 
have ready from which to assert judgments where “learning when it is and is not competent to say 
“I (we) just don’t know”, is every bit as much of a condition of my competence as a knower as 
learning to say and when to retract “I am certain.””29 In this Cavell attempts to avoid the 
requirements for absolute autonomy inherent in philosophical idealism and instead hopes to 
understand the recognition of not knowing as a moment of recognition offered by language within 
a daily experience. In this way, Cavell attempts to surpass the problems of passive or active 
                                                     
28 Ibid., 53 
29 Ibid., 60 
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identifications with the other by incorporating the other within decision making. However, this 
“knowing and not knowing” turns out to be identified as a fluctuation between concepts of 
passivity and activity where, in the experiential plane in between these two, we experience the 
angst of possible impossibilities (the freedom to think) and impossible possibilities (the thinking 
of freedom). 
 
Rehearsing this argument it can be seen that Cavell’s theory, which attempts to assert an 
understanding of the ambiguity of decision without the fixity or assurance of a Categorical 
Imperative, produces images that deal precisely in an aesthetics of ambiguity. As a result Cavell 
does not analyse the system of these identifications, but produces other identifications of 
“meaning”. Thus, “ambiguity” as meaningfulness is seeded in one’s identification as being 
between, or; the combination of antithesis: between passive and active tropes of action; in a 
combination of reason and unreason; rationality and idealism; scepticism and desire, and, perhaps 
more specific to Cavell, the positive aspects of knowledge (logic or rationale), evidenced through 
criteria, and the limits of the knowledge (doubt) exhibited in the lack of appropriate criteria.  
 
To examine the way in which Cavell grounds such antithesis, I will look to one of Cavell’s many 
examples: In The Claim of Reason, Cavell tells a story of a robot that is constructed by a scientist-
friend.30 Upon his first visit Cavell is surprised to acknowledge that the robot is indeed a robot as 
it is dressed in clothes which obscure its image from direct view and it has been programmed 
with basic human characteristics such as the ability to sit, walk and to hold a cigarette. Cavell’s 
scientist - craftsperson friend is delighted to open up the crude machine twisting a small pen-knife 
into its side to demonstrate the robots true mechanical workings, thus proving its status. (Already 
here, Cavell has a sneaking desire not just to look into the robot’s body but into its head.) After a 
number of visits the robot becomes increasingly life-like, now with an altogether more relaxed 
manner and smoking cigarettes. Upon subsequent visits the scientist uses the penknife to open up 
the robot to display more abundantly human features, such as fleshly organs, skin, and bone. 
However, the scientist has yet to allow the robot to experience pain. Again Cavell returns and the 
scientist is even more enraptured by his project, and, upon reintroducing Cavell to the robot he 
moves towards the robot with the penknife. With this the robot recoils in fear, saying, “No more. 
It hurts. It hurts too much. I’m sick of being a human guinea pig, I mean a guinea pig human.”31 
Cavell is shocked into inaction. He cannot decide what to do. The moment of indecision is forced 
                                                     
30 Ibid., 403- 408 
31 Ibid., 405 
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upon him. He is being asked to intervene in a situation he should (apparently) know full well to 
be only a scientific experiment. However, Cavell is challenged directly by his own doubt and 
uncertainty, where logic tells him that the subject is a robot, and belief tells him that in this 
display of pain and suffering that this robot is a subject. 
 
Although Cavell attempts to make both “knowing” and “not knowing” synonymous with any 
everyday judgment where we access these apparatuses, “not knowing” still has the philosophical 
charge of the other. Perhaps too quickly, “no appropriate criteria” becomes no criteria at all, 
almost as if one cannot settle for second best despite the knowledge that one is not aware of the 
“best case”. This “best case” scenario for judgement acts as the “beyond” or the limits of 
language, despite being premised upon methods of interpretation, identification and assessment. It 
goes beyond such contingencies because it also champions a subjective rationale.  
 
With respect to other minds we might say that we have to “remember” the possibility of 
scepticism, e.g., that we have not permitted ourselves a best case, that we do not know 
but that we may at any place, be singled out; hence that, so far as we know, we are not. 
Our position is not, as far as we know, the best. - But mightn’t it be? Mightn’t it be that 
just this haphazard, unsponsored state of the world, just this radiation of relationships of 
my cares and commitments, provides the milieu in which my knowledge of others can 
best be expressed?32 
 
Despite Cavell’s premise that we may be living the “best case”, it is clear that he would take 
some convincing. Scepticism is to be actively remembered as a disappointment, and yet its 
maxim or promise of the best case still has durability. This disappointment over knowledge, and 
the history of scepticism as disappointment that grounds our knowledge of others drives Cavell’s 
call: “Live your scepticism!”33  
 
Although on the one hand Cavell’s notion of criteria has the ability to describe all aspects of 
identification within the world, including the availability of all number of possible types within 
those identifications, it can also, on the other hand, be seen to exhaust itself, where at the domain 
of the limits of criteria, we find horror. In this sense the call to “Live your scepticism” is 
ambiguous to say the least, most of all because the circumstances for critique are situated in a 
particular and circumstantial experience of doubt whilst at the same time this experience totalises 
language as object through the representation of specific identifications. In other words, self-
consciousness is always demonstrated as the genre of horror or paranoia. Here we are drawn back 
                                                     
32 Ibid., 440 
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into the problem of “essence”, where we can see that the “absolute violence” argued against in 
Cavell’s critique of philosophy is translated into an equally ubiquitous territory, a thing that 
approaches us from a dark space, the space where language runs out of effectivity and meaning, 
and a place that although promised in the concrete world of argument is enabled only through an 
acknowledgment that such discursive practices are limited.  
 
Where there is “no appropriate criteria” for decision making, Cavell’s subject doesn’t merely 
make a bad decision, or some other stupid, embarrassing or even banal error of judgement. At the 
level of “no appropriate criteria” the subject is divorced from language and offered a view of it 
from a traumatic distance. This, for Cavell, is the comprehension of non-comprehension. It is 
autonomy as an existential experience produced out of language. Certainly, in Cavell’s narratives 
of the everyday, the criteria and context is laid out for us, the reader, to assert that the “mistakes” 
or problems of knowledge that are described can and do happen to us all. In this they are 
everyday. However, in theorising a significance for these moments of self-recognition Cavell 
necessitates an insistence that we aestheticise or even dramatise these events, or that we know 
them as not banal or “everyday” but as meaningful interfaces with the “unknown”. Consequently, 
Cavell’s notion of self-reflexivity, or social culpability is rooted in the aesthetics of horror where 
the subject’s critical redemption is sited in a negatively charged domain of “not knowing”, over-
shadowed by the aesthetics of trauma. Consequently, we are faced with the problem that in order 
to experience these “internal limits” of language, which by all accounts “happen to us”, we are 
paradoxically invited to write this experience after the fact in a space that is dislocated or 
mediated away from the very site of this experience. 
 
The ambiguity between matters of existence and reality or between the identity and the existence 
of things is delineated in this question: 
 
It depends on whether the question I am asked is one of identification or of something 
else (something I waver between calling existence and reality). The problem, or 
something I am trying to make the problem, is: How do I know whether I am asked the 
one or whether the other?34 
 
Therefore, although Cavell recognises and issues the intrinsic problem of the question of 
existence, he maintains the relationship between existence and reality as separate and relational 
entities. This separation is evidenced in his strategy of thinking through the politics of his own 
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identifications where, as I have already written, Cavell’s theory relies very much on an aesthetics 
which he considers to be without meaning, or in other words the aesthetics of “the knowledge of 
no knowledge”. 
 
As such, Cavell refrains from an in depth investigation into the applications of speech, 
contingency and language. In spite of his affirmation that the question of reality is unhelpful to 
understanding, his work is characterised by a scepticism that sustains a traditional philosophical 
problem within his project. Intrinsically, Cavell conceives an experiential domain wherein which 
the subject can experience an ontological-critical moment of self-knowledge through an 
aestheticised, theatricised de-centering; the moment of being pulled in two ways within a 
romantic-tragic experience that appears or is effected within the everyday and perverse situation 
of a forced choice. This forced choice is constituted in a two-fold experience, in that one 
experiences the force of oneself demanding the exercise of choice (an internalised demand upon 
the self - intentionality) in the context of exteriorised contingencies (the unavailability of 
language which makes that choice impossible).  
 
Cavell’s epistemological concerns are not only limited but also delineate his own philosophical 
narrative. In particular, the trope of violence that seems to be stipulated upon the subjective 
experience of self-reflexivity, as seen in Cavell’s metaphor of traditional scepticism (the bird), 
right through to his metaphoric-philosophy (the robot) remains within the tradition of 
metaphysics. This is despite attempts to overcome this sceptical problem through the self-
conscious narration of such theories as allegorical fictions. Upon these terms it would seem that 
by clinging to the demand for self-consciousness as indicative of autonomy, Cavell is compelled 
to inscribe another metaphysics.  
 
What emerges from this is the question of whether a non-tragic inscription of the act of writing 
does away with the philosophical question altogether? - Or, whether it turns the philosophical 
question into a political question, a question of how we organise our future - and even then - this 
becomes an interpretative, linguistic issue, of how we understand principles and how we 
construct and make interpretations of the “universal”, “objective” or “foundational” characters of 
justice, truth and law. However, first I will look once more to an understanding of autonomy 
without a conception of finitude. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
34 Ibid., 51 
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 Zupancic’s aesthetics of the Real 
The aesthetics of ambiguity as indicative of a subjective choice is also highlighted in Alenka 
Zupancic’s Ethics of the Real. Zupancic and Cavell both produce narratives of decision, which 
attempt to explain or hinge action on an experience of doubt, whether this is developed in the 
description of unfathomable actions (Zupancic) or the subjective response to the unfathomable 
(Cavell’s robot story). 
 
Zupancic identifies the character, Sygne de Coûfontaine, from Claudel’s “The Hostage” as an 
example of the subject in action or “who chooses”. Her choice was the shielding of a bullet which 
was meant for her loathed husband Turelure, whom she was convinced to marry against her 
wishes to protect her beloved Georges and the Pope. The act of shielding Turelure has 
increasingly significant consequence as it is Georges who fires the gun when he is enraged to see 
that the two are married. Turelure cannot understand why Sygne saved his life and desperately 
asks her why she chose this suicidal gesture, whether it was for him or the family name. 
However, “Sygne utters not a sound: she merely signals her rejection of a final reconciliation with 
her husband by means of a compulsive tic, a kind of convulsed twitching which repeatedly 
distorts her face, as if she were shaking her head: “No.””35  
 
In Sygne de Coûfontaine’s nervous tic, Zupancic sees the “small palpitating corpse”, “the piece of 
meat”. It is described as an image of an unsightly creeping manifestation, a subversive corruption 
and a disturbing, even tormenting contamination: “the palpitating corpse…the small piece of 
meat…the nervous twitch.”36 It can be seen that in maintaining the character of the “impossible” 
the image of the grotesque is perpetuated. Zupancic looks to an image which returns to the trope 
of that impossibility, “otherness”, or “freakishness”, and although, this image is in itself 
particularly unsensational in its “smallness” or “averageness”, and in that we could say “it is only 
that,” its aspect of pure materiality, its baseness, is in itself a redeeming feature. It is stupid (it 
does nothing) and is also weak.  
 
A problem can be recognised within Zupancic’s description of this tic as an image of decision, 
which in many cases can be seen in Cavell’s robot story, which cited the paranoiac induced, 
impending horror of making a decision. However, more specifically in Zupancic’s text it is the 
                                                     
35 Alenka Zupancic, Ethics of the Real, Kant, Lacan, Verso, 2000, 212 
36 Ibid., 258 
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expression of “pure materiality” that is seen to transcend and inhabit earthly concerns. This horror 
of the flesh that is allowed through the description of its putrid “everydayness” seems to desire an 
area that evades representation and speaks of something that is “other”. However, in order to 
describe this Lacanian notion of the Real as being both within and without representational limits 
Zupancic employs the most typical language of the “other” whereby it confirms the constellation 
of identities that we know.37 This illustration therefore, makes and confirms the “other” as a 
homely image that seems to dwell in this area between the comic, the tragic and the horrific. 
 
The problem with the definition of agency being an experience between two conflicting laws, 
such as reason and idealism is that first it is figured as an aesthetic identification i.e., there is a 
prescribed territory for this experience, which leads to the question - why tragedy? And secondly 
the politics of this aesthetic identification are not put into question. The experience of “self”, 
advanced through the combination and contradiction of idealism and scepticism, persists in a 
metaphysical philosophical tradition of identifying writing as fictional examples which define a 
philosophical experience, instead of investing in a critique of the territories of that experience. 
That is, Zupancic and Cavell use “everyday” poetics of a perverse realism in order to create a 
concept of decision that is empirically located in our weakness for example, or perhaps a moment 
of being subject to (or of) a crude and banal violence. Images of average reality or mundanity are 
now in correspondence with the Real. This averageness does not resist celebrity, however, it 
becomes a great averageness, the special banality. Boredom and the insignificant are equally as 
enthralling as the most ultimate terror, because they have been written through it. Crucially, it is 
such theories that inscribe the “everyday” boredom and mundanity as the site for “ultimates” 
because it is in the everyday where we identify the repetitive existence of Cavell’s tragic narrative 
of knowledge.  
 
Reading both Cavell and Zupancic our conception of “meaning” is perceived romantically as the 
impossibility of realism. The assertion of our own weaknesses becomes heroic to the extent that 
we can sensationalise this beyond a notion of some “stuff” of miniscule reality. Cavell and 
Zupancic create a split between two aesthetic modes of representation where one’s experience of 
decision hinges upon their political and interpretative differences, say, between the everyday-
                                                     
37 Zupancic takes up Lacan’s notion of “realisation” from The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, in which he speaks 
of an “abyssal realisation” figured by Sygne de Coûfontaine. Zupancic goes on to claim that “after 
sacrificing everything for her cause, Sygne has to sacrifice this very Cause itself. This brings about a new 
figure of the infinite, as well as a new figure of the “ne pas céder sur son désir.” (256) 
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known or rational space for articulation and the other-unknown space of fantasy and desire, or 
even, between meaningfulness and meaninglessness.  
 
As we have seen, Zupancic and Cavell move towards such images/experiences of 
“contamination” in order to overcome the problem of the sacrifice of the subject. Zupancic 
reinterprets Kant’s theory of agency as the suicide of the subject towards a conception of a split 
subject, who subjectivises the self. Cavell makes reference to the “cost of knowing” through 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s reinterpretation of Kant’s concept of the limitations of knowledge 
as representative not of the failure of knowledge but of its realisation. “In Being and Time the cost 
is an absorption in the public world, “mass” or “average man”. In Investigations, the cost is 
arrived at in terms of not knowing what we are saying, of emptiness in our assertions, of the 
allusion of meaning something, of claims to impossible privacies.”38 Clearly both Zupancic and 
Cavell take these “costs” into consideration and their theories show an attempt to formulate a 
conception of self-reflexivity within choice that does not realise the finite to evoke the infinite, 
but yet retains a conception of constraints and therefore consequence - and, it so goes – 
“meaning” or value regarding human action. In order to formulate a subjectivity that can make 
moral value judgements within pluralism Zupancic and Cavell contaminate the aesthetics of the 
finite with the infinite, or, the earthly and particular with the transcendental and universal, whilst 
contradictorily and simultaneously relying upon the subject to invest in the loss of the rational 
distinction between the two.  
 
Cavell’s theory offers an understanding or meaning in the face of the universal, through “the 
recognition of no recognition at all,” or, the recognition of “no reason.” This conceptual notion of 
the unavailability of self-recognition can be seen to trouble a social-political theory of inter-
subjectivity, since, it seems that such a politics of recognition becomes unworkable precisely at 
the point of practice where self-recognition is required. To explain this in more detail, we can 
return to Cavell’s story of the robot, where Cavell develops a concept of autonomy through a 
scepticism of the “human”; i.e., his theory is based upon whether we all have the same 
experiences, thoughts, sense of responsibility, guilt, pain, or feelings of love, etc. and whether we 
can recognise our own humanity and that of others. Duly, this leaves the problem hanging, when 
if we cannot acknowledge the impossibility of doubting oneself as human as contingent to 
autonomy, then we are left with the remaining and troubling consequences of a theory of 
autonomy that is premised upon the experience of doubting the humanity of others.  
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 This demand or requirement for reason (is Cavell’s robot human or not?), or the recognition of 
conflicting laws (Zupancic’s audience recognises Sygne de Coûfontaine as subject of and to the 
law), quickly slips back into a (anti) humanism through the requirement for the subject to know 
or to recognise the point at which s/he doesn’t know or believe, in opposition to what s/he is sure 
of. For example, in Cavell’s story, he is sure that the robot experiences human emotions, such as 
pain and discomfort, but he is not sure if this makes the robot human. 
 
Accordingly, the doubts about moral certitude in Cavell resist a socially responsible subject and 
create an aesthetically defined individual as one writes oneself into the tragic experience, where 
we become our own philosophical examples. The evacuation of recognition in Cavell may be 
induced by an everyday situation, but it ends up in philosophical abstraction. Also, as we see in 
Zupancic, Sygne de Coûfontaine allows the “infinite to parasitise the finite”, a status of semi-
passivity, where her actions are inexplicable, where her choice is rooted in an ambiguous 
intention, and, where in order to realise the “absolute condition” she lives in a moment of 
autonomous indecision.39 The uncertainty of our ability to recognise such differences regarding 
decision could be seen to threaten Cavell’s conception of tragedy. If we understand a basic 
reading of the tragic to be one that insists upon the subject being caught between two things or the 
downfall of the protagonist,40 then the contamination of the infinite and the finite as a wholly 
aesthetic experience challenges such epic oppositions. 
 
In both Cavell and Zupancic the trope of ambiguity, of repetition and of trauma can easily be read 
as an allegory of how knowledge is undone. In other words, we know ambiguity, its construction 
and its invention and as a symbol or metaphor; we know it represents the problem of infinite 
possibilities, or even the impossibility of death. Both theories aim for the Real, where “meaning” 
is still concerned with a politics of recognition whilst refusing the politics of its own status of 
identification. Within their preservation of the “unrepresentable” they effect the same stylisation 
of agency that is demarcated from and unarticulated within traditional philosophy, specifically a 
theory of the politics of violence as the “unpolitical”. Consequently, we are offered an image of 
                                                                                                                                                              
38 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 241 
39 Zupancic, Ethics of the Real, 259 
40 Similarly, this aspect of tragedy was articulated in the first section of this chapter, which looked to 
Oedipus as representative of the impossibility of tragedy, in that Oedipus was for the most part blind in 
order to make the required distinctions between his own actions and the will of the Gods. Unlike Sygne de 
Coûfontaine or Cavell’s autobiographical accounts of decision, Oedipus is never able to make such 
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contamination that highlights the collision of finitude and the infinite in one quite distinctive, or 
even perhaps cliched image. As such, we are left with the problem of an absolute finitude of 
language, although already we can determine the re-writing of the tragic as exteriority upon this 
conception of finitude as another essentially tragic moment.  
 
In making philosophy a genre it would seem that Cavell opens the way to understand also a non-
tragic conception of knowledge. However, this is not only undermined by his universalising of 
the tragic as an everyday experience, i.e., it happens to us all, but also in as much as Cavell insists 
upon the idea that in order to sustain a practice of knowledge we must recognise any attempt to 
do this has the tragedy of disappointment snapping at its heels. Perhaps paradoxically, 
philosophy, may for Cavell, be a genre but tragedy is a condition of all techniques of knowledge. 
 
 
3. Undoing the Tragic 
 
Self-recognition as the tragic success of language 
Returning to Lacoue-Labarthe’s text we can see that the figure of Oedipus is identified in both the 
legacy of Hegel and the work of Nietzsche, as the mark of the end of philosophy:  
 
And it is, perhaps, here that the Hegelian symbolic reaches its limits. That is why 
Oedipus, who is the figure of a dawning Greek knowledge, is also the figure of a truly 
Western knowledge: the last knowledge. It is therefore not his hostility towards Hegel 
that explains why Nietzsche, that “latecomer”, should choose to call Oedipus the “last 
philosopher” - who is, as it happens, also the last man.41  
 
Here, the re-figuring of Oedipus as distinctly Nietzschean does little to spare Oedipus from his 
historical and philosophical role. In which case, it is not so much that we are invited to choose 
between these two figures of knowledge - between a tragic Hegelian Oedipus and the passionate 
Heideggerian or even Nietzschean Oedipus – but rather that we are asked to acknowledge that 
each is stained historically and determinably with the task of philosophy, or as I have shown, an 
aesthetic and political violence. In the face of this irrevocable knowledge are we to renounce our 
choice between the two? And, as such, is decision itself therefore afflicted with and determined 
by the transcendental character of the difficulty, or even the crisis of choosing? On the other 
hand, and this is something I want to consider in more detail, perhaps it is possible to think 
                                                                                                                                                              
distinctions between contradictory laws or duties. His actions are continually, and even within his self-
mutilation, are proportionately self-objective and egoistic. 
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through our undecidability without such a determinate relationship to our decisions. I take this up 
in the final section of this chapter by considering the parodic and ironic aspects of “return” as 
cultural practices before turning finally to contemplate non-ironic portrayals of tragic and non-
tragic narratives, especially those that predicate violence on choice-making. However, first I 
consider how Cavell responds to and figures the crisis of “philosophical return”, and I critique the 
limitations of representing knowledge therein. 
 
Cavell identifies the claim of metaphysics by taking up the Nietzschean concept of “eternal 
return”:  
 
For Nietzsche there is no key to ones identity. Hence after his first book, there is for him 
no tragedy. One might feel that just this is our (new) tragedy. For it means that there is no 
ending, only return eternally.42 
 
Here we can see that Cavell’s theory of philosophy’s self-consciousness as tragedy is perhaps too 
easily construed as the impossibility of difference, or the possibility of the repeat. Consequently, 
not only does Cavell aestheticise undecidability as a recognisable (or possible) impossibility 
found in our daily experiences, but here again possibility is also defined (usefully) as 
impossibility. In this way self-reflexivity is sustained in the romantic tradition of “split faith” 
where the limits of knowledge describe one’s political potential and at once the disappointment of 
our ideals. As such, the Nietzschean convention of “return” in Cavell is determined moreover as a 
philosophical problem or even, the root by which to access the other. Here, Cavell reclaims the 
tragic status of subject philosophy that Nietzsche had exorcised. By reflecting on Cavell’s 
assertion that the quasi-transcendental is best at home with the genre of tragedy, and specifically 
tragic literature, we can ask what happens when the tragic aspect of thinking is recouped through 
practice in the figure of return - the figure without figure? – And, how does this assertion of 
return now relate to aesthetic, literary and cultural productions and identifications? 
 
The answer lies in the way Cavell figures philosophy’s (new) tragic narrative through the trope of 
repeat. Here, the historical tradition of theorising freedom is immanent to all our actions and the 
success of language is zeroed in on as a symbol of constraint. In such a case language transcends 
contingency, the universal use of language is tragedy par excellence. Theorising the tragic nature 
of such practices is made more impenetrable because we are asked to distinguish between the 
                                                                                                                                                              
41 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Oedipus as Figure”, 14 
42 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 393 
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infinite task of writing and the stuff that is written (the finitude of the text), when one is without 
object. Or, as exampled in Zupancic, we continue philosophising despite and because of a notion 
of the Real as an affect of language. Significantly here, both philosophising and the Real are 
aestheticised via the themes of tragedy and repetition. In each case, we have two contradictory 
technologies: the use of language as a continual application and re-invention of knowledge, and 
the knowledge of language as infinite object. Crucially, this metaphysical aspect of writing is 
sustained if we read Cavell’s writing as a transgressive move against the real, an affirmation of 
the freedom to invent and an underscoring of our sentence of confinement within language. In 
this way Cavell’s work persists in writing “the other” whilst asserting the “other” of writing, or, 
that writing is a fiction. Gerald L. Bruns comments on Cavell’s understanding of writing’s 
metaphysical aspects. This is writing’s resistant character, a refusal of the real, as read through 
Socrates and Gadamer; “poetry retains its ancient character as the dark saying or ainigma, that 
which withholds its saying, refuses itself, resists exegesis, forces us into the allegorical posture of 
speaking on its behalf.”43 However, as we have seen through Cavell, such tropes of violence 
establish a persuasive rhetoric very much the same as those of scepticism. 
 
 
Tragic and non-tragic narratives 
Unlike Cavell’s theory, in the post-tragic narrative, doubt is not universalised under the aporia of 
transcendental or substantial value despite the fact that narratives are reproduced over and over 
again. Instead, doubt is performed discursively where the subject is able to reason conditionally 
and circumstantially, whether this is verbally or physically, and “the repeat” does not so much 
reproduce the same narrative, but re-interprets and re-creates another narrative that by all 
accounts does not point us towards the meta-discursive themes of tragic freedom or tragic 
confinement. Significantly, the way in which Cavell describes tragedy, either through “repeat” or 
the “availability” and “success” of language renders the same paradoxical position as his 
recognition of tragedy as the crisis of the lack of “appropriate” linguistic criteria. Cavell cites this 
act of the writing and repeating of the “universal themes” of “violence as decision” as indicative 
of the tragic state of human knowledge. However, as we have seen, the very basis of recognising 
the tragic aspects of language is unavailable to Cavell. Instead, we are left with the need to take a 
closer look at these worn out metaphors of autonomy in the post-tragic narrative.  
 
                                                     
43 Gerarld L. Bruns, Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, Language, Literature, and Ethical Theory, 
Northwestern University Press, 1997, 197 
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To explain this further, I will once more turn to an example in film. Timecop (dir. Peter Hyams, 
1994) features Jean Claude Van Damme as (you guessed it) time-travelling cop Max Fletcher, 
whose job is to prevent crimes before they happen. A corrupt senator in the present is using a 
time machine to commit crimes in the past (thus changing the future for their betterment and, of 
course others’ loss). Fletcher’s job is to stop him. Here, Fletcher’s private/family life and his 
professional/public life are aligned. His private tragedy is the murder of his wife, something he 
should have been able to prevent, after all he is a cop and he can travel through time. Throughout 
the film Fletcher blames himself for her death, but in no way does this deprive the narrative of 
action. Instead, it introduces the question of a potential redemption. This narrative of private 
justice does not take centre stage, rather it is inter-textually combined with Fletcher job as a time-
cop. However, he is not the upholder of an agreed upon centralised or absolute law, rather, the 
pluralised law of the future - a now familiar cinematic image of a privatised corporate law 
enforcement.44 Here, his public job as a cop shows him battling between his own beliefs shown to 
be a more true and universal concept of justice against the particular interests of a privatised 
corporate law. Crucially, our hero is able to make the “wrong decision”- the mistake of not being 
there to protect his wife. However, these decisions are not characterised by the immanence of 
tragedy as an absolute condition to action but as potentiality. As we see, Van Damme is always in 
action, and manages ultimately to use his role as a time-cop to bring his wife back from the dead.  
 
Another example of the post-tragic heroic is Arnold Schwarzenegger’s spoof action movie The 
Last Action Hero (dir. John Mc Tiernan, 1993). The opening scene features Schwarzenegger’s 
heroic character, Jack Slater, playing the role of Hamlet. On approaching the infamous lines that 
characterise Hamlet’s procrastination in the soliloquy “To be or not to be,” Jack Slater lights up a 
cigar, and, riding a rearing horse bluntly affirms, “Not to be”, before riding away, leaving a 
spectacular explosion in the mock medieval castle behind him. Here, in the most crude and 
deliberate way, the orthodoxy of the suffering hero is confirmed as historical fiction by the power 
of the post-tragic subject. In these words, Slater asserts not only his power over death, but also his 
ability to make his justice over others their death sentence.  
 
                                                     
44 This image of the future of law enforcement is perhaps best seen in Paul Verhoven’s 1987 film Robocop, 
where we see crime prevention to be consumer product in the form of the company OCP (Omni Consumer 
Products). Here we have a “Philip K. Dick-style” future, where machines are given the role of law 
enforcement. The police, whilst remaining as the central symbol of law enforcement, are in fact being 
controlled by corporate enterprise run by power hungry megalomaniacs. More often than not, this 
pluralised and privatised notion of the law is shown to be an apocalyptic scenario for ethics; even the police 
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In the post-tragic narrative the idea that we have concern for others’ suffering is outdone by 
marveling at the sensational aspect of such suffering, or more crudely perhaps, the quality of 
suffering. This evacuation of the tragic content in the post-tragic narratives (read not as a lack, as 
Cavell would prefer) forces home the problem with Cavell’s theory: that it may be OK to theorise 
a conception of literature as philosophy, but only to the point that one identifies the act of 
philosophising as the singular “critical” path; that this path is in itself tragic and finally that the 
only literature that is “philosophical” or capable of philosophy is the tragic genre. Philosophy 
may be a form of literature, but all literature is not philosophy. As such, Cavell’s theory is 
problematically reduced to the artistic and poetic taste of the philosopher.  
 
As I have demonstrated, Cavell’s theory becomes unworkable when the genres don’t fit and as a 
result, the nature of theorising is problematised in general. This is because firstly, the 
identification of localised experience of autonomy marginalises the practice of theorising, 
because the practice of theorising is relegated to the tragic. Secondly, and more generally, a 
theory of the tragic in practice can be seen to formally replicate itself as a “tragic” problem - the 
problem that the theory of the tragic is based upon a theory of its own insubstantiality. It is a 
theory of half a theory.  
 
Cavell’s theory of the tragic narrative, as recourse to social self-recognition, relies on a notion of 
the individual as tragic author with enough knowledge of the unknown to produce an experience 
of it. At the same time it invests in the belief that this experience raises an inside/outside paradox. 
A self-reflexive knowledge of the tragic (as producer and the indicator of self-recognition) both 
demand a dedicated and particularised notion of authorship expertise and, in contradiction require 
that the author always be an expert in defining his/her limits to it. In this we can understand that 
the “tragic”, as a theory or a formalised genre, utilised as recourse to self-recognition, only 
produces a self-recognition that evacuates itself as concept, for one cannot organise the split faith 
that the tragic requires. As such, looking at the tragic as a prescribed and understood territory of 
experience, we can see that this evacuates the central concern of the tragic, or, the philosophical 
question of essence and truth, as things that are qualified by a character of exteriority. Attempting 
to define a politics or a theory of self-recognition in or through the tragic therefore obligates a 
theory of the tragic that the tragic cannot offer, or else give itself up altogether.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
have to be policed. This relationship between the subject and the law will be discussed in more detail in my 
conclusion.  
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 4. Practices of Return 
 
Contemporary narratives of decision or choice which represent an understanding of violence as a 
means to produce autonomy problematise conceptions of the tragic as it is through such 
representations that the redemptive facility of the other is evacuated. This happens in two ways in 
cinema: Firstly and generally, cinema writes for itself. In other words, cinema remains within, is 
defined by and does not transgress the medium of its self-definition – celluloid.45 Secondly, and 
more particularly, what is represented as “action” in contemporary cinematic genres does not 
identify an absolute other, or a tragic subject upon which that action is understood. Significantly, 
it is in the postmodern narrative of decision that I will attempt to identify the structure of, or the 
experience of meaning within the genres of violent agency. Crucially, this is not in order to 
replace the Cavellian (tragic) figure for knowledge with that of the post-tragic, but more to 
understand the relationship between what I have identified as a Nietzschean character of 
postmodern agency with this figuring of agency in culture. 
 
Initially, I am thinking here of the many James Bond films where the token torture scene is 
perfected as means by which we don’t ever think of if our hero will escape, but how? Certainly, 
violence happens to the hero, and the hero can go through all manner of torture, both emotionally 
and physically and their suffering is always outweighed by a complacent defiance. The hero’s 
suffering is not frail and weak, neither is it an ordeal to prove and assert strength in the sense of 
some religious rites of passage, as for example, in John Webster’s Jacobean tragedy, The Duchess 
of Malfi. Here, the Duchess’ suffering is a means to her eventual and absolute freedom in death. 
The court malcontent Bosola is given the task of torturing the Duchess by her evil brothers 
Ferdinand and the Cardinal. Dressed in disguise Bosola subjects her to all manner of torture 
including making her believe that her children have been butchered, when in reality he has shown 
her wax replicas. Bosola soon takes on the role of priest touched by the Duchess’ humility. The 
Duchess ultimately identifies redemption through suffering, saying:  
 
                                                     
45 In many ways the cinematic tradition could be seen as something that occupies a rather different notion 
of critique than that of a typical avant-gardist art’s critical position. Certainly, film can, and does ask the 
same philosophical questions as art. For example, there are many films that critique the inherent nature of 
film, as narrative content, as celluloid medium, and in terms of size, and context. However, this practice is 
lived out through and accepted normatively as the “film medium” of a two-dimensional projection, whereas 
art’s critical faculty, particularly relative to a modern and avant-gardist practice, sought to destabalise the 
very medium, aesthetic, and locale of what society understood and accepted to behave as and look like art. 
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 “There’s no deep valley but near some great hill.” (Act 3, sc. 5) 46 
 
Through this acceptance of her inevitable death, and her identification of it as an earthy 
purgatory, the Duchess prepares herself for heaven. In this, her torturer becomes not only her 
priest but also the perpetrator of a perverse God-like justice. He represents the choice to redeem 
herself of her more unscrupulous affairs and to meet death as a prince. As such, the strength or 
power in the tragic narrative is hinged upon the hero/heroine’s recognition of a higher law, and a 
redemption that is characterised through the acceptance of one’s situation as “guilty mortal.” The 
Duchess faces the inevitability of finitude, almost perceiving its materiality:  
 
“- tell my brothers 
That I perceive death, now I am well awake, 
Best gift is they can give, or I can take.” (Act Four, scene 2) 47 
 
In sharp contrast, in the post-tragic narrative, the subject under the violence of torture doesn’t 
undergo some moralistic change or learn anything from violence; violence is not a redemptive 
tool, it is part of the action in the sense that the torture of our hero is a means by which he can, a) 
demonstrate his strength in the face of his captors and, b) make an extravagant escape. Strength in 
this instance is violent agency. Also, the subject’s decisions are not relative to any concept of 
absolute autonomy or transcendental freedom, nor a self-consciousness of ethical responsibilities. 
In The Duchess of Malfi, we see the Duchess giving up her identity as an earthly woman, (she is 
both physically and morally weak) in order to achieve the status of transcendent prince. 
Comparatively, the post-tragic hero shows strength by self-construction not self-destruction: On 
the one hand, we see the tragic hero apply the negative to achieve the positive, whilst on the 
other, the post-tragic hero is totally mobilised. Importantly, and relative to this mobilisation is 
that the apparent necessity of violence seen in the post-tragic narrative does not emphasise its 
banality. Instead, the hero redeems her/himself often through a revenge that always outclasses the 
violence of the “evil” perpetrator.  
 
The increasing cultural consciousness of the ambiguity of agency and violence can be seen in a 
number of film productions, where the hero’s actions increasingly opt for the execution of the bad 
guy. Instead of “bringing him in” to face the penalties of State justice, the bad guy suffers an 
execution style killing under the jurisprudence of the hero. This can be seen in many styles of 
                                                     
46 John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi, ed. John Russell Brown, The Revels Plays, Manchester University 
Press, 1984, 106 
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action narrative, from the “schmaltz-style” action of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Commando and 
Brad Pitt in the serial killer thriller Se7en (dir. David Fincher, 1995), to Kiefer Sutherland’s 
(playing Jack Bauer) shooting of Dennis Hopper’s (Victor Drezin) in the TV series 24 (June-
August 2002, BBC 2.) In these narratives justice is taken as a personal responsibility, however, 
the action is universal, not in the sense that Jack Bauer, or Arnold Schwarzenegger in any of 
those various roles, or indeed, any other heroic lead represents us, in the sense that we could say, 
“yes I am like that,” but in that its abstract fulfillment of the criteria of our expectation of action is 
played out within a hierarchical schema of violence. 
 
 
Knowledge and expectation 
Such a fulfillment of the criteria of expectation replays a problem of the empty metaphors of 
idealisation and how we go about understanding apparently universal aspects of language. In 
Jacques Derrida’s text “White Mythology”, a conversation between Aristos and Polyphilos is 
recounted from Anatole France’s The Garden of Epicurus: 
 
“I think I have at last made you realise one thing, Aristos, that any expression of an 
abstract idea can only be an analogy. By an odd fate, the very metaphysicians who think 
to escape the world of appearances are constrained to live perpetually in allegory. A sorry 
lot of poets, they dim the colours of the ancient fables, and are themselves the gatherers 
of fables. They produce white mythology.”48  
 
This quote re-traces Cavell’s concerns with the metaphoric element of metaphysics, that abstract 
ideas are essentially correlative to an empty or even (it would seem for Cavell) a meaningless 
language indicative of the realm of “no appropriate criteria”. Derrida continues to write upon this 
poetry of metaphysics as the employment of “worn out metaphors”, where metaphysics is both 
accessed and devalued by its own rhetoric. Here, the “atemporal and non-spatial” quality of such 
metaphors, present a transcendental, mythological narrative representative of the refusal of 
meaning.49 As such, Derrida defines the writing of philosophy as an assertion of empty inactive 
or dead metaphors that are thus inherently authoritarian, where any value of meaning is based 
only in their political employment. Agreeing with Derrida’s citation of the “idealising metaphor” 
as something that is situated around a philosophical theme of “empty rhetoric”, it is interesting to 
identify the politics of what we could call “empty rhetoric” in the generic Hollywood narrative.  
                                                                                                                                                              
47 Ibid., 128 
48 Jacques Derrida, The Margins of Philosophy, Harvester Press, 1982, 213-4 
49 Ibid., 225 
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 Here, one can identify that the language of “choice” in general smacks of an apparently “lazy” or 
non-intellectual relationship with spoken language. Catchphrases and profanities intersect each 
other and are used again and again to denote “action”. Scripts are increasingly speech-free, and 
also free from complex accounts of social relations. In most cases of action-adventure narratives 
the Hollywood formula is in place; (Usually a) man loses a loved one (wife, partner, child, 
friend); comes close to losing his colleagues’ respect (his allegiances with the good are 
questioned); man avenges death(s) and emerges triumphant. 
 
A number of examples of this tendency in Hollywood narratives can be drawn upon. The 1993 
movie The Fugitive (dir. Andrew Davis) starring Harrison Ford as the central character, Richard 
Kimble, adapted from the 1960’s TV series of the same name starring David Janssen, is an 
obvious example. Kimble is a doctor who comes home to find his wife brutally murdered only 
too late to catch the one armed man, the perpetrator of the crime who fled the scene. Kimble is 
duly arrested for murdering his wife, and then manages to accidentally escape from prison due to 
his prison transportation being caught up in a horrendous and lucky accident. From then on 
Richard Kimble is “The Fugitive”, simultaneously fleeing from the law, whilst always on the task 
towards avenging his wife’s murder. This is all done whilst constantly winning over respect from 
his acquaintances as he moves from town to town, where each time he jeopardises his freedom 
with acts of kindness to others. In the series and the film, Kimble has lost all his dignity, in that 
he is accused of the most heinous crime against his wife, whom he obviously loved dearly. 
Deemed as a murderer, Kimble fights for his freedom in each episode of the series, whist 
simultaneously striking up a comradeship and a respect with and from the police that hunt him. 
Ultimately Kimble is a man that has lost everything, but it is the means by which he maintains his 
identity that drive the narrative. These characteristics turn out to be his practices of kindness, and 
unerring respect for himself and the law, despite his unlawful status as “fugitive”. These are 
manifest centrally within his role as a doctor, something that clearly demonstrates his caring for 
others not to be a career for which he wishes recognition, but moreover it is his natural 
disposition. In the movie, The Fugitive, Kimble’s ongoing task of revenge against the one-armed 
man is finally achieved, where his vengeance is in correspondence with not only the respect of 
the police but also the exoneration from his own guilt. 
 
Both Derrida and Cavell’s theory of language points to the problem of how and upon what terms 
the language of universals, or of metaphysics is put to use within narrative. Also relevant, is to 
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consider more closely the nature of these apparently atemporal, non-spatial tropes of ultimates, 
especially regarding the political condition of aesthetics (and vice versa). This is significant when 
recalling Cavell’s inscription of the rhetoric of metaphysics in as much as the tragic ambiguity in 
everyday actions such as doing philosophy, thinking, or walking, etc. are indicative of an ever 
present violent “other” that suffers and bears the weight of God.50 Here, in Cavell’s theory of 
subjective critique, the singular experience of the subject is not reducible to a universal 
absorption or an absolute surrendering to the narrative, but as Bruns points out “the universal is 
historicised, or (better) localised.” However, as I have written the problem regarding Cavell’s 
understanding of a localised or historicised universal is that this does little to articulate the 
problem of language as a “thing”, which we see cropping up constantly in Cavell’s project. 
Therefore, I will attempt to look to a notion of critique that understands what Cavell would call 
the “success and horror” of meaning whilst not falling into either category. 
 
Cultural investments in the rhetoric of agency as violence and the cinematic ambivalence towards 
death further illuminate the paradoxical nature of a theory of the tragic; whether this is a theory of 
tragic “excess” or return, or tragedy based on “lack”. This is evidenced most particularly in 
cinema (even when the actor plays a character that dies) when the “celebrity” of the actor outside 
the script can be seen to be as much a part of the script itself. By this I mean that when Arnold 
Schwarzenegger as “The Terminator” (from the film Terminator, dir. James Cameron 1984) dies 
in the first film, we are ready for his return in the second movie, not merely through the script’s 
explanation that he is a manufactured robot, i.e., there are many of him, and that he can return 
over and over again, but also that the “celebrity” of Arnold Schwarzenegger himself projects an 
immortality onto the character that confuses the two identities. Similarly, despite Oliver Reed’s 
death occurring in the middle of filming Gladiator, (dir. Ridley Scott 2001) we are still able to 
see his character’s actions throughout, either from computer generated images, or by disguised 
actors taking his place. On all counts the cinematic genre defies death both as a fiction, as a 
reality and as a celebration. 
This phenomenon is to be had in many movie genres, where actors refer to other movie characters 
that they play, take up characters they have played in completely different movies and use them 
again. This dialectical operation between the exposure of real life and the staging of it becomes 
more complicated with the advent of the super-star celebrity as we are aware from the recent 
                                                     
50 Bruns writes more on this in Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, 209-211 regarding Cavell’s 
philosophy of the everyday, the enigma of being human and the phenomenology of the monstrous.  
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plethora of “real-life”/”real-time” documentary style programmes, such as The Osbournes (2002 
MTV), where real-life provides the realm of celebrity drama. 
 
 
A post-tragic condition: force and farce 
Violence in contemporary narratives does not distinguish between good violence and bad 
violence but constitutes an ethics of the style of violence. The hero’s violence always has to be 
more tantalising, more inventive, more daring, more witty than the villain’s, and in this sense it 
alludes to a more creative aspect to “good violence” where the artfulness of the good guy is 
always more flamboyant than the often crude and megalomaniacal inventions of the bad guy. In 
many film productions this requirement for “natural” artfulness from the good guy often counters 
the over-refined “plotting” of the villain, and it is here where reason/unreason, manifest as 
plotting, is countered by the natural, unthinking, “reacting” and “acting” actions of the hero. The 
hero doesn’t have to reason his violence; it is part of him; whereas the bad guy is always asserting 
his status in relation to it. This is nicely parodied in the Austin Powers movies where Dr. Evil 
constantly assesses his evil status with his circus-like entourage, sharing in our knowledge of the 
formula of heroic narratives.51 Such critiques identify critical autonomy in the excessive 
repetition of the theme of ultimates. In parody, comedy asserts a criticism by demanding the 
return or the repeat. It identifies the repeat as a means to redemption forcing its presence as a 
perverse excess embodied in examples such as Dr. Evil’s side kick “Mini-Me” (a clone, a friend  
and a pet) and other characters such as the grotesque and aptly named “Fat Bastard”. Here, 
humour exhausts the romantic concerns of Cavell.  
 
However, in forcing the repeat, or by making it our own, parody as a critical tool still doesn’t deal 
with the many representations of non-ironic violence, interest in justice and the notion of 
individuated laws of decision that are constantly affirmed in contemporary narratives. Indeed, 
parodic criticism expects, requires and needs such serious investments in themes of agency to 
continue in culture. This type of comedy laughs at such conventions but its critical and 
redemptive power lies in making such beliefs ineffectual by acting as if they do not effect us, or 
that we have a critical distance over them. Of course, the Austin Powers films rely upon the fact 
that we enjoy and get caught up in the story-line of the various James Bond movies, but this 
repeat does not raise the problem of, nor disputes how we understand justice as rhetoric, the 
repeat just rhetoricises justice (again). Consequently, the critique asserted in the Austin Powers 
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movies is a critique made by the intellectual or aesthete, where the comedy skills of Mike 
Myers’s “fronting” or packaging of the film and, is shown for example in his playing more than a 
few of the characters, and co-writing and producing the film, induces another experience of 
excess and farce empowered from a position outside of the script. Parody, in this instance, is 
effective in the ability of the subject/author to extradite himself from the narrative and to at once 
position him/herself artfully within it. The author’s critical capacity is here based in the ability to 
occupy two places at once. In this sense films such as the James Bond franchise and those of 
Austin Powers exist side by side, where the “transgressive” elements of Austin Powers films do 
not really effect how we watch James Bond as they become another literary fragment in 
describing our relationship to choice and identifications of choice.  
 
 
Return to the tragic heroic character in contemporary film narratives 
The refusal of death in representations of the powerful subject, specifically within American 
action movies, commits narrative to the necessity of violence as a repetitive metaphor for the 
success of meaning or agency within the text. Regarding this it is relevant to review a final 
example of the tragic-heroic. For this I will look to Steven Spielberg’s 1998 film, Saving Private 
Ryan starring Tom Hanks.  
 
Saving Private Ryan’s central thematic of the individual - Private Ryan (Matt Damon) - could for 
one part be seen as Speilberg’s critique of the political value of one life, and also the 
political/institutional or governmental construction of “meaning” within war. However, as we 
shall see this issue is merely a backdrop for the action and the means to invoke abstract “truths”.  
 
To recount the story in brief, Captain John Miller (Tom Hanks) and his platoon are sent to 
rescue/find a Private Ryan and to bring him home as his six brothers have all seen killed in battle. 
As his mother’s last son, his safe return will represent hope, justice redemption and also the 
success of the American campaign. The narrative of the film unfolds with this aspiration first 
proposed and then followed. Speilberg features the “thinking moralising” intellectual within the 
army unit, in the form of the interpreter, Corporal Upham (Jeremy Davis). He is present 
throughout the film as part of the platoon, but always dislocated from them because of his 
social/intellectual differences. Speilberg employs this distancing device to create an “objective 
                                                                                                                                                              
51 I’m specifically referring here to Austin Powers II: The Spy Who Shagged Me, dir. Jay Roach, 1997 
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response” and an emotional juxtaposition to the other soldiers’ confrontations with war. War is 
horrible because we see it through the eyes of an outsider.  
 
Clearly, this “thinking” man is poetically written to demonstrate a facet of Miller’s psychological 
make up. Each member of his crew is representative of his “body politic;” the thinking man, the 
joker, the headstrong righteous bulldog and the innocent teenager. As such, Saving Private Ryan 
is a narrative of one man, Capt. Miller, because the narrative of the film - the one for the many - 
is turned upside down, since Miller now represents the many as one. In this sense Spielberg’s 
narrative repeats the proposition of Saving Private Ryan, with its inverse and equal - the killing of 
Capt. Miller. This character, for Speilberg, represents the “unknown soldier” and Speilberg 
allows us to get to know him from a formal distance, i.e. as made up of formally constituted parts 
and us, the audience, like the rest of the platoon, do not know anything about his personal life 
outside the army. For the American government Private Ryan is the “unknown soldier”, but for 
Spielberg, the true “unknown soldier” is the tragic (dead) hero, not the one who gets saved, but 
the one who sacrifices his own life.  
 
What is important to Speilberg’s tragic narrative is the specific experience of its delivery. Saving 
Private Ryan is a sensational story of individualism, where war is given a documentary feel. To 
perfect this realism as a horror of war, Speilberg uses subjective viewpoints, and awkward shaky 
camera angles. This is demonstrated in garish representations of people’s faces being ripped off, 
legs and arms being thrown all over the place and tragic, even farcical occurrence. In one scene a 
bullet hits a man’s helmet, he reflects upon the good fortune of his saved life, distractedly looking 
at his helmet to see where the bullet hit, to receive another fatal bullet in the head, sending a 
shower of pulsating blood into the mud and over his fellow soldiers. The dramatic irony in such 
instances can only be read as black comedy. Attempted as documentary-style realism, Speilberg’s 
moralizing directorship doesn’t fit well with such comedic identifications, because Speilberg’s 
narrative attempts to perform a conscious knowledge of tragic circumstance without being aware 
that tragedy is so close to farce. The awkwardness in watching or experiencing a director’s 
“critical” voice prompts the question of how can one understand this representation of reality, as a 
reality where we feel Spielberg’s force or manipulation of it in order to construct a didactic 
morality tale? This film perfectly entertains that problem, where Spielberg’s voice is always in 
conflict with a reality he attests to and allegedly describes. The central problem here is that 
“reality” is a sensational horror. Truth is violence. Spielberg’s film-making underscores the desire 
to retrieve an earthly or realistic quality to war, yet this is not the earth of nature, of dirt. This is 
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soil as absolute metaphor. Speilberg’s film works on the theme of how we should live our lives, 
not as a discussion of the politics of the values created upon life. As I have already described, 
both Private Ryan and Capt. Miller are shown as the suffering face of humanity under the 
unquestionable (and what seems to be the irrational) duty of the State, which requests that Ryan’s 
life should be spared, and therefore worth more than Capt. Miller’s life and those of his unit. 
 
This “tragic” moment in Saving Private Ryan reaches its highest pitch in the penultimate scene of 
the film, where we see Capt. Miller’s death. His death is a public theatre, falling neatly into a 
tragic space between the heroic and the banal. For this, Miller gets a literal centre stage within the 
shot, surrounded by supporting cast. Leaning awkwardly against the wheel of a jeep, shooting a 
pathetic handgun at a great tank, he keeps on “fighting” to the bitter end, despite his fatal wounds. 
Speilberg desperately tries to create tragedy in the moment of this “awful” juxtaposition, showing 
the “small” average man; who teaches kids “back home”, and who kept his crew together, 
immovable in the face of the tank, a large powerful faceless machine. This tragic moment is 
inspired through Speilberg’s heavy-handed invocation of “ambiguity”, inscribed between Capt. 
Miller’s incapacity to move, as he is fatally wounded and the possibility that he would also 
choose not to move. In other words, tragedy is obtusely scripted in Spielberg as the space when 
forced choice collides with, or becomes, subjective choice. The problem with this collision (for 
Speilberg, I would imagine anyway) is that this is not tragic. We are not saddened by Capt. 
Miller’s plight and we do not experience others’ suffering as an indication that we must be always 
aware of our social responsibilities concerning violence. Saving Private Ryan uses the trope of 
the futility of war, to remind us that war is not futile. We are reminded in the final scene of the 
film that the memory of Capt. Miller makes Private Ryan as, now an old man, think about how he 
has lived his life, and whether or not he has earned the right to live.  
 
Reminded constantly of the value of (his) life, through the guilt of others, Private Ryan stands for 
a world free from tyranny, or even a world free from terror. He is a reminder that violence is both 
terrible and that we can only use violence for the force of good, thus according to the same 
paradoxical logic that Cavell mobilises around tragedy. Apparently, then, futile death saves the 
world from tyranny just as it saved Private Ryan, as long as we realise that death was futile. Here, 
we can take Speilberg’s lesson, that value is not attributed to life in particular, but to the moral 
“rightness” of our actions represented in contradiction, in the lone man played by Tom Hanks.  
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In such cases, we know what will happen, and this awareness of how meaning is incorporated 
prevents the ambiguity that the tragic requires. Namely, self-conscious romanticism, or a theory 
of the tragic evacuates its own possibility. Because of this - and what this example proves - is that 
an investment in the tragic not only exposes itself as post tragic, in that it exposes itself as genre, 
but also crucially that we know we are faced with questions of action as a parody or farce, and/or 
action as a problem for individual moralising powers.52 
 
 
Authorities of decision 
Postmodern versions of agency or power offer an alternative to this embarrassment of action in 
farce. They focus our attention on theories of power and authority, in as much as the characters 
are not aggrandised through failure, and have both a stupidity and power that falls short of any 
sentimental inclinations about our human state. Here the success of scepticism is not tragic, but a 
space for invention, in that unlike Cavell and Zupancic’s narratives, the violence that the subject 
inflicts and endures is a violence that is implied within every action. Inter-subjectivity is not 
approached through a pathos that demands we all experience the trauma of life’s impossibilities, 
but instead is accessed around a re-affirming, or an agreement in what is known - including the 
other. 
 
In conclusion, and at worst, we can see that Cavell’s tragic scepticism highlights his theory’s 
truly tragic potential as being an un-reflexive or even naive romanticism, because it sketches 
concepts of power and knowledge as idealistic futures (best cases) that are rooted in an undefined 
territory of unprincipled desire (the cost of our will to knowledge). However, interestingly, 
Cavell’s theory does implicate the tradition and convention of philosophy, and also the literary 
fragment as the political and public articulation of private theoretical projects. It is with this in 
mind, working from Cavell’s account of the rhetoric of metaphysics, that I will organise a basis 
for a critique of the politics of the violent history of scepticism, which can also take into account 
Cavell’s own work.  
 
                                                     
52 The hierarchy of the post-tragic overriding the tragic needs some clarification: Tragedy, in this case (and 
many others) shows itself to be a formally constructed experience. However, crucially, this does not 
prevent our feeling empathy with the suffering of others in their tragic situation. Most significant to this 
argument is that the formal identification of tragedy evacuates a tragic identification as being the universal 
locus for knowing others’ humanity. As a result this prompts a further analysis of the politics of authorship 
with respect to non-tragic and post-tragic narratives.  
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Television/cinema’s forays into the everyday are now no longer tinged with the inverse of 
dramatic irony, and more importantly knowledge has become a communal and social/cultural 
experience. Our ability to know what happens in certain narratives, and to know what has 
happened, including the histories of the actors and characters involved and just exactly how much 
they know about us (the audience), has become something that we expect.53 In many cases the 
evacuation of the tragic understands itself as farce, particularly if we continue to look at comedy 
as a critical tool. Consequently the self-understanding of the tragic is raised in comedy, in as 
much as comedy still takes on the same task of writing this understanding both within and outside 
of the script.  
 
As I have already demonstrated, comedies such as the Austin Powers series rely upon genre, 
tropes and action to which they explicitly refer. These narratives (i.e. James Bond films) are not 
transgressed, but are utilised for the creation of other narratives. The Austin Powers films are 
however, transgressive in character in the sense that they test our limits of taste, and morality, 
through their deliberate and rhetorical excesses, not in the sense that they site an absolute object 
from which to transgress. To underscore this point, Austin Powers is demonstrative of a Marxian 
conception of “return” lived out as farce without tragedy where the play of the non-tragic subject 
throws the subject as celebrity into light. Similarly, films such as Commando represent a 
Nietzschean conception of the “will to power” after the tragic as a rhetoric of power where the 
heroic character still retains its autonomy without the same degrees of satire, irony or parody. In 
this way, film as a non-transgressive genre offers concepts of agency that persist in extremes 
without recovering the tragic necessarily as a narrative thematic or as a notion of the tragic 
quality of writing itself.  
 
This postmodern heroic subject does not separate “knowing” or “thinking” from “doing” and the 
actions of the subject are absolutely contingent on his/her language. A lack of knowledge in no 
way effects this subject’s ability to act. As such, knowledge as essence is not something the 
subject needs to seek out. Rather, the “nature” of this subject is made up of a practice of a 
convergent notion of knowing and doing, expressed more often than not as a natural skill or a in-
built sensibility towards what happens next. This is clearly demonstrated in the film Out for 
Justice, (dir. John Flyn, 1991) starring Steven Segal. Segal plays a character who although being 
a cop, and therefore someone who should be all the more aware to the difference between right 
                                                     
53 This relationship between the audience and the filmmaker will be discussed later, specifically on David 
Arnold’s composing of the James Bond soundtracks. For this, see my concluding chapter.  
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and wrong, still undertakes a personal task of (a mostly brutal) revenge over a friend’s cruel and 
unwarranted murder. Segal’s character has to use all means available to him to get justice, but this 
exception is lived out in Mafioso-style training coinciding with his devout spiritualism, both 
expressed as a natural ability to artfully defend himself on the one hand and to “get justice” on the 
other. Crucially, these actions are clearly outside of what we consider to be the “everyday” law.  
 
His expression of autonomy is most pertinent in a scene that depicts a spectacular and violent 
confrontation between Segal and the bad-guy gang members, plus other general low-lifes. This 
scene, set in a sleazy bar is made even more significant because it is where Segal looks for his 
only possible lead to the killers. Here, he not only uses expert Aikido moves with broken snooker 
cues, but also smashes a goon’s teeth out with a pool ball in a napkin, where we see blood and 
teeth splurge out onto the green baize of the pool table. In this ten minute relentless violent 
vignette, Segal’s fighting techniques cover the gamut of what we could expect to see in such a 
movie, a hybrid between the spiritual calm of physical and mental agility demanded in the 
orthodox of martial arts; the brutality of a personal vengeance, and crude and unrelentingly brutal 
language coupled with the expert moves of a bar room brawler. This happy contradiction between 
mysticism, spirituality, the Mafia - which operates as the character’s shady back ground - and the 
law as, say, the judiciary and the police, together with the character’s personal vendettas all add 
to the fact of his ultimate autonomy, in that he can deal out all manner of rhetorics in a brutal 
sophistry.  
 
Today we watch and produce renditions of the sequel or the repeat, over and over again, and the 
fact that the protagonist doesn’t die is not a concern or sadness; it is moreover economically 
productive and “super-star” orientated. We know that there will be a sequel, and if there isn’t 
there must be a possible re-make further down the line, or even, if not that, there will be a 
tendency to produce another film of that ilk during the same season.54 Regarding such films as 
those made by Steven Segal we know that they all follow the same or at least similar narrative 
                                                     
54 I am referring to the fashion of film genres, where genres are produced in timely correspondence. It could 
of course be argued that this is mostly down to economics, but this is clearly not the only factor. The Tom 
Hanks film from 1989, Turner and Hooch, was a smash hit comedy, closely followed by James Belushi’s 
K9, and then of course these films had sequels such as K9000. Similarly, Tom Hanks again, was the star of 
the film Big, a comic tale of “body changing”, the comedic rendition of missing out the process of puberty 
where the character changes from child to adult overnight. This was promptly followed by Dudley Moore’s 
Like Father Like Son of the same year, a tale of body swapping, again from a boy to a man. In the past few 
years, the monster or alien “family” movies have been the exclusive genre, with films such as 
Independence Day, Men in Black, Godzilla, Jurassic Park, and Jurassic Park II and III. Still, more recently 
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structures. What is crucial to this phenomena is not only the idea of what happens within the 
narrative, but also the character and motivations of the authors of these narratives themselves and 
the cultural tradition of their writing. The advent or promise of the sequel then, and the exploits 
and motivations for making the movie is equally as engrossing as what actually happens in the 
narrative, for example, we both wonder and expect which characters will appear again, and will 
the same people play them. And, say through Steven Segal’s movies, we can also acknowledge, 
(however strange his motivations may be) that these movies are indeed the culmination of belief 
in his personal eastern style mystical spirituality coupled with an American-style conservative 
and even, a naive belief in social harmony and justice for all.55 
 
Concentrating upon such non-comedic uses of the aesthetics of violence as the space in which the 
problem of critical autonomy is both problematised and brought into focus, I will continue to look 
at the metaphoric and foundational aspect of this rhetoric of agency, the writing of narratives of 
decision and the question of how violence is represented. What is increasingly significant to this 
is what I have explored in this chapter, namely, the similarities between an account of violence 
characterised by stereotypical cliches and those cliches as abstract indicators of a philosophical 
tradition and also the various technologies of power. Therefore, what is particular to this text as a 
whole is the question of how agency is perceived and represented within these narratives, and 
also how the politics of this representation is contingent upon the repetition of certain linguistic 
tropes. I now intend to move through Cavell’s philosophical romanticism towards a study of how 
agency is understood under the condition of absolute finitude in language. Returning to the 
example of Oedipus, the problem can be drawn out further regarding the choosing and the 
figuring, or, the representing of ideological and philosophical theories. If we prefer a non-tragic 
or Promethean Oedipus, will we automatically backslide into the archetypal Nietzschean 
problematic of the “will to power”? Does the identifying of politics as a system of dominating 
forces necessarily invite absolute domination? In light of this I consider the locus and 
consequence of the philosophical project of freedom in the matrix of a complex hegemony. This 
includes the problem of philosophy’s apparent displacement from political practices, when in 
such cases, the work of theorising is responsible for understanding the finitude of political 
freedoms in the role as “guardian” over them. 
                                                                                                                                                              
we can see the fashion for superhero movies such as Dare-Devil, Spider Man, The Hulk, and the X-Men 
now up to its second sequel. Of course this list is inexhaustible. 




 To pursue these questions further in Chapter Two I concentrate upon the relationship between a 
Nietzschean-style aesthetics of violence and what I have called the postmodern heroic which, as I 
have already described, could be construed as the rhetoric of active nihilism. Following this, I 
critique the social problems leveled at poststructuralist conceptions of agency, specifically that of 
Michel Foucault, where I analyse in more detail the relative and historical condition of aesthetics, 





2 Aesthetics, Transgression and Power: 
Kant, Nietzsche, and Foucault’s antihumanism 
 
 
1. Pluralism and the Aesthetics of Evil 
 
As I have shown in Chapter One, contemporary representations of post-tragic subjectivities 
feature and concretize violence, brutality and power as traditional characteristics for the practice 
of any decision. Here, the subject acts without any transcendental guarantees; his/her life is 
organised for self-interest and identity is unequivocally defined by the use of power.  
 
In this chapter I take up the many arguments which understand this antifoundationalist-style 
subject as inherently antihumanist and also Nietzschean. On these accounts poststructuralism is 
equated specifically with the antimodern, in that an unchecked and irrational nihilism prevails and 
leads decision making, and also in that an identification with evil is equated with the good. 
Accordingly, and in keeping with this orthodoxy, when decisions are made they are made with 
the problematic identification of “nothingness” - the negatively defined territory of immorality 
and evil - pursued with all the fervour of a Nietzschean caricature acting out a “means to an end” 
power hungry irrationalism.  
 
First, I consider claims made against the contemporary tendency towards an aesthetics of evil in 
Jennifer L Geddes’s introduction to the book Evil After Postmodernism, then going on to look at a 
specific critique of the post-tragic agent in Roger Shattuck’s text, “Narrating Evil: Great Faults 
and Splendidly Wicked People.” Both Geddes and Shattuck understand the depiction of an 
aesthetics of violence to be socially and morally dangerous when understood to be intrinsic to 
action. They argue that the depiction and even fascination with evil or horror as a traditional and 
“necessary” violence is construed as a symptom of our disregard and disrespect for actually 
dealing with “evil”, both culturally and politically. The first problem that arises from this 
assertion is exactly how a post-tragic aesthetics of violence produces a problem for a critique and 
an understanding of evil. Here, evil is related to this violence mainly because the post-tragic 
narrative depicts the subject as being rationally in control of his/her actions, whether the subject is 
the victim of such action, or is conducting the torture of others. As such, the task of condemning 
post-tragic subjectivities because they are symptomatic of a power hungry nihilism on the one 
hand, and paradoxically on the other, a bland tolerance at the heart of culture, is firmly rooted in a 
rationalising theoretical argumentation. As such, the post-tragic narrative (as representative of a 
problematic postmodernism) both banalises the decision making process and concretises 
identifications of “decision as violence”. 
 
Here I draw out a number of themes for discussion dealing with the aestheticising and theorising 
of decision as transgression within theories of subjectivity. These include: i) The tradition of an 
aesthetico-ethical relation to evil; ii) The act of transgression towards evil, or away from the 
good, as relative to a political project of emancipation, and also; iii) The complex relationship 
between the proximity of the postmodern conception of agency to the antimodern. 
 
Significant to these problems are the claims made against the inherent and mechanistic violence 
in poststructuralist and antifoundationalist discourses. To critique the problems of aesthetics and 
power in pluralism I concentrate upon the work of Michel Foucault. Crucially, Foucault figures 
the central problem above: first; in his attempt to construct a nonhumanist non-emancipatory 
politics as a solution to the evacuation of a Kantian Categorical Imperative; and, second, in his 
allegiance to a Nietzschean-style politics of self-aestheticisation. Consequently, my analysis not 
only includes a response to Foucault as the archetype of a Nietzschean-style poststructuralism, 
but also reflexes back upon the relationship between Kant and Nietzsche in as much as I read 
Nietzsche as Kant upside-down. 
 
It is not my intention to consider Foucault’s work specifically, or in any great detail. More 
importantly, what is of interest to me is the controversy and argument around his work and 
Foucault himself. Most significant to this is that the various criticisms against Foucault’s project 
problematise his theory by producing undesirable representations of a “Foucauldian subject”. As 
a result, after Foucault, we can say that any theory of freedom models a problematic subject in 
that theorising always risks being prescriptive, legislative, and dominant. However, intrinsic to 
my argument is not just that this Foucauldian subject is undesirable socially and politically but 
that the very agreement that it is, established through these criticisms, points us to the complex 
co-relation of ethics, politics and aesthetics.  
 
In response to this relationship between ethics politics and aesthetics, in the final part of this 
chapter, “The Narrative Turn”, I examine the legacy and consequence of Foucault’s project. 
Significant to this is that interpretations of Foucault’s project can be seen to “figure” this violent 
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post-tragic agent in a number of ways. Here, we see the literal embodiment of Foucault’s ethos as 
a narrative genre produced equally by Foucault and his critics. Crucial to this representation of 
Foucault, and reflected in my interest in his critics’ formulation and interpretation of his project, 
is both his and my own attempt to think through the problems of decision in pluralism with 
language. Foucault’s project sustains the legitimacy of aesthetics in the political terrain where 
aesthetics or even the understanding of “critique as attitude” does not undermine the effectivity of 
critique. Rather, language is central to the political, to community and to agency. By 
foregrounding this correspondence of aesthetics and politics, in both Foucault’s project and the 
post-tragic narrative, I finally return to the complex relationship between philosophy and 
narrative, or even, what could be seen to be the contradictory task of thinking for the political and 
the work of practicing politics. Once more, it is the specific identification and tradition of 
violence as decision (and vice versa) that sets the scene. 
 
 
Evil: inside and out 
In the editor’s introduction to Evil After Postmodernism Jennifer L. Geddes writes: 
 
Concomitant with the diminution of moral vocabularies, and perhaps because of it, evil 
has become an object of aesthetic fascination, rather than moral concern. Evil has taken 
on a glamorous sheen. The increasing popularity of horror and sci-fi movies, media 
attention on serial criminals, interest in the Gothic, the theatricalisation of war as it is 
occurring, to name a few examples, suggest that our culture has a growing obsession with 
evil. These popular representations of evil tend to relegate it to the realm of the 
mysterious, the other, and at times, the non-human – in each case, to a realm beyond 
rational consideration. By being aestheticised, evil has become at once domesticated and 
removed from the arena of thoughtful concern, and we the viewers of such evil become 
anaesthetised such that our questions take the form of curiosity rather than concern56. 
 
In the above quote we can see that Geddes identifies the contemporary investment in the narrating 
of evil as a product of our inability to describe or understand it. With this in mind, she also quotes 
Andrew Delbanco’s text, The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil, where 
he writes: “evil remains an inescapable experience for all of us, while we no longer have the 
symbolic language for describing it.”57 Following Delbanco, Geddes recognises the narration of 
evil as something which signifies and is the product of a “lack” of understanding in that it cannot 
be articulated in language, only experienced. Crucially, it is because of the perpetual use of the 
narration of evil in culture that Geddes argues that evil becomes something which problematises 
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its possible understanding. In this, subjective agency is identified and equated with “aestheticised 
transgression” based upon an unthinking application and acceptance of “evil as agency”.  
 
As a result, we can confirm that for Geddes “evil”, as something that exists outside of language, 
and action as “aestheticised transgression”, are seen to be intangibly combined. The aesthetics of 
evil, as something which is “narrated”, then resists our understanding in that it is said to incite 
“curiosity over concern”, or possibly, “irrational desire” over “reason”. Geddes is therefore 
clearly concerned with the problem of the inability to differentiate between “evil”, as something 
which happens to us in the world and evil as a force that we cannot contextualise or comprehend. 
As such, the “aesthetics of transgression” in Geddes’ view creates an experience of “evil” that 
disables rational judgements. By placing aesthetics outside of a political space she blames the 
aestheticisation of evil for the banalisation of the term and at once identifies aesthetics as having 
the responsibility for maintaining evil’s mystical “otherness”. In relying upon an idea of “evil” as 
something that is both unpoliticisable and mainstream Geddes conceives evil as something not 
only relative to the aesthetics of transgression but also as something that is hinged upon a 
understanding of and an identification with autonomy. For example, evil has been used as a term 
to justify cruelty and violence to others. However, despite Geddes’ attempt to avoid such 
fundamentalisms, her preference for a critical rationale as the legitimising authority over the 
language of evil reflexes problematically around the question of a censoring authority. This is 
because in associating the narration of evil as something that is inextricably bound to evil itself, 
one could argue that by ridding the world of the narration of evil, or in other words its image, one 
would also get rid of evil itself. This proves to be a theologically motivated theory inherited from 
and recalling biblical commandments whereby the manufacturing of graven images was censored 
on account of them having the power to incite what they represent in the world at large. 
Consequently, we can see that Geddes’ theory seems to miss the point about attempting to make a 
rational study of evil as it moves so quickly over to a reactionary and dogmatic position of first 




As I previously mentioned, Geddes explores the concerns of the narrating of evil as an 
introduction to a text featured later in the book, Roger Shattuck’s “Narrating Evil: Great Faults 
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and Splendidly Wicked People.”58 Central to his assertion of the dangers of thought, Shattuck 
identifies the institution and postmodern theorists for the creation of evil as the object of 
subjective autonomy: 
 
Our culture, and in particular the institution of the University, has contrived over the past 
few decades to transform sin and evil into a positive term: transgression. As used by 
postmodern critics today, transgression refers to conduct that aspires to…an implied form 
of greatness in evil.59 
 
Significantly, it is in “metaphysical evil” that Shattuck identifies his central problematic wherein 
he defines two subject theories. The first is that of a critical subjective agency, where he prefers a 
subject that can self-reflexively doubt self-knowledge in the face of a ubiquitous and at once 
banal evil. The second, he identifies as a Nietzschean-style subject who condones evil or 
transgression as autonomy through the complicit act of narrating evil. He writes: 
 
Metaphysical evil designates an assenting and approving attitude toward moral and 
radical evil, as evidence of superior will and power in human beings. Thus, forms of evil 
arriving from human agency are given a status as inevitable, effectively a reversion to 
natural evil in the first category. And thus, the cruelest monsters and tyrants become 
normalised in the perspective of history and of the “survival of the fittest” in evolution. 
Metaphysical evil nullifies all attempts to establish constraints of social law or compact 
[…] The twentieth century has conferred astonishingly widespread respect on the attitude 
of metaphysical evil by honouring the thought of Nietzsche.60 
 
Shattuck’s apparent criticism of the twentieth century’s attraction for a “Nietzschean 
metaphysical evil” is directed towards the recognition that the attempt to effect a non-
transcendental critique requires the domination of a subjective investment in the power of reason 
to an irrational extent. This “irresponsibile” investment, or, misguided self-confidence in the 
power of our reason, is claimed by Shattuck through his idea of our inability to control and 
differentiate an image of evil from acting upon those images and behaving “evilly”. In other 
words, our ability to be reasonable is shown to be limited precisely through the fact that we 
cannot differentiate between aesthetics and action. As such, curiosity is understood as something 
that is ungoverned by reason but also, wrongly, sanctioned by it 
 
Sustaining his critique of theories that advocate an unselfconscious agency, Shattuck identifies 
such concepts as conditioned upon an understanding of belligerence, aggression and transgression 
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as autonomy. In this he looks to Ralph Waldo Emerson’s subject centred theory; “We believe in 
ourselves, as we do not believe in others. We permit all things to ourselves, and that which we 
call sin in others, is experiment for us.”61  This correlation between acting evilly and having a 
lack of care for others is negotiated in his taking up of Emerson’s “controversial” phrase, “there is 
no crime in intellect.”62 Here Shattuck holds this “experimental” attitude responsible for the 
subject who applies intellect to condoning evil. From this position Shattuck identifies this 
intellectual subject as indicative of a Nietzschean-style hegemony whereby the subject asserts and 
defines one’s authority over others. 
 
Shattuck attempts to deal with the problem of the subject’s “unreasoned” curiosity, brought on by 
an Enlightenment-style self-confidence, not by asking us “not to reason”, but to be careful about 
how we do. This is because Shattuck believes that through intellectualising evil, we historicise it 
and therefore condone it. Implicating the “barbaric” element of Enlightenment thinking as 
specific to a postmodern investment in an antimodern Nietzschean stance, Shattuck constructs his 
own mythology around such theories through a rather superficial critique of the dialectics of 
Enlightenment self-confidence, which he construes as dogmatic belief. From this, one could pose 
the question of the advocacy of “silence”. After all, “being careful” or understanding the 
limitations of reason could easily fall into the possibility that we attempt to become “passive” 
subjects. Unfortunately, for Shattuck, this potentially would move rather too quickly into the 
moral relativism and bland tolerance that his critique is clearly trying to avoid. However, this 
argument around a potentially “vigilant reason” can be paralleled and contested in Jean Luc 
Nancy’s statement in the chapter “Evil: Decision” in the book, The Experience of Freedom:  
 
If every thought of freedom must be renounced in order to make room for the hastily 
acquired consensus of a moral and political liberalism, then thinking as such must be 
renounced. This would not be a serious matter if thinking were only “some thought”; on 
the contrary, it would be to renounce that which can be evil and do evil in thought: 
illusion facility, irresponsibility, and intellectuality, which only considers itself free and 
easily affirms freedom as long as freedom does not put it to the test.63  
 
Nancy continues to analyse the impossibility and implausibility of “silence” voiced through 
Adorno: “Not even silence gets us out of the circle. In silence we simply use the state of objective 
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truth to rationalise our subjective incapacity, once more degrading truth into a lie.”64Adorno’s 
statement clearly problematises Shattuck’s conception of action as an ambiguous strategy for 
thinking intellectually. Consequentially Shattuck’s quick acceptance of “crime in intellect” does 
not attempt to describe what reasoned or “good” thinking could possibly be. In other words, 
despite loosely condemning “thinking” in itself Shattuck still calls upon the task of thinking as a 
means to condemn evil. 
 
The project of understanding evil for both Geddes and Shattuck is a necessary task for politics. 
However, what is crucial to this call to understand evil is that it is raised from and within its 
concretised aesthetic configuration through the production of narratives as the rhetoric of evil. As 
such it is “the diminution of moral vocabularies” and the spectacular nature of death, murder and 
violence, that invites this moral questioning of evil, not a call from beyond the structures of 
language systems. Here, evil is bound to its rhetoric. However, it is also conceptualised as a 
transcendental object. In this way for both Geddes and Shattuck, the spectacle of “aestheticised 
transgression” is inherently linked to a project of a Nietzschean-style evil or aggression as 
transgression, due to the fact that this aesthetics of transgression is understood as having a 
transcendental relation. 
 
The identification of subjective autonomy as “evil” action is taken up in Nancy’s commentary on 
Kant: 
 
It is in diabolical wickedness that Kant will recognise […] the biblical representation of 
an incomprehensible origin of evil in human beings. In other words, for there to be 
relative evil (which is called “radical evil” and for which there is always hope for a 
"return to the good"), there must be in the origin the absolute evil of the determination 
toward evil […] The wickedness of Lucifer/Satan figures an incomprehensible, absolute 
evil at the root of the root of human evil.65 
 
This proposes evil as a sustained correlative to action and even an imperative, whereby the 
subject can associate “freedom” with a transgressive move away from a concept of the good. 
Nancy continues by quoting Heidegger: 
 
For evil is truly in man’s essence as the most extreme opposition and revolt of the spirit 
against the Absolute (tearing oneself away from the universal will, being against it, the 
will replacing it in this “against”) Evil “is” as freedom, the most extreme freedom against 
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the Absolute within the whole of beings. For freedom “is” the capacity for good and evil. 
The good “is” the evil and the evil “is” the good.66 
 
It is precisely this contingency - that evil, it seems, is always already associated with a concept of 
freedom and that the subject as the agent of action makes this identification – that situates the 
problem for aesthetics, or the imaging or identification with one’s action. These claims to a 
transhistorical conception of agency as hinged upon transgression, violence and evil sustains a 
problem when regarding Nietzsche’s central influence upon postmodern theory because we can 
no longer identify “bad Nietzscheanism” as the lone carrier of this predication of evil as 
autonomy, and also, that “bad Nietzscheanism” is not a theory as such, but a historically inscribed 
writing of the identification of evil’s immanence as object in the material world. 
 
 
Pulp Fiction and “cool” 
Shattuck details his concerns with a Nietzschean-style postmodernism most fully, and also comes 
closest to a position by which to respond to this as a problem, in his example of the film Pulp 
Fiction (dir. Quentin Tarrantino 1994). Here, the problem of narrating evil is raised where 
Shattuck identifies the act of narrating as hinged upon a passive un-thoughtful complicity with 
evil actions: 
 
Pulp Fiction mitigates the behaviour it represents, [it] carries us further away from 
responsibility and guilt. In the idea of “cool” complicity in criminal violence lurks the 
suggestion of greatness in evil and of evil… The “cool” of Pulp Fiction, transports us 
first into the pervasiveness of radical evil and then back to metaphysical evil - Evil is not 
overcome; evil is accepted and admired.67  
 
What is initially significant to this passage is that by requiring or demanding redemption in and 
from such texts, it is evident that Shattuck relies heavily on the narrative function in general to 
have a didactic capacity and a literal effect upon the audience. In this, it seems that as “scholars” 
we are to guard against our fascination and unbridled curiosity with the story and instead read 
them as cultural parables that can warn us against the concept of pleasure in violence or evil. 
Shattuck’s preference for narrating evil then, seems to take the form of some kind of intellectual 
chastisement, where we are to accept the inherent “immorality” of not only the image but our 
participation as an audience within it.  
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For Shattuck, Pulp Fiction epitomises the “postmodern” problem in its celebration of evil in the 
“coolness” and attraction of purposeless violence and the film’s non-satirical, non-ironic 
production. This “coolness”, creates for Shattuck, the problem of the disappearance of the tension 
between the audience and the narrative, where he identifies the film as something that mitigates 
or supports the violence it represents through its “cool” or desirable aesthetic. It is interesting to 
note that Shattuck redeems Tarrantino’s critical position as being against violence in the scene 
where Bruce Willis’s character (the boxer, Butch Coolidge) cannot decide which weapon to 
choose when being chased by the gangster boss. Here, Coolidge goes from one gruesome weapon 
to the next, in a “vaudevillian” comedy style, to finally settle for a samurai sword. Shattuck 
identifies a redemptive factor situated within the excess of the performance, through its overly 
dramatised staging of a comic book violent fantasy in a “lawless” state.68 However, in the rest of 
the film’s more “realistic” quality he doesn’t identify such a critical mediation. Instead, Shattuck 
proposes that in the rest of the film “reason” or “critical distance” disappears, brought on through 
the audience’s complicity; the desire to be associated with the violence of the characters and to 
enjoy violence. Shattuck claims therefore, that the only way to situate a critical position within 
violent imagery is to make a comedic violence. Excessive violence written as an improbable 
comedy thus serves Shattuck’s purpose of ordering and delimiting violence. This comedy is 
clearly negotiated through a simplistic performance of rational actions where the irrational power 
of violence is undermined in the series of “rational” choices, which appear comically absurd 
under the urgent circumstances. However, Shattuck is still left with the problem of the remainder 
of the film. As such, Shattuck’s identification of critique as something that is effective through its 
image of obvious “excess” or comedy, is problematised by narratives that display complicity in 
violence through “coolness”. These narratives are outside of and delimit Shattuck’s method of 
critique. Unfortunately, in this sense Shattuck can only complain that such films exist, 
surrendering to the impossible, delivering the sentiment of “what is the world coming to?” instead 
of actually addressing this phenomena. 
 
Shattuck does not recognise the more subtle “fantasy” elements of this genre, and specifically 
those within this film, where the action takes place in strange “other-worldly” places, dark bars 
and themed restaurants; where American icons from history are alive and well, in the form of 
waiters and waitresses ready to serve up oversized burgers and milk shakes; where the central 
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characters all operate around the swift, banal and cool vernacular of a language which is 
communicated as style. The film itself is produced in over-saturated colour and is edited within a 
circular narrative. Being groundless and particularly uneventful, there are no conclusions, evil as 
an object is not sought to be attained, or in other words the characters do not especially delight in 
evil, or aim for evil as a metaphysical end, they just are “bad mother-fuckers”. Certainly violence 
is associated with “action” but violence here is demonstrated as the constant acceptable “excess” 
of the everyday-underworld. Shattuck’s complaint that this violence is mainstream and 
represented as something that is not shocking does not necessarily equate with the experience of 
the audience as being wholly complicit with it in the sense that now we can act just like the 
characters in the movie. Shattuck sees the “coolness” delivered in Pulp Fiction to express not just 
a complicity within the image, but also the desire for complicity.  
 
To make some early conclusions: in both Shattuck and Geddes’ description of the aestheticising 
of violence, crime, or evil, aesthetics and evil can be seen as inseparable, whereupon the narrating 
or aestheticisation of evil demonstrates a fascination, curiosity and a “lack of law” around 
subjective judgements which moreover seem delegated to the area of taste. As such, Shattuck 
considers satire as rationality the (or one) answer to the problem of representing evil, for this 
satirical space is where the subject deliberately distances him/herself from the action. In 
opposition, the coolness of Pulp Fiction, for Shattuck, acts as a non-satirical distanctiation from 
the “real dangers” of evil, violence and force. “Cool” is not critical for Shattuck; it is passively 
complicit with evil, acting as a weak and even immoral concession to its image and practice. 
Accordingly, evil is associated with the audience’s desire to assimilate, or be assimilated by, the 
image of “cool” violence. Shattuck does not entertain this desire as having a rational possibility, 
or the possibility for understanding and also disagreeing with it. Moreover, Shattuck’s 
explanation of the desire involved around a notion of “coolness” in violence is understood as a 
perverse pleasure in evil, a pathological enjoyment, or an apparently “unreasoned” curiosity 
around and towards evil. This confirms aesthetics as ultimately correlative to evil, and 
conditionally, this evil as the “beyond”. 
 
 
The limits of a rationalising self-government 
To briefly conclude, the problems of situating a rational criticality in the face of post-
structuralism’s proclivity for “bad Nietzscheanism” (or the identification of an aesthetics of 
transgression as autonomy) is further problematised by the means Shattuck undertakes to avoid or 
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even challenge it. His theory is underpinned by something that is not unlike the character of 
metaphysical evil. This can be initially recognised in his de-politicising of the aesthetics of evil. 
Here, he (problematically) maintains the concepts of fascination, taste and curiosity as irrational 
and pathological instances outside of understanding and also, strangely, conditions a space for 
evil’s transcendental nature to be a product of it being aestheticised. This prompts the question of 
how action as “aestheticised evil”, “joy in violence” or the “popularity of the criminal”, as 
inevitable and associated objects of action, can be usefully articulated when taste itself is 
designated outside of the political.  
 
Further to this, Shattuck’s theory is problematised because he maintains the subject at the heart of 
the decision making process whilst simultaneously disabling the subject’s potentiality or mobility. 
In other words, Shattuck separates rationality from belief, since it is not rationality that is 
responsible for our lack of moral certitude, but our belief in it. As such, Shattuck does not contest 
rationality as the basis for judgement. Rather, this is relied upon to the extent that now our own 
ability to judge is very subject of our scepticism. Consequently, we are faced with a guilty subject 
who is forced to find at fault the very locus of self-assertion.  
 
Significantly, Shattuck’s attempt to overcome what he calls the postmodern attraction for a 
Nietzschean-style metaphysics of evil is manifest either in creating an authoritarian power 
structure to govern the production and consumption of what he chooses to designate as “evil 
narratives”, or through making a “blockbuster” (what could be construed as an infantile and 
didactic) morality tale of how the dangers that a desire for a Nietzschean-style, non-
transcendental critique has an inevitable anti-humanist tendency when effected as a “postmodern” 
narrative. The problem of “violence” for Shattuck’s theory is therefore focussed initially in the 
demand for power and moreover expressed in the attempt to sever, or, to make distinct 
separations between what is deemed “good” and “bad” or “right” and “wrong”. 
 
As such, Shattuck forgets and therefore leaves the problem open for discussion, of the 
relationships between the forces of knowledge that he seeks to undermine and his own 
“rationalising forces” he seeks to champion. Further to this, his critique highlights the complex 
relation between the dialectic central to Enlightenment thinking, namely the paradox of 
organising self-government, and a conception of violent postmodern subjectivities. This problem 
of the structure of knowledge and power within language defines the central and recurring 
argument throughout this and the following chapters. 
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 What is central to Shattuck’s analysis is his reliance upon postmodernism as a diseased, corrupt 
or flawed version of modernity. However, evidently his aims to avoid the problems raised in a 
pluralist conception of agency by institutionalising a “healthy modernity” (evidenced in his 
attempt to re-think the “postmodern” Nietzschean avowal through Enlightenment theory) prove 
unworkable. This leaves open a “postmodern” space for a further discussion of particular 
authorities of agency and how these are definitively related to an aesthetic identification of self-
invention. This is usefully described by Zygmunt Bauman as “where the pluralism of authority 




2. Foucault’s “Totalitarian Liberalism” 
 
The question Shattuck’s analysis leaves us with is the problem of Nietzschean-style aesthetics as 
correlative to a postmodern identification of action. Following from the problematic of being and 
appearing discussed above, the problem for judgement as taste and the problem of understanding 
the alignment between politics and aesthetics can be seen to be foregrounded in the work of 
Michel Foucault. In Critique of Violence, Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory, 
Beatrice Hanssen attempts to recover Foucault’s ethico-aesthetics from claims that his work on 
ethics embodied conservative, anti-democratic and totalitarian ideologies. Hanssen recalls such 
condemnations from Foucault’s detractors,  
 
Whether coming from critical theorists, poststructuralists, Marxists, or liberal 
pragmatists, the charges have ranged from “neoconservatism” (Habermas), “pan-
aestheticism” (Wolin), a fascination with marginal lifestyles (Zizek), a perverse defence 
of “public school virtues” (Eagleton), and neo-Romanticism (Rorty), the larger 
implication being that Foucault’s anti-universalist ethics opened the door to decisionism, 
voluntarism, authoritarianism, particularism, individualism, or the romantic quest for 
authenticity.70  
 
Such identifications are predominantly situated around Foucault’s relation to Nietzschean-style 
aesthetics that demarcate what seems to be an unnegotiable pit-fall to his project. In this sense 
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Foucault’s “totalitarian” aspect is seen to be re-issued in his privileging of the aesthetics of 
politics. This understanding of the legacy of Foucault’s theory therefore presents a problem for 
action based on an inextricable aesthetico-political dynamic. Foucault can be seen to promote an 
aestheticised notion of subjectivity that suggests a dangerous tenor around critical choice or 
judgement. Hanssen writes that “behind apparently universal normative claims (lay) hidden the 
subjective power claims of value appraisals. To aestheticise politics in effect meant to relinquish 
the discriminatory capacity of reason and to enthrone the faculty of taste as the supreme critical 
instance.”71 And:  
 
At its worst the fear was that this sliding into Nietzsche’s direction might give rise to the 
frightful prospect that violence and terror would force their entry into the realm of the 
ethical, as subjects sought to foist their fickle “will to power” upon others.72 
 
By interrogating the structure of the Nietzschean politico-aesthetic at work within Foucault’s 
theory I intend to establish first, an understanding of the politics of a “postmodern” subject. This 
study is not based upon the intent to redeem Foucault’s work from the above claims, but to invest 
in and further my analysis of a subjectivity that inhabits a position between, or even confuses, the 
anti/modern and poststructural theories. Following from this Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault’s 
work can be seen to make subjective action directly correlative to an act of transgression, thereby 
providing a particularly individuated self that raises the problem of a potential lack of concern for 
others. What this reading also throws up is the maintenance of the act of transgression and that is 
both fascinating, dangerous and something that always aims towards an idea of autonomy as 
power, essentially the Nietzschean ontology of the “will to power”.  
 
Central to Foucault’s unstable postmodernism and his Nietzschean influence is the way in which 
the Foucauldian subject is modeled upon historical and foundational grounds. With this in mind I 
look to the problems of understanding Foucault’s ethics as a temporal and self-asserting practice 
of law, an ethos, since Foucault’s inscription of a central system of “law” not only invites 
metaphysics but is also conditioned upon and bears forth the representation of the “Foucauldian” 
figure for knowledge described by his many critics. As such, because this critique focuses upon 
the representations and critical interpretations of Foucault’s theory, I ask if this figuring of 
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Foucault’s ethical paradigm as rhetoric can shed light upon the complex relationship between the 
subjective practices of the freedom to choose and the theorising of that freedom.  
 
 
Foucault with Kant and Nietzsche 
Hanssen identifies the theme of the will to power in Foucault’s work as the incentive for Richard 
Rorty’s suspicion of Foucault’s relationship with Nietzschean philosophy. Quoting Rorty’s Moral 
Identity, Private Autonomy:  
 
Apart from the perils of solipsism that might afflict the individual overemphasizing the 
relation to self, the real danger was that such a search for one’s autonomy might turn 
Nietzschean, if one tried to act upon it no longer in the privacy of one’s own home but in 
the public sphere.73 
 
The Nietzschean aspect of Foucault’s theory as something that is responsible for the ethical 
suspicions around his thesis is further examined by Hanssen when she asks: “To what extent was 
Foucault’s ethical project not Nietzschean, to what extent was it less than Kantian?”74 Foucault’s 
use of Kant and Nietzsche can be seen to draw upon the fusing of subject philosophy with the 
preference for a non-transcendental critique. The latter designating the Nietzschean aspect and the 
former, the Kantian, wherein we see Foucault’s reliance upon a primordial concept of ethical 
values and the operation of such values exercised within language. These aspects are combined 
by Foucault in the form of what Habermas describes in his text “Taking Aim at the Heart of the 
Present” as “the philosophy of Kant and the politics of Nietzsche.”75  
 
Whereas Kant and Nietzsche could easily be identified as the odd couple at the centre of this 
project, under Foucault’s historicised reading, their relative influences are at times hard to 
discriminate. Hanssen describes Foucault’s route between Kant and Nietzsche to be comprised of 
a Kantian “technologies of the self” and a Nietzschean tribute to Baudelaire, where Foucault 
looks to Nietzsche’s “self fashioning” of the subject to understand identity formation mediated 
through Baudelaire’s aestheticism.76 This foregrounding of the self can initially be seen in 
Foucault’s recognition of the Kantian notion of criticality as a stylised transcendental thematic. 
By attempting to move past and reject modernist critique Foucault sought to overcome the 
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problems of Enlightenment thinking expressed in Adorno & Horkheimer’s dialectic, whilst 
accounting for a morally contingent notion of subjective autonomy within a non-hierarchical 
society.  
 
Kant identified critique as the act of testing the limits of reason evident in the Enlightenment 
(epic or even, heroic) slogan “Dare to Know”, outlining a methodology of the “conscious practice 
of freedom” as the tools by which to lead the ethical life. This prefers ethics as “self government” 
and the practice of philosophy as “self-interrogation” resulting in a “permanent critique of 
ourselves”.77 Foucault was to combine this culture of self-critique inspired by Kant with the 
Greek term “ethos”78 which advocated an aesthetics of existence where one would practice the 
arts of living in all aspects of life. 
 
Foucault’s historicising of the term “critique” developed through the Kantian recognition of the 
Enlightenment as “the age of critique”79 allowed him to establish critique as the “attitude” of 
modernity. Habermas describes Foucault’s use of Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?” commenting 
on Foucault’s translation of Kant:  
 
Instead we encounter a different Kant - the precursor of the Young Hegelians, the Kant 
who was the first to make a serious break with the metaphysical heritage, who turned 
philosophy away from the Eternal Verities and concentrated upon what philosophers had 
until they considered to be without concept and non existent, merely contingent and 
transitory. In Kant’s answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault sees the 
origin of an “ontology of contemporary reality.”80  
 
In this sense, Kant’s Critique of Judgement could be read as the “critique of taste”, for which 
judgment is effected through empirical rules and criteria and where there can be only critique. 
Here, one’s will is inextricably related to knowledge and is a particularly individuating force, 
being defined by “the resolution of one’s reason without relying upon the external guidance of 
others.”81 In addition, desire as correlative to will, is also expressed as something close to the 
quest for knowledge and also closely related to freedom, determined in the phrase “the desire not 
to be governed so much.”82 Hanssen describes how Foucault was to glean the “will to revolution” 
from Kant despite Kant’s later “conservative republicanism” expressed in the move towards the 
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“will to evolution.”83 In doing so, Foucault took up Kant’s experimental attitude and 
revolutionising understanding of freedom in order to create an “enthusiasm for the will to 
revolution,”84 an “ontology of ourselves,” and “a radical critique of the now.”85 
 
 
Between modernism and postmodernism  
It is within Foucault’s move towards “an ethico-poetic cultivation of the self” that Hanssen 
identifies a shift from Kantian territory since such an ethics could no longer be seen to operate 
around “a Kantian-infused conception of an individual will that answered to a universal moral 
law.”86 Instead Foucault opted for an ethics which was governed by the primordial sensibility of 
the “desiring subject”. Here, as previously mentioned, ethics were not situated around a general 
law of the “other”, but through the construction or even the evolution of an autonomous self-
governing subject who would not require authoritarian State powers. Nancy Fraser describes the 
ideological object of Foucault’s work. Here, she picks up on the protracted legacy of Foucault’s 
project, where power is transparent and universally contingent. However, despite, and perhaps 
even because of this, power is also an operation of normative and invisible hegemonical 
dominance: 
 
One can imagine a perfected disciplinary society in which normalising power has become 
so omnipresent, so finely attuned, so penetrating, interiorised, and subjectified, and 
therefore so invisible, that there is no longer any need for confessors, psychoanalysts, 
wardens, and the like. In this fully “panopticised” society, hierarchical, asymmetrical 
domination of some persons by others would have become superfluous; all would surveil 
and police themselves. The disciplinary norms would have become so thoroughly 
internalised that they would not be experienced as coming from without. The members of 
this society would, therefore, be autonomous. They would have appropriated the other as 
their own and made substance subject.87  
 
Clearly demonstrated here are problems with Foucault’s project, in as much as if power is 
recognised as subject to all, then power underscores its own ubiquity. Foucault can’t theorise a 
universal conception of power without replacing power outside of, or, problematically, as a 
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mechanistic foundation for politics. Accordingly, what we are left with in Foucault’s 
identification of power’s ubiquity is the force of Foucault’s argument and the memory of his 
prejudices between good and bad governmental conduct. Consequently, it is the problem of 
acknowledging power as universally relative that proves problematic for politics.  
 
To briefly summarise, we can agree that Foucault sought a non-transcendental critique founded 
within the act of speech, context, contingency, and event, thus moving away from a Kantian 
metaphysical critique to one which worked within a preference for the analysis of historical 
singularities.88 Through this move however, he sustains an awkward reliance upon an 
unexplained and idealistic trust in, as Hanssen puts it, “a rarefied primordial ethic at work through 
age old petrified moral codes” in order to realise the ideological dream of a society of individuals 
that were free to control the various structures of dominance.89  This raises the issue that both an 
ethical “origin” and a notion of the “ideal” as factors that were not really dealt with in Foucault’s 
work and which also implicitly signify the distinctly “modern” character within his critique 
previously described by Habermas. Consequently, Foucault’s project amply demonstrates the 
problems of thinking through the relationship between a performing poststructuralist subjectivity 
that sustains the rhetoric of a classical hierarchy on the one hand, and on the other shows up the 
demand inherent to modernism: the problem of understanding a democratic and inter-subjective 
politics of emancipation. 
 
For Foucault, this “primordial ethic” would sustain one’s cultural work upon the self, and is 
evident in his turn to Nietzsche, and move through Baudelaire, where one’s “self fashioning” 
endowed the subject with the Kantian potency of the subversive practice of the art of “not being 
governed so much.” Foucault was careful not to identify this aspect of invention as an appraisal 
of irrationalism. Instead, his turn to Nietzsche translates the understanding of transgression as a 
wholly negative phenomena and redefines a concept of critique, moving away from something 
which seeks to make radical breaks with continuity towards a concept of invention to structure “a 
way of being that is still improbable.”90 It is this use of Baudelaire through Nietzsche that 
prompts many of Foucault’s detractors to identify the questionable moral and political ground of 
his theory.  
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Since Foucault’s conception of “critique as attitude” or convention fails to move critique away 
from its oppositional character, the problem of the transgressive character in Foucault’s project 
withstands: Either the democratisation of agency as self-fashioning is seen to fall off into a 
relativistic and private reliance upon his a priori, or, it produces a subject whose self-invention is 
a public exercise the “will to power” over and against others. Consequently, despite Foucault’s 
descriptions of a universalised power apparatus, a core attitude of transgression remains. This 
transgressive attitude and function of critique, highlights the fixed conditions of social dominance 
remaining at the heart of Foucault’s politics, and alerts us to his project’s emancipatory 
foundations and motivations. Here, Foucault combines, and to some extent, confuses a general 
and temporal labour upon the self with a goal that is over and above daily self-betterment, namely 
the desire to be free from the practices of dominant hegemonies. 
 
At this point it is also relevant to comment further upon the consequences of Foucault’s ethical 
ground. It is argued by many of Foucault’s critics and supporters, including Hanssen, that 
Foucault’s founding ethical law gives way to an under-developed set of moral codes which 
identify the “will to power” as the object of transgression to any authority, generated by the 
alignment of self-critique and self-invention. Since the alignment of self-critique and self-
invention are unified in daily performances of self-fashioning, the uses of power/knowledge now 
feature as key factors to sustaining and identifying ones autonomy. In this instance it is the 
“blind” investment in an internal ethical law that can be seen to act as fragile grounds upon which 
Foucault builds his politics of action as self-fashioning. It is also significant that Foucault’s 
roughly sketched internal (primordial) ethic as the ideal charge for the subject creates the 
combined tension between this, the (un)located ethic as the internalised “other” within the 
subject, and, the exteriorised or public action carried out by the self-fashioning subject.91  
Therefore, Foucault can be seen to inadvertently create a rather troubling account of power 
politics, despite his attempt to take on this issue as a central problematic. The dangers of the “will 
to power” are recounted in Fraser’s criticism: 
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Such a society seems objectionable only because Foucault has described it in a way that 
invites the genetic fallacy, that is, because he has made it the outcome of a historical 
process of hierarchical, asymmetrical coercion wherein people have been in Nietzschean 
parlance, “bred” to autonomy.92 
 
Here, Foucault’s Nietzschean politico-aesthetics generates the simultaneous potential of both the 
violence and the banality of subjective action as transgression. This is where criticality, 
formulated as an inventive strategy, seeks and maintains the character of both a subversive 
Kantian moment and where the product of self-fashioning is always transgressive. The self-
inventive aspect of the “will to revolution” (action) becomes indistinct from the “desire” for 
knowledge (thinking) when materialised in a positively charged force characterised by the 
aesthetics of self as a mode of (transgressive) critique. In this Foucault moves past Habermas’s 
concept of Kant as the purely philosophical agent in his project, introducing a moral and political 
element, effected by that same Kantian modernist sensibility. This could go some way to 
confirming Fraser’s recognition that “without a nonhumanist ethical paradigm, Foucault cannot 
make good his normative case against humanism.”93  
 
In this sense Foucault’s recognition of the crisis of modernist critique, manifested in its rejection, 
also sustained its character. His project redeems the character of “critique” precisely through its 
historicisation. The “political” therefore is seen to be at risk within Foucault’s work, through the 
sustained Kantian character of an ethical subject plus the evacuation of the grounds which 
enabled the subject to determine or assess action. This problem of the modern character at work 
in Foucault’s project is indicated in criticisms such as Habermas’s: that although Foucault’s 
critique of contemporary culture and society purports to be postmodern, it is at best modern and 
at worst antimodern.94 
 
 
3. Kant and Nietzsche 
 
What this assertion of modernism calls into question is exactly how this Kantian character 
provides the basis of this political risk for Foucault’s project, especially when taking into 
consideration that these criticisms of Foucault are identified particularly through his Nietzschean 
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influence. The Nietzschean connection to Foucault’s proposition for a postmodern theory of 
subjectivity is initially evidenced in a mutual strategy of moving against modernist, 
transcendental critique. This inability to overcome metaphysics, despite turning it against itself 
can be seen to be the hallmark of Nietzsche’s philosophy, manifest precisely through the 
significant lack or the evacuated space of the categorical imperative. However, it is important to 
re-state the complex dynamic at work within the modern and anti-modern relations, especially as 
here we are dealing specifically with an accusation being leveled at Foucault’s postmodern 
Nietzschean influence. In order to construe how the problem of modernist critique can be 
identified as a Nietzschean problem it is important to identify a common point between Nietzsche 
and Foucault, significantly the problem of aesthetic judgements. 
 
Kant’s dedication to the issue of aesthetic judgment proves to be pivotal for the text Critique of 
Judgement, where, with his assertion regarding the synthetic faculty of taste, that “this problem of 
the Critique of Judgement belongs to the general problem of transcendental philosophy: how are 
synthetical a priori judgements possible”95 is grounded in the problem of judgement within a 
concept of aesthetic “disinterestedness”. His formulation of the antinomy of taste goes: “The 
judgment of taste is not based upon determinate concepts”, whose antithesis is; “the judgment of 
taste is based upon a concept but an indeterminate one.”96 It is in this unavailability of a 
concretised understanding of aesthetic judgements that Kant situates the pleasure in the beautiful 
as without enjoyment, without concepts and with only the spontaneity of reflection. As such, 
Kant de-centres reason from aesthetic judgments, and likewise, the demand to make aesthetic 
judgments de-centres the power of reasoning. Nietzsche takes this up in On the Genealogy of 
Morals: 
 
“That which pleases without interest”, Kant had said “is beautiful”. Without interest! 
Compare this definition by that offered by a genuine “spectator” and artist Stendhal - who 
once described the beautiful as une promesse de bonheur. Here in any case the very 
aspect of the aesthetic condition which Kant emphasised at the expense of all others  - le 
desinteressement - is rejected and crossed out.97 
 
Siding with Stendhal, Nietzsche moves through the Kantian problematic by refusing to situate or 
rescue an a priori upon which to base judgments of taste. Instead he understands the interest and 
pleasure one associates with Stendhal’s “une promesse de bonheur” as the thing which motivates 
will as an absolute interest, something that is always based in conception. In championing 
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subjective interest Nietzsche conflates the judgement of beauty with reason. This adds further to 
the Kantian problem of reason as transcendental to understanding because Nietzsche’s dedication 
to passion, interest and natural desire is arguably as divorced from aesthetic judgment as the 
Kantian a priori that he seeks to avoid. 
 
Further to this, the demonstration of Nietzsche’s vitriolic opposition to notions of Kantian 
subjectivity paradoxically underscore the proximity of their critique, or indeed the specific 
reliance that the antimodern has upon the modern, where Kant’s Categorical Imperative so 
ruthlessly evacuated by Nietzsche retains its radical and immanent character to action precisely 
through the visible lack of law. In this sense I do not wish to map a clear distinction between Kant 
and Nietzsche but to acknowledge their mutual “contamination”. 
 
Central to this are the issues of subjectivity, power and freedom. Nietzsche writes: 
 
If out of the vindictive cunning of impotence, the oppressed, downtrodden and violated 
tell themselves... “…The good man is the one who refrains from violation, who harms no 
one, who attacks no one, who fails to retaliate, who leaves revenge to God…who avoids 
all evil and above all asks little of life, as we do, the patient, the humble, the just.” When 
listened to coldly and without prejudice this actually means nothing more than: “We 
weak men are, after all, weak; it would be good if we refrained from doing anything for 
which we lack sufficient strength.” [It is] as if the weakness of the weak man itself - that 
is, his essence, his action, his whole single, unavoidable, irredeemable reality - were a 
free achievement, something willed, chosen, a deed, a merit. […] The subject has 
therefore, been perhaps, the best article of faith on earth so far, since it enables the 
majority of mortals, the weak and the downtrodden of all sorts, to practice that sublime 
self-deception - the interpretation of weakness itself as freedom, of the way they simply 
are as merit. 98  
 
In the above quote Nietzsche takes this Kantian premise of the “good” subject as the weak, or 
non-transgressive subject, overturning Kant’s rationale. What is crucial to this is that Nietzsche 
stays firmly within the same hierarchy of values that Kant prescribes. Also, stepping back to my 
earlier quotation by Nancy on Kant, one can identify Kant’s structuring of diabolical evil as an 
absolute and, perhaps inadvertently, an imperative. This conception of autonomy as transgression 
is especially relevant when under conditions of “lawlessness” such as the French Revolution, it is 
clear that Man takes the violence of transgression against the general law of State to be an 
autonomous experience. In this, freedom is construed as being against the law, a self-defining act 
that demands the recognition of difference, but also a place where the subject can recognise his 
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own alienation from the law and accordingly from community, State and God. As such, freedom, 
for Kant is conditioned upon transgression, but the good subject refrains from these “natural” 
urges in order to lead the “good life”. Further to this, although Nietzsche allows evil as an 
imperative to action, he does not identify it as an absolute:  
 
I gave God the honour, as is fitting, and made him the father of evil. Was this the very 
thing which my “A priori” required of me? That new immoral, or at least amoral, “A 
priori” and the alas! So anti-Kantian, so enigmatic “categorical imperative” which spoke 
through it and to which I have since been increasingly attentive and more than just 
attentive? Fortunately, I have since learnt to separate theology from morality and ceased 
looking for the origin of evil behind the world. 99 
 
By navigating a terrain beyond good and evil Nietzsche problematises Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative. Although Nietzsche can be seen to move beyond the absolute imperative of evil 
evidenced in Kant, he situates and motivates the difficulty of knowing whether we are being evil 
or not. In this sense although Nietzsche side-steps the problem of absolutes within theological 
grounds and attempts to move past any reliance upon an a priori, he does not escape the good/evil 
polemic but falls into it all the more. This can be seen to be indicated in the ethos of the “will to 
power” where the subject perceives power as domination over others because now power is a 
“natural right” and one should act according to one’s nature. This again raises the problem that 
Nietzsche’s disruption of the Kantian Categorical Imperative in his aim to move past or beyond 
good and evil moves quickly back and even deepens such polemics through the subjective 
requirement with a definition of power that is recognised through the assertion of one’s 
individuated power over others. Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, also acts as a radical assertion 
of both the violence of ethics and as a concretised history of conflict and cruelty.  
 
Crucially, Nietzsche’s conception of power is not benign, which raises the problem upon what 
axis is action directed and what does it look like? This problem recalls Nancy’s identification of 
the political problem of modernist critique in general, where action as transgression is motivated 
in relation to a concept of evil. It is the consistent and awkward relation of this version of action 
as aestheticised transgression, identified through Kant, coupled dangerously with the Nietzschean 
project of “the will to power” that can be identified in Hanssen’s critique of Foucault’s project. 
This coupling generates the problem that a politicised and historicised reading of Kant’s “critique 
as transgression” can be recognised as the prevailing attitude and the problem for Nietzsche’s 




philosophy. Significantly, this identification complicates the ability to define specific differences 
between the aesthetics of transgression as being particularly related to either the antimodern or 
the modern. Therefore, it is now important to think through the consequences of the evacuation of 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative - identifiable as “lack” in the work of Nietzsche - to how this 
problem is understood in Foucault’s postmodern project. In other words, we are left with the 
question of how Foucault goes about understanding the immanence of power, violence or 
transgression to action (as we see already established by both a Kantian and a Nietzschean 
identification of transgression as relative to an experience of autonomy), without conditioning 
action upon it.  
 
 
Figuring Foucault  
Returning to the Critique of Violence, Hanssen ultimately describes Foucault’s moves between 
Kant and Nietzsche and his drawing upon other influences with the intention to highlighting his 
“un-Nietzschean” aspect:   
 
It is not necessary to graft Foucault’s aesthetics onto the threatening program of a 
Nietzschean aestheticism, if this means the anti-democratic, aggressive imposition of 
transvalued values upon one’s unsuspecting neighbours, as laid out in Nietzsche’s Birth 
of Tragedy, Genealogy of Morals or The Will to Power. For all his explicit advances to 
Nietzsche, Foucault’s endeavour to reanimate the aesthetic seemed to have more 





Foucault did not wish to furnish a “moral genealogy” in the Nietzschean sense [and] if he 
did enlist the tools of etymology to pierce beneath the surface of conventional, 
historically encrusted moral codes, it was really to hark back to the “conservative” Greek 
sense of terms such as askesis or ethos. Basically, rather than emulating Nietzsche’s 
critique of morality, Foucault really historicised it, ascribing to it a set place in the 
philosophical canon.101  
 
This infers that although taking up a similar strategy to Nietzsche’s genealogical study, Foucault 
ultimately prefers a genealogy of ethics. This quest to dislodge critique leaves an undeveloped 
moral field since what was considered “moral” by Foucault - a set of values and rules of actions 
that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies 
such as the family (in one of its roles), educational institutions, churches and so forth - was left 
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uncharted in favour of the formation of oneself as an ethical subject through a system of codes.102 
Hanssen writes: “[Foucault] distinguished between rules of conduct (codes), actual conduct 
(askesis) and, third, ideal conduct or “the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical 
subject acting in reference to the prescriptive element that makes up the code.””103 Following 
Hanssen’s distinctions we can see that Foucault’s ethico-aesthetic mapping of self-invention upon 
the subject’s knowledge of various conventional codes of law, practice, or ideology, 
conventionalises transgression as one aspect of performative possibilities in a plurality of self-
styling. However, it is also evident that the practice of self-invention in accordance with these 
codes is privileged such that individual difference is zeroed in on as the expression of autonomy 
in the social sphere.  
 
This political and moral problematic does go some way to account for the claims made against 
Foucault’s work such as the decadent aestheticising of the private domain in the move away from 
universalist ethics to a concentrated and auto-biographical particularism demonstrated in his 
interest in S&M. In the latter, his concept of self-invention could be seen to have undergone a 
translation effected through his adoption of the California lifestyle. It is here that one could see 
Foucault’s attempt at “self-fashioning” through the play of a multiplicity of realities which 
intended to radically translate the negatively defined Kantian subject towards a notion of a 
“positive critique” of invention resulting in a “transvaluation of the present”104 prompted the 
criticisms that perhaps it was too inventive. This “danger” is evidenced in charges such as 
Alexander Nehamas’ in The Art of Living, where he suggests that Foucault’s work brought about 
an “abandonment of politics.”105 Such a condemnation sought to confirm Foucault’s style of 
ethico-aesthetics could not escape the claims that it potentialised an irrationalism, irresponsibility 
and created at once both an ineffectual, fickle and troubling notion of subjectivity. In this sense 
the danger was that this aspect of “radical invention” became the illusive object of such a politics. 
Nehamas makes this possible by conceptualising a credible risk to invention without law, even if 
this invention does not seek an identification with a transgressive move away from it. This 
portrays a notion of a subject who is too free, and ultimately introduces Nehamas’ call for the 
requirement of an ethic upon which to govern the invention of oneself.  
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Although highlighting Foucault’s Kantian/Nietzschean marriage as wholly correlative to this 
project and offering distinctly un-Nietzschean aspects to his work (in the sense of arguing against 
a “bad-Nietzscheanism” anyway), the assertion of Foucault’s critics that “his proposal for an 
antiuniversalist ethics backslided into an irredeemable, not to say opproborious, Nietzschean-style 
aestheticism”106 is ultimately mitigated in Hanssen’s text by pointing to Foucault’s “liberal” 
intent, exemplified in the concept of the “historical reinvention of self”. In other words, Hanssen 
describes Foucault’s “attempt” at the task of dealing with the absence of “normatively negotiated 
directives or an unambiguous adherence to a common vocabulary” as the redeeming feature of 
Foucault’s project. On the contrary, and as I have argued, it is precisely this ideological aspect of 
Foucault’s work that allows many of his critics to define his work as allowing the subject to make 
power claims over others.  
 
Hanssen also describes the redemptive faculty in Foucault’s theory as broadening “the spectrum 
of non-coercive identity positions that subjects can occupy beyond those listed in conventional, 
normative handbooks.” Aesthetics, for Foucault were intended “to rouse the benign meaning he 
once invoked in an interview, when he noted that “aestheticism” really meant the transformation 
of oneself through knowledge.”107 
 
Hanssen continues to administer Foucault’s “bad press” by emphasising his “historical 
reinvention of the self” where she resists monolithic narratives by choosing to analyse Foucault 
both locally and historically. In other words, Hanssen adopts a pragmatic style of critique and 
highlights a contextually and historically driven analysis to re-motivate and possibly recover his 
project. Hanssen does not take Shattuck’s redemptive route, warning us to be careful about the 
power we endow to reason. She instead prefers to singularise and compartmentalise Foucault’s 
efforts preferring some aspects more than others. However, this tends towards a wish to give 
Foucault the “benefit of the doubt” over “totalitarian” or “antimodern” accusations without 
attempting to negotiate the root of such condemnations such as Rorty’s: that an aesthetics of the 
self worked through Nietzsche is either unpoliticisable - as a “bedroom philosophy” - or as a 
politics motivated around violence, terror and evil. Here, with Rorty, we are once again given the 
problem of the “unpolitical” aspects of Foucault’s ethical language, and, whether this is inherited 
from Nietzsche or from Kant, the intrinsic relation between a metaphysical-style power and an 
unpoliticisable language remain. As such, although the analysis that Hanssen carries out in 
                                                     
106 Ibid., 88 
107 Foucault, “Ethics of Pleasure”, in Foucault Live, 379  cited in Hanssen, 96 
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Critique of Violence, contemplates the Nietzschean dynamic at work within Foucault’s project, it 
does not attempt to interrogate the problematic that theorising autonomy creates, namely, the 
consequences of the aestheticisation of the political. What is left over for Hanssen’s detailing of 
Foucault’s historical project, and what I now take up, is a contemplation of the specific legacies 
and manifestations of a non-emancipatory politics including the ways in which the historical and 
conventional stain of power in agency is contextualised. 
 
By showing how the redemptive feature of Foucault’s politics is situated within his humanist 
sensibility, and thus turning Foucault’s problematic politics away from Nietzsche in Hanssen, I 
wish to re-invite Fraser’s request for a non-humanist ethical paradigm to Foucault’s project. 
Contrary to the attempt to drag Foucault back into an acceptable “liberal” arena or by identifying 
his “good intentions”, Fraser attempts to take up the logic of Foucault's argument allowing the 
question of the articulation of this unknown ethical space as means to escape Habermas 
“modernist” accusations. It is my intention to take up the “postmodern” problem of Foucault’s 
work issued here by Fraser, through the recognition and investigation of a notion of Foucauldian 
subjectivity as evident in contemporary culture. 
 
In the various characterisations of Foucault’s project (led by various accusations of his 
entertaining an anti-democratic, or conservative sensibility and that the Foucauldian subject is the 
subject of, or between, totalitarianism and (postmodern) neo-liberalism), we can see that 
Foucault’s project describes what could be seen as an accurate description of the subject of a 
conservative American liberalism. Here, an individualised concept of agency as self-
empowerment is believed to be either privately, and therefore unsubstantially subversive, or on 
the other hand, read as a public type of self-righteous vigilantism formed from ones belief in an 
internal primordial ethic - that we trust in ourselves as right - where we are free to practice these 
rights without restraint from institutionalised apparatuses of the (State or judicial) law. 
In returning to the character of an anti-humanist protagonist, we can see that because we can so 
literally identify this Foucauldian/Nietzschean-style subject in culture at large we are faced with 
both the historicisation of a Nietzschean inspired subjectivity and also the daily re-writing of it as 
an identification and an exercise of subjective freedom (in films, narratives, partisan politics, etc). 
In Foucault’s attempt not to overcome metaphysics in a Nietzschean sense, but instead, to witness 
its passing (lived out in his stylisation of a Kantian Enlightenment term of critique), his project 
still retains a transcendental basis for the subjective practices of freedom. Although Foucault 
manages to divorce critique as an absolute imperative to autonomy, the “negating” move of 
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critique still holds as an intrinsic value to action. This is because, despite Foucault’s historical and 
temporal critique he retains concepts of “good” and “bad” uses of power through the universal of 
his founding or primordial ethic. In other words, Foucault’s temporal project contradicts itself 
through the fact that Foucault normatively upholds certain values and normatively condemns 
others.108 
 
When seen as a historicised and formalised rhetoric of power - a vigilante style subject with a 
primordial sense of right and wrong – Foucault’s powerful self-aestheticising subject invites 
further questioning regarding the formulation of subjective identities through rhetorical practices. 
Understanding Foucault’s transcendental and ideological theories as rhetoric invites an inquiry 
into the relationship between a non-transcendental and non-emancipatory politics and a “violent 
subject”. Crucially, we are faced with the problem of how a violence that is described and 
understood as a natural disposition to all action hinges upon and effects the conception of 
political practices - and how this ubiquitous violence is both undermined and underscored 






4. The Narrative Turn 
 
The notion that the realm of the political is a “necessary risk” upon which action is predicated 
remains significant in as much as the processes within which we perform political decisions are 
subjected to the possibility of an ineradicable violent dimension if we do, or even don’t, demand 
an organised politics of recognition. The transcendental or metaphysical character, demonstrated 
here in Foucault’s work, is important to this study as it re-positions the question of how we 
understand and conceive of “agency” or “critique” when any possibilities for action on a non-
foundationalist stage are challenged if we are to sustain this subject-centred version of agency. In 
                                                     
108 In the “Ethics of the Concern for Self” [in Foucault Live (Interviews 1961-1984) ed. Sylvere Lotringer, 
trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston, Semiotext(e) 1996, 446] Foucault writes of the practices of the 
self as means to acquiring “the rules of law, the management of techniques, and also the morality, the 
ethos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games with as little domination as possible.” 
Although Foucault’s desire was to resist creating a “utopia of completely transparent communication” and 
instead to centralise a discursive plurality of power systems, his understanding of negative and positive 
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other words, subject philosophy (Kant) demands that the subject “act” through the application of 
knowledge and yet the availability of this knowledge is always at risk in the non-identification of 
a Categorical Imperative.  
 
In light of this, what can be seen to be most at risk in Foucault is not the impossibility of an 
ethical law, but the problems of how Foucault sustains his conception of it. This “ethic” therefore 
enhances the poetics of a transcendental critique, in that it is written out in Foucault’s conception 
of human government. Regarding the rhetoric of power at work in the Foucauldian subject 
described above, it is my intention to examine the possibilities for the rhetoric of metaphysics 
specifically through Nietzsche and Foucault in order to identify an experience of critique within a 
relativist/narrative structure.  
 
This also raises the question of how thinking through a narrativised conception of subjectivity 
responds to a conception of the contingency of the philosophical in relation to our aesthetic 
identifications of judgments. In order to explore these issues in the following chapter it is 
important first to conclude this chapter with a brief description of the rhetorical or “narrative 
turn”, at work here - from the metaphysics at work in Foucault’s Nietzscheanism - to a narrative 
philosophical relation which continues the characteristics of the Foucauldian subject. This 
includes the question of philosophy’s formal relation to language, and also raises limit questions 
around both. 
 
The difficulties presented by such a “narrative turn” are described by Gerald L Bruns in the 
chapter, “Along the Fatal Narrative Turn” from the book Tragic Thoughts at the End of 
Philosophy. Bruns’s critique is useful to consider at this point not only for the sake of brevity, but 
also for a comprehensive view of some of the key problems within the philosophical-narrative 
discourse. Bruns’s critique points us to the problems of philosophical theory and an 
antifoundationalist politics, on the one hand showing their irreduciblity and incompatibility, since 
they construct two distinctive types of linguistic codes, and on the other hand, establishing the 
facticity of their linguistic framework and political employment. After thinking through the 
aestheticisation of ethics in Chapter One’s work on philosophy, and the aestheticisation of politics 
in Foucault, Bruns’s critique now directs us to the central problems of understanding the 
rhetorical force of the law as subject to both encoded structures.  
                                                                                                                                                              
uses of power reinforce a normative move away from domination. For a commentary on this see Barry 
Hindess Discourses on Power, From Hobbes to Foucault, Blackwells, 2001, 156 
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 Richard Rorty’s investment in literature as the realm for critique is the incentive for Bruns’s 
examination. Here, Bruns describes the narrative turn as moral philosophy under 
antifoundationalism where “things have histories rather than natures or essences.”109 Bruns 
continues to describe how the function of narrative is to give examples of action, decision and 
moral choice, “to show”; “Richard Rorty speaks of a turn from theory to narrative, meaning that 
like narrative poets we can alter a thing (anything e.g., ourselves) by describing it differently, to 
which he adds that philosophy ought in fact to get into the business of redescription.”110 Bruns 
then takes up the Platonic project of understanding a distinction between theory and literature in 
order to situate and navigate this difference. Here, stories differ from a general philosophical 
motivation in that stories don’t identify or motivate themselves around a philosophical interest in 
“truth”: 
 
The difference between theories and stories is that theories are in competition with one 
another for the role of “best theory so far”; that is, they logically organise themselves 
hierarchically, whereas stories or examples multiply horizontally much the way human 
history moves in its production of unprecedented situations whose moral complexities 
cannot be organised from above.111 
 
Reflecting upon this difference between theories and stories we can already draw out some 
problems. Firstly, this distinction forgets the sustained value structure of stories within culture in 
as much as stories rely upon hierarchical categorisations.112 Secondly, this division also 
problematically understands theory to be something that cuts through world history on a sharp 
linear trajectory devoid of specific context. More accurately then, we could say that stories 
compete for “best story so far,” within their own genre categories and theories compete for “best 
theory so far,” on equally contingent circumstances.113   
                                                     
109 Gerald. L Bruns. Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, Language, Literature and Ethical Theory. 
Northwestern University Press. 1999, 94 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 96 
112 For example, stories are subject to genres, and sub-genres, wherein we are able to identify a story with 
consequence, such as that which deals with important and relevant socio-political issues “of the day” over 
that of pulp-fiction “chick-literature”. What is significant to my distinction is that these genres base 
themselves within and upon these differences. Similarly, in film narratives we are able to identify “A” 
movies from “B” movies relatively easily due to a number of facets, such as who is the lead role, who is the 
supporting cast, how many special effects, or, how much the film has cost to make, and the aesthetic style 
of the film’s promotional material. This also includes journalistic reviews of the story, all of which 
accompany the “packaged” experience of the narrative. 
113 By this I mean that commendations of awards for literary prowess are attributed to genres such as 
romantic fiction, science fiction, historical fiction, autobiography, historical biography and so on. The 
fashion for judging these categories against each other is increasingly popular, seen in television 
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 Bruns also tries to move past this conception of a theoretical hierarchy taking up the problem of 
Habermas’s communicative action theory in its opposition to Rorty’s “narrative turn”. Bruns 
shows that for Habermas’s philosophy, an antiformalist theory that levels the genre distinction 
between literature and philosophy problematises judgement because reason is no longer 
privileged as central to decision making. Bruns writes:  
 
Let a thousand vocabularies bloom and then see which survive, says Rorty. Habermas, by 
contrast is the horticulturalist who says, Let a thousand vocabularies bloom, but only 
within our Enlightenment garden, where it is the business of philosophy to organise and 
police these vocabularies so that they don’t interfere with communicative praxis.114  
 
For Habermas, antiformalism reduces philosophy to nihilism or cynicism which could threaten 
any sense of “subjective positivity” or invention, or, it provides an “uncritical” grounding of 
something like philosophy as a romance novel. Crucially, it is this problem that I intend to move 
past when identifying a philosophical-rhetorical relation. 
 
The difficulty of rationalising in the face of competing narratives outlined in Habermas’s theory 
is reclaimed as a problem in Bruns’s critique of Rorty. In Rorty’s “non-reductive physicalism” 
Bruns reclaims and translates the Platonic discrepancy between theories and stories by 
distinguishing between Rorty’s conception of the “physiological” (scientific) narratives and his 
“phenomenological” (literary) narratives.115 Here, Bruns argues that for Rorty, poetry becomes 
the work of rationalisation:  
Ironically, when Rorty speaks of a poetised culture replacing a scientistic one, what he 
finally means is that poetry will now do what heretofore, before the narrative turn, had 
been thought to be the job of reason, namely to bring our culture more completely in line 
                                                                                                                                                              
programmes and other media that aim to poll the nation for the top ten best books ever and such like. Here, 
people’s votes go towards a universal top ten of all time. However, this is something that we know will be 
replaced and is only fixed in time to the point that it marks current opinion, and it does not go beyond this 
currency. 
114 Bruns, Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, 97 
115 Rorty’s self-description as being a “non-reductive physicalist” is interpreted by Bruns as a theory that 
“looks like an attempt to replace the mind body problem with a two-language theory, which is the theory 
that the same event can be described equally well in physiological as well as intentional or 
phenomenological terms, where these two sorts of terms are not synonymous or inter-translatable but rather 
form a portion of a cultural heteroglossia – a multi-language or multi-cultural culture.” For more on Rorty’s 
science-culture distinction see Bruns, 97-99 For Rorty’s own critique of the problems of theorising science, 
and its relation to art, politics and religion see “Pragmatism Without Method” in Objectivity, Relativism, 
and Truth, University of California Press, 1994, 63-77 Here, through Dewey and Hook, Rorty discusses the 
avoidance of slipping back into the “old Platonic dream.”  
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with physical science, appropriating its language for our self-description, of the stories 
we tell.116 
 
Bruns goes on to describe the limits and possibilities of narrative in response to Peter Winch’s 
argument: “All we can do is look at particular examples (of human conduct) and see what we do 
or say about them; there are no general rules which can determine in advance what we must say 
about them.”117 Bruns confirms that “moral philosophy can only take place at the level of 
narratives of human judgments,” and consequently, philosophy either becomes “literary 
criticism” or is not required at all. He continues: “so long as these narratives are seen to have 
application to our everyday experience, justice remains a living concept, a concept we know how 
to use or live with.”118 This promotes the political relation of narrative as a performative cultural 
production within which we all participate, as narrators and audience, where notions of justice 
demonstrate an inclusive parity within the identification of decision in language and morality 
critique is a retro-active politics. However, Bruns’s critique also reflexes back upon inherent 
differences between contemplative (philosophical and/or scientistic) agency and the products of 
culture in terms of stories. Here, although we don’t return to the Platonic distinction between the 
“real” and the “ideal”, we are given another problem: in understanding transcendental thinking 
not as a metaphysics but as a politics, Bruns’s critique of both Rorty and Habermas still takes us 
to the philosophical problem of making sense of the world as having a rational view over it. Now, 
comprehending the meanings of objects is how we exercise knowledge and control over 
language.119 As such, narratives of justice are sustained as aesthetic and political questions, 
wherein we are left to consider how these narratives are enforced and how they are identified. 
This return us nicely to the knowledge/power problem and to the complex dynamics between 
propositional theories and the performances of judgement such as those sketched out above. 
This prevalence of law and themes of justice at work in culture in general situates my persistent 
interest in an idealised moment of action seen through representations such as the dramatic 
rendering of drama within “real life” situations (for example representations of “decision” as an 
epic-everyday occurrence). Now Nehamas’ earlier worry regarding Foucault’s concept of self-
invention as anarchic excess without law falters since we can clearly see that although Foucault 
does not consider the conceptualising of governing self-invention within the political sphere as 
                                                     
116 Ibid., 99 
117 Ibid., Bruns citing Winch from, Moral Integrity, Ethics and Action London; Routledge and Paul Kegan, 
1972, 182 
118 Ibid., 100 
119 I discuss Bruns’s solution to the problem of the ubiquity of abstract language systems later in Chapter 
Three, 126, where we encounter Bruns’s call to “out rhetoric rhetoric.”   
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intrinsic to his project, we can nonetheless identify laws which still occupy these 
“representational practices” and demand further examination. This commits us to the totalised 
or contained spaces of the performances of such narratives as renditions of antihumanist 
philosophy. 
 
Understanding the allegorical and representational power of narrative relates moral philosophy as 
“narrative critique” to philosophy in general - as a concretised cause and effect of the theme of 
freedom. In doing so a direct connection is opened up between the rhetorical and formal demands 
of philosophy and the question of the limits that such demands create for the philosophical 
process. In “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism”120 Derrida comments that although he 
acknowledges literature as “the complete opposite of the expression of private life” he 
nevertheless is “not able to separate the invention of literature, the history of literature, from the 
history of democracy.” Consequently, for Derrida the public and performative aspects of 
literature helpfully constitute an unstable and open political field. Here, public and private 
distinctions are dissolved but not reconciled and, as Derrida identifies, literature is something “on 
the basis of which the public realm and the realm of the political can be and always remains 
open.” 121  
 
 
The theme of freedom in literature and philosophy 
Having identifed a relationship between the propositional (philosophical), physiological 
(scientific), political (moral), and phenomenological (literary) languages through Bruns (Rorty) 
and Derrida we are provided a fairly abstract confirmation of the mutually historical and unstable 
relationship between literature and democracy. Taking up Bruns’s concerns regarding the 
hierarchical ratiocination of narrative, the question remains as to whether this performative 
political relation to the narrative theme of freedom undermines philosophical (or rational) 
critique, decision and choice. In other words, are these languages of rationality and poetry merely 
incompatible, or does one over-determine or even unaccomplish the other? Rehearsing this 
                                                     
120 Jacques Derrida, “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism”, in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, 
Simon Critchley et al., ed. Chantal Mouffe, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, 77-88  
121 Ibid., 80 Derrida argues that without the motifs of emancipation inherent to the singular practices of our 
individual beliefs in freedom one cannot pose the question of ethics. (82) This assertion is entirely 
significant to Chapter Three where I take up Stanley Fish’s neo-pragmatist theory, clearly influenced by 
both Derrida (and Levinas). This is because, for Fish, like Derrida, subjective autonomy is intrinsically 
linked and is constitutive of democracy as a destabilising practice of belief. As such, it is this problem of 
the locus and the legitimacy of both ethics and emancipatory discourses that I move through in the 
following chapters.  
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question via Derrida we can ask how and in what way does this relationship between democracy 
and literature problematise the “foundational” tropes of subjective autonomy and the law? Are 
such critical and destabalising practices made possible purely because of the absolute 
indeterminacy and as such, the intrinsic compatibility of the systems of politics and literature?  
 
This leaves the problem open of how the philosophical theme of freedom is evidenced within 
narrative as a critical, social and political factor. Or, how and in what way the multiplicity of re-
producing narratives that situates freedom as a theme contradicts the universalising ideological 
thinking of freedom as a theory. This leads in turn to the problem of how an understanding of a 
postmodern and rhetorical conception of the subject/power relation can be subjected to scrutiny 
without creating its “philosophical double.” This is particularly relevant when considering as we 
did in the previous chapter Stanley Cavell’s reading of philosophy as narrative, where despite and 
because of a desire to disengage from a metaphysical philosophical structure, theory ultimately 
grounds and reproduces a similar foundational and universalising moral voice. 
 
Just as narrative can be seen to open up the political (Derrida), in that it is open for all 
possibilities within language, we can also see that narrative’s “foundational” and consistent 
investment in autonomy as relative to violence articulates or is indicative of an experience of the 
limitations of such narrating. In this way, we could say that these traditions or foundational 
moves expressed within narrative open up a problem for the legitimation of philosophical, 
transcendental and metaphysical discourses. This is because the ambiguous, traditional or, 
conventional and repetitive character of violence within language could indicate limitations to the 
structures of communication precisely through its representations and performances in language. 
In turn, this identification of limits or constraints becomes an ironic description of language as 
totality, because in this literary version of the finitude of language we are shown an aesthetics of 
violence, a localised philosophical language of origins and ends. 
Paradoxically, the philosophical is required or is called into question precisely at its limit, where 
the circumstantial and contingent multiplicity of possibilities in narrative is forced as a 
universally recognised or naturalised phenomenon over and above such temporalities. In this 
sense the will to image persists in the poetising and rhetoricising of the philosophical and 
concretises the essential problem for philosophy; that it cannot stand outside of it own rhetoric. 
The will to image can therefore simultaneously be seen to limit the philosophical and demand that 
philosophy confront its own limits. As Peter Winch points out, there are “features of morality that 
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we find philosophically puzzling.”122 And this brings about the question of what it means to do 
philosophy as and within narrative?  
 
In order to examine this question it is clear that an investment in the rhetoric of metaphysics is 
linked to the politics of authority and consensus within language. Narratives or performances of 
decision as a spectacular “risk” in the “postmodern” are also crucial to this study, especially if we 
are to consider the tradition of decision as violence in Nietzschean philosophy as relative to a 
socio-political identification in the genre of the “postmodern heroic”. This non-ironic, powerful, 
and unselfconscious postmodern subject described in the previous chapter offers up the potential 
of creating an understanding of the problem of the Foucauldian subject as something that can be 
examined locally within the everyday uses of language. As such, the various figurings of 
Foucault’s philosophical, metaphysical and ethical problem as a political problem of domination 
in the end produces a subject who characterises a particular, albeit dramatic, 
philosophical/narrative genre.  
 
In light of this I now ask how do our experiences of an investment in such narratives articulate an 
“ethical experience”? Crucial to this question is that decision making in non-emancipatory or 
post-tragic narratives does not rely on a traditional Kantian (rational) conception of action 
through the applications of knowledge (organised vis-a-vis a Big Other), whereby we have the 
necessary equipment to avoid violence, or, suffer the guilt of behaving badly, nor, on the other 
hand do they rehearse a Nietzschean-style irrationalism where decision is violence. 
 
Faced with the prevailing themes of autonomy in language, politics, and philosophy, in the 
following chapters I critique their correspondence from both a socio-political and an aesthetico-
political perspective. Both chapters Three and Four concern themselves with the relationship 
between language and autonomy and operate as mutual strands that stem from these previous 
arguments. In light of this they rehearse similar arguments regarding the use, efficacy of language 
and also the transcendental and foundational character of specific language codes. In this way 
they continue with the theme that is central to this thesis; that narratives of justice, freedom, and 
autonomy, are understood in terms of their legitimacy, consequence and operative values, both in 
reflexive and “representational” cultural spaces, such as the media, film, art, literature, and 
television, and in the social and communal spaces of partisan politics. 
 
                                                     
122 Bruns, Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, 107 
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In the next chapter I consider the consequences of the differentiation and the unification of 
aesthetics and ethics, demonstration and representation, or thought and language, as, and in, 
hegemonical practices and understood as the prevailing issue throughout is the problem of 
articulating the relation between rhetoric and force. Here I continue to analyse the immanence of 
violence in decision initially as it is theorised in terms of transcendental, metaphysical and yet 
nonetheless contingent linguistic phenomena. This leads on to the question of how and under 
what conditions autonomy is experienced when an aesthetics of transgression is no longer 
understood as being relative to an evil act. In other words, because we do not have the facility to 
recognise evil as a priori to language, we cannot condition freedom upon it and, so it goes, we 
also do not collectively identify what evil actions are with the kind of universal agreement one 
may presume. Taking up these themes of rhetoric and relativism, I now contemplate the 
productions of autonomy under our ever-complex understandings between disagreement and 
critique, together with notions of complicity and consensus within the social.  
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3 Force and Rhetoric:  
Practices of authority in Hobbes and Fish. 
 
 
Good and Evill, are names that signify our Appetites and Aversions; which in different 
tempers, customes, and doctrines of men are different: And divers men, differ not onely 
in their judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, Smell, 
hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is comfortable, or disagreeable to Reason, in 
the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; 
and one time priaseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth 
Evil: From whence come Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. 123 
        




1. Authority, Power and Consensus 
 
In the previous chapters I have drawn out a number of arguments regarding subjective decision as 
violence. In this chapter I wish to take up some of the lingering and problematic implications 
already raised in my inquiries. This necessitates a further critique of a naturalised or ubiquitous 
conception of violence and the immanence of this violence to subjective autonomy. Having made 
a case for the tragic notion of autonomy as a rhetorical genre in my first chapter, and inscribing 
the rhetorical character of an anti-humanist and metaphysical subjectivity in the second, I will 
now go on to identify how a non-emancipatory politics of justice and decision produces and 




In the Nietzschean idea of qualifying value or “meaning” with “struggle”, an unchecked 
irrational-style violence is not only underscored as a seeking out of violence but can also be seen 
to be a product of discourses which attempt to face up to this problem. I’m recalling here the 
logic of Enlightenment rationalism in my critique of Shattuck and Geddes’ effectively “censorial” 
arguments mentioned earlier in Chapter Two. Judith Butler further comments on this preference 
for rationalism or mastery of reason in her essay, “Restaging the Universal” in the text, 
Contingency Hegemony, Universality:  
123 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 111 
The fear, of course, is that what is named as universal is the parochial property of the 
dominant culture […] The proceduralist view seeks to sidestep this problem by insisting 
that it makes no substantive claims about human nature, but its exclusive reliance on 
rationality to make its claim belies this very assertion.124  
 
I now turn to Stanley Fish who critiques this double move in his essay “Mission Impossible” 
wherein he attempts to structure a response to the problem of violence. He writes that to organise 
this procedure one follows this orthodoxy:  
 
First announce that there exists no mechanism capable of adjudicating between 
competing systems of belief, and then install in a position of privilege, just such a 
mechanism; declare something to be unavailable and then almost in the same breath, 
discover it.125  
 
This problem introduces the question of how we begin to organise a critique of this established 
consensus of violence as decision, when any attempt to think through or rationalise violence 
produces its double. 
 
The notion of subjectivity described in theories that centralise self-reflexivity can be seen to cling 
on to (what could be construed as) an irreconcilable difference between the force or the authority 
of representing violence as a universal and, on the other hand, the (natural and unrepresentable) 
universality of force that is implied through the procedure by which this authority is performed. 
In other words, for the subject to know self, he/she is compelled to acknowledge and understand 
the alterity of the other. However, as we see above, knowing nothingness, or recognising the 
impossible always appears to be outside of or in excess of the universal it seeks to produce. Any 
notion of an irreconcilable difference between the universal authority of the “particular” author 
and the text as an abstraction forgets perhaps too quickly that such a formal aesthetics of power 
by which it is constituted allows for a simple deconstruction of that power. Here, the individual 
author does not wholly stand outside of the narrative in question, because the social, cultural and 
political fiction that produces that narrative relies upon exactly the same rhetoric of aesthetics of 
power that characterises that system.  
 
In terms of the relationship between ethics and formalism, or representationalism, I now deal with 
how authority is construed within the rhetoric of force, taking up the relative “foundational” 
                                                     
124Judith Butler “Re-staging the Universal” in Contingency, Hegemony Universality, Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Zizek, Verso 2000, 15 
125 Stanley Fish, “Mission Impossible” in The Trouble With Principle, Harvard University Press, 2001,186 
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tropes of law which are, the ethical, the normative and the “natural”. This relationship has already 
been raised in my description of Stanley Cavell’s “everyday ethics”, and also in the description of 
the problem of a normativity of violence identified as the impact of Nietzsche’s naturalised 
genealogical political practice upon postmodernity in Chapter Two. To supplement this and to 
further examine the political consequences and possibilities for analysing the rhetoric of the 
subject and power, I first look to the work of Thomas Hobbes. In particular I consider his 
abhorrence for the art of rhetorical redescription, which in many senses can be a preference for 
the rationale shared with the theory discussed above. This interest in Hobbes’s reason and 
rhetoric is particularly useful in looking to a non-humanist politics of contract and consent, what 
could be seen to be a traditional philosophical interest in the humanism of the mastery of the art 
of rhetoric and also truth as an ultimate end that rhetoric discovers or bears forth. I then look to 
the political and hegemonical implications of Hobbes’s “science civilis” and specifically to his 
notions of Commonwealth, consensus and contract within the realm of a quantitative power of the 
“state of nature”.  
 
Taking up Hobbes’s articulation of rhetoric and reason, consent and power, and demonstration 
and representation, and leaning on Quentin Skinner’s work on Hobbes’s rhetoric and reason I 
argue that the understanding of the legacy of Hobbes’s work (and what he articulates most fully 
in Leviathan) is that it points out its own investment in the rhetorical arts. As such, this legacy 
challenges the basis for making distinctions between reason and rhetoric, and also introduces 
ways to understand the problem of what Hobbes demarcates as “Perpetual Warre” where the 
authority of persuasion used in the art of rhetoric (based in artifice and fiction) can no longer be 
seen to conflict with the exercising of rational authorities (based in fact and science). 
Accordingly, this supports my following analysis of identifications of quantitative power, where I 
look to Hobbes’s attempt to organise a non-idealistic, or non-emancipatory political theory based 
on practice.  
 
Following this, I examine Stanley Fish’s anti-formalist “theory of no theory” where all theory 
goes to practice. It is here, and specifically in his essays “Rhetoric” and “Force” in the text Doing 
What Comes Naturally, that I examine more closely how the continued preference for a self-
legislating non-transcendental subject participates in the production of hegemony. Fish takes the 
same notion of society as Hobbes: a community that is based upon, “a defensive contract based 
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on mutual distrust.”126 This is made more pertinent to my thesis considering that I have been 
continually interested in instances when we do agree, and particularly when there is an agreement 
that the violence of transgression, immorality and aggression is characteristic of autonomy. This 
formulates my study of the politics of individualism, which does not necessarily indicate a 
dangerously pluralised society of perpetual conflict but rather considers how the identification of 
this individualism advertises agreements in the social. As such, the status of agreements and 
radical individualism (the idea of disagreement or transgression) are discussed under the 
condition sketched out above - the impossibility of non-contingency. This is particularly relevant 
to Hobbes and Fish for whom the problem is that the precarious basis for agreement is essentially 
based on the universally unstable and perhaps even volatile fact that we don’t agree, or, on a 




In this chapter I wish then to more fully examine processes of consensus and agreement in 
identifications of “violence as decision”. Here I discuss practices of quantitative power that show 
how the use and availability of resources, skills, and mastery of rhetoric by an individual 
authority can convince others to consent to his/her power. Significant to this is that the 
agreement, identification and understanding of violence as decision can be seen on the one hand 
to be generic, normative and accepted, but on the other hand, and more to the point, this power is 
conceptualised as being un-deliberated and natural. This effect is confirmed when we look at the 
genre of heroic narratives. It is only when our hero has a passive or “cool” relationship with 
violence that he/she can experience autonomy. Similarly, this autonomy is based on a quantitative 
mechanistic notion of power where the will of the hero is more powerful because he/she is 
naturally more strong or powerful than others.  
 
This notion of individualised, or “heroic style”, action is not merely relevant to the heroic genre 
in literature or culture, but also to politics in general, since to great extents a theory of rhetoric 
and power in the social relies equally upon mechanistic and quantitative identifications of 
authority. Key to this, is that rhetorical practices in language immediately introduce problems 
such as “knowing knowledge”, and the uses of knowledge as power. Such fears of quantitative 
power are based upon the assertion that an aesthetico-political unity concretises the equation 
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between violence over others and absolute autonomy.127 This introduces a question of the 
difference between a consolidated aesthetic and political unity and its practice in as much as 
although I have argued that images always mean something, we could also agree that they are 
subject to interpretation. Crucially, this invites the question of whether the product of 
understanding the difference between practice having meaning and the specific meanings of 
practice results in underscoring an aesthetic (representational) and political (practicable) 
difference. It is this problem that drives another strand of my investigation. 
 
With regard to the immanence of violence to decision and its impact upon political practices, the 
question still remains of how we understand the identification of “decision as violence” as 
trivialising the practice of moral judgements, where violence is celebrated fatalistically. Also 
involved in this is the problem of an identification of the contingency of “violence as decision” as 
principled or ideologically motivated, because the abstract, naturalised, or generic language of 
violence as judgement sustains difficulties for interpretation and critiquing the powers that 




In this chapter, I concentrate on particularised tropes of the subject as “powerful” and go on to 
deliberate the consequences of theories which are both subject centred and that also write the 
impossibility of self-reflexivity. Regarding the ubiquity of power Barry Hindess writes in 
Discourse of Power, From Hobbes to Foucault that “power is a ubiquitous feature of human 
interaction, it is everywhere and available to anyone. This suggests that there is little value to be 
said about power in general.”128 Concerning this he quotes Giddens: “Power in itself is not a 
resource. Resources are media through which power is exercised.”129 With this in mind, Hindess 
goes on to articulate a critique of power: 
 
Power refers to a heterogeneous collection of attributes and possessions that need have 
little in common - except for the fact that they might be useful in the pursuit of some 
human purpose or other. Rather than investigate the properties of power as such, my 
serious inquiry would have to concern itself separately with the discrete powers 
associated with extraordinary strength, or eloquence, or with riches, the secret workings 
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of God and other such attributes, as well as with the diverse uses to which those powers 
can be put.130 
 
Taking a cue from Hindess’s investigation, my analysis concentrates upon a political and 
aesthetic study of the production, locations and contingencies of our consent and identification of 
the universal of agency as violence. This returns us to an argument around the force of rhetoric in 
particular subjectivities and, simultaneously, the rhetoric of force employed in the universal and 
abstracted narratives that these subjectivities produce. The inability to pull apart this formulation 
of rhetoric and force definitively, when both are so heavily conditioned upon each other, 
provokes a problem for an understanding of our inclusion within the production of universals.  
 
In light of this I can ask if and how the practice of rhetorical re-description, of what to all extents 
reflects a mutual cultural agreement on power as quantitative (often brutal and mechanistic) 
within culture and politics, can allow this abstract and generic “foundational ground” to be 
interpreted as principled or interested.  
 
This question is especially important regarding the politics of contract and agreement. Here we 
return to questions of the ubiquity of power and force in that, for example, Hobbes’s state of 
perpetual war is situated not only as a procedure of continual disagreements inherited from 
rhetorical debate, but is also implicitly within the conditions of the agreements and laws by which 
communities govern themselves. And these agreements implicate a contractual use of power, a 




2. Hobbes and Rhetoric 
 
The problems of rhetorical redescription 
In Rhetoric and Reason in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Quentin Skinner defines three centrally 
connected arguments in Hobbes’s political project: i) the universal theory of self preservation, ii) 
a theory of the state of nature as war: “Since we are all more or less equal, the state in which we 
attempt to exercise this fundamental right of self-preservation will prove to be a state of war - a 
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war against all a bellum omnium in omnes;” and, iii) That as soon as this danger becomes 
apparent, we will want to seek peace and avoid death.131  
 
For Hobbes, it is the art of rhetorical redescription132 that threatens man’s ability to seek peace, 
for; “the problems posed by the technique of rhetorical redescription are mainly in connection 
with the names of such things that affect us, that is, which please and displease us,” and as such, 
are connected to “the names of Vertues and Vices.” Hobbes writes that “such names can never be 
the true grounds of any ratiocination”133 and that we can’t name things according to our passions 
and our interests, because we’ll find ourselves “in the condition of meer Nature,” which is “a 
condition of War.”134 This scepticism of rhetoric and its distance from the art of reason is more 
vehemently laid out in Hobbes’s On the Citizen: 
 
The art of the one is Logic, and the other Rhetoric. The end of one is truth, of the other 
victory. […] But their ability to render their hearers insane (who were merely stupid 
before); to make men believe that a bad situation is worse than it is, and that a good 
situation is bad; to exaggerate hope and to minimise risks beyond reason is due to 
eloquence; not the eloquence which expounds things as they are, but the other eloquence, 
which by communicating the excitement of the speaker to the minds of others makes 
everything appear as if he had seen it in his own excited mind.135  
 
Rhetoric, for Hobbes then, is a distinct choice, and it is moreover an involvement with 
determining ambiguities that confuse the basis upon which “reasoned” judgements can be made. 
Hobbes’s identification of rhetoric as a moral problem is also explained in Leviathan:  
 
All our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we 
can hardly avoid different naming of them […] For one man calleth Wisdome, what 
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another calleth feare; and one cruelty what another justice, one prodigality, what another 
magnamity; and one gravity what another stupidity.136  
 
The art of rhetorical persuasion demands attention to ones audience, where the good rhetorician 
will employ several of the many rhetorical arts to win over the agreement of the audience and 
defeat the opposition’s arguments. Accordingly, rhetoric seeks to establish agreement, by using 
language that already has some agreeable aspect. It is here that we can note the complexity of the 
art of rhetorical persuasion. On the one hand rhetoric is the work of reason, finding (scientific) 
proof as a means to win over one audience, and on the other we can see that the art of rhetoric is 
based in the art of “moving” one’s audience. By all accounts, this ability to emotionally move the 
audience relies very much on both traditional “tried and tested” methods of poetic speaking, and 
inventive and creative speaking. Duly, this type of “moving speech” has, for Hobbes, an 
unscientific, poetic approach based in various irrational and dangerously fickle self-interested 
whims. For Hobbes, poetic speaking harbours and inscribes a forum of contestable and therefore 
false universals, because such “universals” are seen to be dangerously situated around self-
interest, unconcerned with any absolute truth - only the truth by which to assert power over one’s 
enemies and to win particular arguments.  
 
As a consequence, Hobbes structures a theory that responds to the problems of rhetorical 
redescription, relying upon two central motifs. The first is the arbitration of decisions from a 
higher authority in the role of the sovereign. Here, the sovereign is the ultimate law enforcer, all 
subjects relinquish the right to private judgements consenting to this centralised authority, who 
has a direct link to God. Secondly, and simultaneously, Hobbes constructs a project of authentic 
scientific demonstration in order to evacuate the requirement and use of the rhetorical arts. With 
these two theories Hobbes seeks to exorcise the art of rhetoric from the realm of the political 
through the central acknowledgement that virtue is not to be understood as a formal concept. 
Hobbes writes in On the Citizen that philosophers “have taken the view that the nature of the 
virtues lies in a certain mean between two extremes, and vices in the extremes themselves, and 
this is patently false.”137 Hobbes decrees that virtue is in no way related to this ground of 
mediocrity and that indeed he cannot find any such mediocrity.138 Therefore, “common ground” - 
the foundational territory of agreement and therefore the “truth” that the good rhetorician asserts 
in his rights to “move” the audience - is considered to be equally a rhetorical ground.  
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Significantly then, Hobbes articulates clear differences between the practice of self-interest and 
the practice of reasoning, initially identifying the art of rhetoric to be the corrupter of truths and 
the inscriber of false truths because it relies upon false universals in manufactured social consent 
vis-a-vis the commonplace or traditional qualities of emotional speech. Because Hobbes is critical 
of accepting these agreements in language as the truth or foundation for social and political 
technologies, he conscripts a “science of reason” in order to practice essential truths and facts: 
“Men are therefore in a state of war so long as they judge good and evil by the different measures 
which their changing desires from time to time dictate.”139  As such, as long as good and evil are 
measured by the diversity of desires, those who utilise the art of rhetoric will find themselves still 
living in a state of war. 
 
Hobbes demonstrative science evacuates the formal problems of virtue as mediocrity, because it 
prefers a practice of facts. Here, following the more forceful explanation of his point in On the 
Citizen and The Elements, Hobbes believes that by demonstrating the facts, as in a scientific 
experiment, one does not have to convince the audience of one’s correctness. Rather, the practice 
or demonstration of this fact will in itself prove its own innate truth. This is speech making as a 
science, in that the speaker need make no central gesture to the audience to convince them of 
truth. Instead the facts will do this in themselves. There is then no “winning assent” or 
inventiveness with fantasy in language, neither is the speaker required to win consent by 
establishing an already conceived “common ground.”  Hobbes writes: “I reckon, I do not merely 
debate.”140 In response, Skinner confirms that “the rigorous search for Truth can therefore be 
equated with the quest for demonstrations.”141 Quite clearly, demonstration is understood by 
Hobbes at this point, as specifically unrelated to the art of rhetoric and the social performances of 
agreement. Accordingly, the practice of reason evacuates the problems of rhetoric and solves the 
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3. Hobbes and Original Covenant 
 
Hobbes”s response to the essential inability to agree on “wants” finds a route to agreement 
through political hegemony. In this, we see power placed in the hands of “The Leviathan” the 
mythological beast made up of the Commonwealth, where the sovereign acts as its (literal) head 
of State. Under this rule, diverse opinions still exist; moral judgements are seen as a matter of 
feeling as well as of perception; and something virtuous or good is aligned with something 
broadly the same as the description of the pleasurable.143  
 
However, Hobbes interprets the radical instability of the state of nature caused by the innate 
desire of self-preservation not as a fundamental law or duty but as a right or liberty. One stays 
true to one’s natural desire to seek peace, manifest as the logic of self-preservation in the act of 
protecting one’s self from conflict by giving up individual choice, by entering into a contract with 
a greater protector - the sovereign. This move quells the human predisposition towards a violent 
state of nature. The paradox that Hobbes sets up is this: In endowing one’s “natural” behaviour 
with matters of choice and reason, one is now free to give up this choice (inspired through reason) 
but only in order to retain it. Consequently, Hobbes’s solution to the relativist problem of a 
natural and universal right of self-defense as an all out social war is for men to renounce their 
judgement by entering into a contract with the State. He writes: “So - we must divest ourselves of 
liberty - as an agreement has to be communal for laying down of ones Rights.”144 Hobbes 
recognises that such a Covenant requires a higher binding law by which to achieve consensus and 
rule, and it is here that the sovereign performs its role. Hobbes speaks of the limits of the 
Covenant in Leviathan arguing that it “is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be 
somewhat else required to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common 
Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common benefit”.145 Consequently, 
to prove the eternal rule of Covenant Hobbes situates an immutable and central power. This is the 
solution that keeps the Commonwealth free from the dangers of a natural irrationality: 
 
To conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, 
that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as 
to say, to appoint one Man or Assembly of men; to beare their Person; and everyone to 
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owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their 
Person, shall Act, or Cause to be Acted.146  
 
This central and absolutist covenant prevents the risk of “treasonous” activities which, in Hobbes 
view, would most easily be accomplished through the use of moral redescription. Also, this 
grounding a priori agreement of Covenant to the sovereign declines from interpreting justice as 
any identifiable norm, for the capacity of power is essentially placed in the hands of the 
sovereign. Hobbes suggests that even under a tyrannical rule it is the subject’s duty to remain 
under contract to the State. In this society of autonomous individuals subjectivity is given up to 
this central authority whilst the sovereign consists of a power that is greater than any individual 
subject or group of subjects. 
 
This brings up two questions: the first is around the act of consent, or how the law is understood; 
the second is in relation to its enforcement. The notion of consensus could be read here (regarding 
Hobbes’s beast “The Leviathan”) as a negative phenomenon, in that we give over power to an 
other when we enter into a contract, retaining very little or no power after this contract. However, 
this reading forgets Hobbes’s essential notion of the “state of nature”, that of self-preservation. 
Under this state of self-love, it would seem that no one would enter into any contract with others 
if it was thought that they would not benefit in some way. In this sense, the act of consent 
acknowledges the act of contract as a choice but it is also the only choice. For Hobbes, the act of 
Covenant is based in pre-moral origins, seen in his demand for the subject to identify with this 
“original decision” to give away one’s freedom which is in turn duly made possible by thinking 
the fact that we are born free. Consequently this is a contract with no performance, no paper and 
no signatories. It is Original Covenant. This Covenant then is an impossible a priori and 
understood as an institutionalised rhetoric of power.  
 
Despite Hobbes’s humanism - the continuing predilection towards a “free will” seen in the ability 
to master the rhetorical arts - this “mastery”, or possibly self-empowering skill, available to the 
Commonwealth is sublimated by its essentialising the political contract in the sovereign, and to 
the project of truth, where all power goes to the One. Accordingly, this underscores subjective 
power as something that comes prior to the political, or even initiates it.  
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Claude Lefort’s text “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?” further problematises 
Hobbes’s conception of a pre-linguistic Original Covenant by understanding the productions of 
collective identity as a politics of representation. Significantly, his understanding of agreement as 
material discourse is inherently linked to the re-engagement of social actors within political 
argumentation: 
 
The idea of the nation does not refer to a text which exists prior to the commentary; it is 
of course supported by an accretion of materials and representations, but it can never be 
separated from a discourse of the nation. […] Whilst the nation bestows a collective 
identity, it is at the same time implicated in that identity. It remains a floating 
representation, and the vectors of its destiny are always subject to the decrees of social 
actors - or those who speak for them - who want to establish themselves within a duration 
and a time which allows them to name themselves.147  
 
Lefort’s conception of “nation as discourse” understands the political nature of Covenant or the 
public performance of one’s agreement to the State as requiring already existing hierarchies from 
which to enact consensus. However, these hierarchies are not outside of the political, moreover, 
they are the practice of politics. Consequently, Hobbes’s notion of choice as pre-political can be 
read as a manufactured fiction of choice, and an exercise of domination, something to assure the 
smooth running of State and the docility of its citizens.  
 
In Hobbes’s theory of Covenant then, there is no room to imagine a space of “free choice” that 
acts prior to the political, because the subject is never in a rational position to give itself up to a 
contract, in that the space Hobbes conceives for contract perversely exceeds the law defined by a 
Hobbesian rationality. Instead, we have a situation of a naturally “free willed” sovereign rule 
where, at best, the authority of sovereign power, government, and hopefully Commonwealth, 
participate and benefit from the invention of Commonwealth’s consent and agreement to give up 
“choice” in order to rule State and country smoothly and effectively.  
 
 
Conscience and the law 
Leaving Hobbes’s a priori of an absolute free-will behind, we can now open up a critique 
regarding the consistency of both decision/choice and identification, and also that of the structure 
of coincidence between the subject and the law. Regarding the subject’s place within the law 
Hobbes writes in On the Citizen that “the natural law is the moral law [and], though [men] cannot 
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agree on a present good, they can agree on a future good. And that is the work of reason.”148 For 
Hobbes, the subject’s coincidence with the law made up of a natural and rational desire for peace 
prevents the questioning of rights. As Skinner remarks: “No subject can ever lawfully put his 
conscience against the law” and, “any claim to judge the justice of a law will involve an 
absurdity, that of claiming the right to question the standard of justice itself.”149 Consequently, 
for Hobbes, “A man’s Conscience, and his Judgement are the same thing” and “the Law is the 
publique Conscience” such that every subject “hath already undertaken to be guided.”150  
 
Skinner’s point here is crucial: “no subject can ever lawfully put his conscience against the law” 
for Hobbes, because it demonstrates that the subject’s “natural” unpoliticised state is still intact, 
and furthermore that this is in danger of rising to the surface through criminal acts. Significantly 
for Hobbes, these moments of illegality serve no particular purpose and can be seen in acts of 
stupidity such as getting drunk. As such, for Hobbes, the subject who breaks the law is an 
irrational “unthinking” subject, a subject who has momentarily lost his/her reason. Certainly, the 
subject can break the law, but he/she can never reason against the law and is never divorced from 
its rule. However, it is crucial to point out that in these “irrational” moments Hobbes identifies a 
subject who remains under a delicate and unstable balance between Nature and State. Here we 
have a precarious distinction between being within the confines of law as rational subject, and 
being against the law because the subject is without reason. Consequently, rational behaviour is 
distinctly aligned with acting according to a “good truth”, so as long as the subject thinks 
rationally then, through the knowledge of Original Covenant the subject acknowledges the 
absurdity of putting the law into question. 
 
 
The politics of religion 
Returning to my second question, regarding the enforcement of the act of consent, I now look to 
the difference between Hobbes’s science of demonstrating truth, which could be seen to rely 
upon a transcendental notion of “truth” and “fact”, in relation to the will or capacity of the 
sovereign: the ultimate link to God’s truth. This turns out to be a question of a naturalised justice, 
where the will of God is understood through a science of political law, or vice-versa. On all 
accounts it is hard to distinguish the difference between the two modes of Hobbes’s project, 
because both chart a seemingly uncontestable path to fact and God. However, what is significant 
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here is the contradiction of Hobbes’s atheism against his simultaneous determination to the bible 
as a useful political guide as well as the sovereign as the symbol of God’s power. Regarding the 
institutionalisation of Gods and Catholic laws in Rome; Hobbes writes in Leviathan: 
 
The first Founders, and Legislators of Commonwealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends 
were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, 
to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning 
Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of 
some God… So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted 
amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the 
Kingdom of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the Sunne: and 
Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy 
Ghost, in the forme of a Dove.151  
 
This is clearly a description of all religion as government. However, Hobbes’s view of the 
Commonwealth differs: “God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he 
is King by Covenant.”152 Hobbes is sceptical of the political inscription of religion as mystical, as 
is seen particularly in his diatribe against the Catholic church in Rome later in Leviathan. 
However, this does not affect his assertion that belief in the supernatural or transcendental power 
of the Divine is the basis for any political law. As such, what can be detected in Hobbes’s 
political science is a conflict between the use of God’s power (the truth) and the power of the 
sovereign in the political realm, when we see that the sovereign can essentially be free to conduct 
himself according to his own self-interest and the word of the law is reducible to God-like 
commandments.153 This under-theorised role of the sovereign’s power in the political realm is 
significant when looking at Hobbes’s basic political assertions, which take the form of rather 
flimsy biblical-style injunctions such as to treat others as one would wish to be treated and such 
like.  
 
What is important here is that there is a conflict in the identification of “God’s truth” and the 
power of the sovereign in the political realm, since to all extents it is unclear as to whether the 
sovereign acts upon both self-interested whim or conducts him/herself according to the benign 
passivity of a figurehead. This is the word of God as simultaneously impartial and interested. As 
such, and problematically so, no laws of government are articulated by Hobbes for sovereign rule. 
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However, despite this lack in the political structure and despite Hobbes’s reliance upon a quasi-
transcendental hegemony, Hobbes’s subject of the Commonwealth does not suffer the trauma of 
transcendental angst.154 More to the point, Hobbes avoids theorising the transcendental, yet his 
acknowledging of religion as political proposes firstly that belief is both rhetorical and political 
and, secondly, that consensus (the rhetoric of belief) made in Covenant to the sovereign’s 
“natural” power produces an abstract and powerful hegemony - that of the beast, Leviathan. The 
Leviathan decontextaulises any particularised politics of belief towards an abstract “fullness” of 
belief, which in turn, and in its grasp upon a metaphoric and abstract power, brings into question 
the apparatuses of both political dominance and critique, especially if we are to identify our 
ability to understand meanings within power as being contingent upon our moral and political 
responsibility.  
 
However, despite Hobbes’s religious parlance, he refrains from philosophising, acknowledging 
that scepticism or doubt is not directed towards affirming one’s limits. When we doubt “we don’t 
go mad.”155 In other words, because the subject is never without reason, and duly, never without 
the law, a transcendent moment of self-consciousness designated at the limits of knowledge is 
unavailable. Instead Hobbes looks to the political construction of society, where his interest 
focuses upon the scientific understanding of social life through Man’s cultural and social 
identifications, communications and agreements. What is raised here is the question of the uses of 
the rhetorical arts in Hobbes’s work and his theory of the act of demonstration in science, and this 
returns us to the art of rhetorical redescription. Such a redescription is to “read thyself” and this is 
identified in Hobbes as work for the poet/artist. Here, it is the painter and the poet who is best 
suited to “reading thyself”: “The characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are 
with dissembling, lying counterfeiting and erroneous doctrines, are legible to him that searcheth 
hearts.”156 Reading oneself in this way constructs Hobbes’s basis of a civil science, where the 
artist - poet acts as its foundations, and it workings. Skinner points out that this artistic desire to 
“search the truth of hearts” paralleled with a rationalised examination of them, provides a 
“scientific analysis of the emotions and the heart” that enables us to read each other.157 “Knowing 
self” is not designated as a task, or an object, but moreover, as a practice and a skill. Here, the 
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work of the artist has no transcendental function in its navigation and production of an experience 
of the limits of language. Instead, the work of the artist and poet for Hobbes, is valued precisely 
through the assertion that language is readable and that the poet has the facility over and above 
the average citizen to take up the work of community by first “reading thyself.” This firmly 
politicises the work of the poet, translating the peripheral function of artistic creativity as central 
to the socio-political stage. What we also see is a move from a conception of the poet as mediated 
commentator to political mediator, fully equipped with an arsenal of rhetoric by which to win 
assent and is as such, a crucial social player. 
 
 
Hobbes’s rhetoric and reason; the mastery of eloquence 
Despite Hobbes’s abhorrence for the arts of rhetoric, particularly in The Elements and On the 
Citizen, it is evident that in Leviathan he makes certain acknowledgements of its place within his 
scientific discourse, often approving of a dynamic between reason and eloquence. He turns to the 
humanism of Quintilian rhetoric when he asserts that the rhetorical device of establishing 
interests and grounds for understanding is required for an argument from reason. This argument 
takes up Aristotle’s premise that rhetoric helps those making legal judgements to arrive at 
verdicts congruent with justice and truth.158 Hobbes also acknowledges the pervasive dominance 
of rhetoric particularly in reference to the role of sovereign, since although a ruler may be 
“Carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest,” he will nevertheless be “more 
or no less carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends: and for 
the most part, if the publique interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the 
Passions of men are commonly more potent than their Reason.”159  Following this, Hobbes 
situates a more complex account of the subject and the law, and seems to be moving closer to the 
problem of pluralism that is, for Hobbes, the state of perpetual war mentioned earlier. Here, 
Hobbes is still keen to separate reason and self-interest but now establishes that politicians cannot 
tell the difference and neither can the Commonwealth.160  
 
Hobbes’s assertion of the commonwealth as a man-made contrivance helpfully acknowledges the 
persuasive elements of reason and law. However, in admitting the problem for anyone to 
distinguish between self-interest and reason, Hobbes’s locus for the contract of a singular choice 
                                                                                                                                                              
157 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 384 
158 Hobbes, Leviathan, 421 
159 Ibid.,131  
160 Ibid. 
 113
is also troubled. As I have already indicated, this is firstly because the subject needs to be able to 
master the arts of science and rhetoric enough to first organise his/her contractual “choice” to the 
State and, secondly, in the fact that it is impossible to think reasonably when this is construed as 
thinking outside of or before self interest, putting the subject in an already contingent situation 
with respect to language and politics. Here, Hobbes combines the impossible pre-moral, passive 
or a priori aspect of contract, that is motivated by the subjects natural desire for self preservation, 
with the demand that the subject give up the practice of self-preservation in the political arena. As 
such we give up our “natural” subjectivity, the power to dissent or to wage war, in order to 
consent to an artificial social contract. However, what is particularly interesting about this 
conception of citizenship is that subjectivity is performed as consent through rational practices. 
And what grounds these performances of consensus, or, the workings of community, is the 
universal and contingent notion of self-interest. Here, the subject’s natural predisposition to 
bellicosity is fought against with Hobbes’s rhetoric of reason. This is laid down in Hobbes’s 
steadfast insistence that “Judgement does all”, thereby still insisting upon his preference for 
reason.161 Hobbes agrees that this “reason” is linked to mastery, and specifically a mastery of the 
practices of knowledge. He writes:  
 
Time and education begets experience; Experience begets memory; memory begets 
Judgement, and Fancy; Judgement and Fancy begets the strength and structure; and 
Fancy begets the ornaments of a Poeme. The Ancients therefore fabled not absurdly in 
making memory the mother of the Muses.162  
 
This is a relatively complex account of inherited knowledge as memory, the application of 
knowledge, education, and the invention of knowledge, cited here as strength and structure. The 
more attention that is paid to Hobbes’s detailing of their reciprocal relations, the more contingent 
upon each other they become, and equally difficult to separate. Hobbes writes: “The Sciences are 
small Power” but “Eloquence is Power and is indeed to be numbered among the most eminent 
faculties of the human mind.”163  
 
Accordingly Skinner identifies Hobbes’s recognition of the value of the art of rhetoric and that 
oratio and ratio can work together, pointing out that Hobbes moves back into the project of a 
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classical rhetorical ideal.164 Hobbes acknowledges a practice of rhetoric and reason, since 
although he still believes in an essential truth this belief is put to one side and ideas of truth and 
opinion are related through and as practice. Hobbes thus evades the emancipatory ideal 
associated with humanist philosophy. Instead, the art of rhetoric is associated with an individual 
assertion of power that is not around achieving peace, but rather the task of preventing or 
guarding oneself against war. As such Hobbes retrieves a notion of free will based in the use of 
the rhetorical arts where mastery is the pursuit of a consensus to one’s power, motivated from 
fear of this “natural” autonomy.  
 
Skinner sums up the differing approaches to rhetoric and reason through Hobbes project by 
drawing upon Hobbes changing alliances towards the art of rhetoric. First, in The Elements, 
Hobbes writes that “so long as his readers bring attention,” it ought to be sufficient for him “to 
show my reasons” to win assent.165 In Leviathan, he declares that the only way to win “attention 
and consent is to write with eloquence.”166 Contrary to the such views expressed for example in 
the work of Richard Tuck who sides with an identification of Hobbes’s work as an 
epistemological critique of the political problems of philosophy, Skinner looks to Hobbes as 
investing in a humanist project. What is important about Hobbes, for me, is to understand his 
theory of reason and rhetoric through or between these readings, in that Hobbes’s work can be 
identified both as humanist in the way that he cites, albeit reluctantly, an individual mastery of the 
rhetorical arts and reason, and as nonhumanist when regarding his theory of political practice and 
his reluctance to institutionalise an ideological conception of social emancipation. The legacy of 
Hobbes’s humanism thus can be seen to make available the grounds for an epistemological 
critique of philosophy. It is here in Hobbes’s failed (humanist) mastery of reason over rhetoric 
and the crucial move laid down in Leviathan towards rhetoric as means to inscribe reason, that 
the study of the politics of language becomes a central concern. 
 
This mastery of the art of rhetoric is visibly demonstrated by the metaphor of the Leviathan itself 
as the symbolic figurehead of the text. Hobbes identifies eloquence to be situated in use (power 
and mastery), a tool with which to convince the Commonwealth of the truths that civil science 
finds out. Furthermore, “fancy” and “judgement” do not contradict each other so easily if we are 
to take up the classical Quintilian method for cultivating discretion within the art of rhetoric. 
However, to ascertain how and by what means rhetoric establishes “facts” is a more complex 
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task, especially when it would seem that, for the subject to identify oneself as conceding to 
contract, one is subject to rhetoric. Although Hobbes acknowledges the relationship between the 
two, reason still has the dominant position, in as much as reason utilises rhetoric to win assent 
towards the establishing of facts. Consequently, the possibility that our reason may be subject to 
rhetoric upsets the status quo of the power balance and we return to the potentiality of Hobbes’s 
worst nightmare. This is the nightmare that rhetorical function has more than just a role in the 
establishing and arguing of facts, but that it is also implicated within the identification and 
understanding of them too. This pluralism returns us to the matter of our natural rights coinciding 
with the State law - a state of nature as perpetual war. 
 
 
Rhetoric and power - preliminary questions 
The legacy of Hobbes’s rhetoric and reason is the difficulty of separating subjective choice as a 
disagreement (conceptualised as perpetual war), and agreement as a passive moment in the social. 
Hobbes conceives the State and God as being in alignment with a combination of the subject’s 
natural and reasoned self-interest. As I have written earlier, the subject is not free to rationalise 
Hobbes’s Covenant; rather, this power is handed over to the “great protector”, the sovereign head 
of State. However, in Hobbes’s fusing of the theological and the political (in that Man’s self-
interest is unified with a theological concept of law), what we are then faced with is a 
foundational difference between the (pre-linguistic) natural state of man and a 
political/theological state of man. 
 
In Lefort’s critique of the relation between the theological and the political he writes that the 
exercise of power becomes politically dangerous when these terms are understood separately 
and/or when they are forced together in an impossible unity.167 It is here where we articulate 
Hobbes’s project as indicative of a forced unity, conceived under the symbol of State and God in 
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order to quell the natural material plane of interest from the masses. Significantly, Hobbes doesn’t 
propose an emancipatory politics through religious practices, he promises instead a war free zone 
through the politicisation of religious rhetoric. Lefort writes that the logic of quasi-transcendental 
power demands the conception of an original contract which, understood as a myth, invites 
further problems around a conception of the political as hinged upon both a spiritual-style 
“means to an end” task of enlightenment and a pragmatic practice of politics: 
 
It is true, as social science asserts, that power no longer makes any gesture towards an 
outside, that is it is no longer articulated with any other force which can be represented, 
and that, in that sense, it is disentangled from the religious. It is indeed true that power no 
longer refers to any point of origin which coincides with the origin of Law and 
knowledge and that, in that sense, the type of actions and relations which cluster around 
its pole can be distinguished from other types of actions and relations which might be 
termed judicial, economic and cultural; and it is therefore true that something can be 
circumscribed as being politics [la politique]. The one thing that remains hidden from the 
gaze of the scientific observer is the symbolic forms which, as a result of the mutation of 
power, makes this new distinction possible: the essence of the political [du politique]. 
The illusion that the political can be localised within society is therefore not without a 
certain consistency, and to dismiss it as a mistaken opinion would mean surrendering to 
one more illusion.168 
 
This rather lengthy quote from Lefort introduces two main problems regarding aesthetics and 
politics. The first problem is situated in a theory of quantitative power or authority, in which the 
more one is able to master the rhetorical arts, the more power one achieves. The second is the 
status of consensus within this theory of domination. The Quintilian art of rhetoric requires, at 
bottom, the establishing of an ethos, and there are two ways to establish this: i) “To speak of 
things of consequence - or things that delight”. Things that are novel and important, or something 
that concerns the good of the community. ii) To seek to ingratiate oneself with the audience 
whilst giving an impression of complete impartiality.169 Essentially the goal of the rhetorician is 
to persuade the audience as to matters of great importance, but it crucially remains unclear who 
decides what is of value when this is an ambiguous mix of persuading and crowd pleasing.  
 
Significantly, the use of rhetoric to gain power demands the establishing of consensus and as such 
it requires an inter-subjective identification, not only by an audience but also by the orator in 
choosing the most appropriate methods and style of communication. In other words, the orator 
has, to some extent, give the audience what they want. Skinner writes of a traditional way to gain 
the audience attention: “it is because of the nearness between evil and good that the rhetorician 
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can arouse the deepest emotions.”170 In light of this assertion - that rhetoric makes use of, and is 
subject to, pre-established categories - we are still faced with the problem of the Hobbesian 
experience of the immanence of truth. And this is a problem if we take up both of Hobbes’s 
conceptions of it - either as an immanent and natural violence - made available through the self-
interested disagreements performed through rhetoric - or how the project of rhetoric as a 
reasoned practice could be employed as a means towards scientific truth. However, since there 
are no pre-established possibilities for a contract without a rhetoric of the social, we can also see 
that Hobbes’s desire for scientific “fact” and “truth” under the art of rhetoric make truth an 
interested notion. Essentially, representation - the rhetoric of force, or the means by which we 
understand images of power and demonstration - and the force of rhetoric - or the means by 
which we are moved to agreement - are intrinsically conflated in a practice of language that is 
compelled to constantly assert definitions of value through its own shifting technologies.  
 
Consequently, we can ask a number of questions regarding the mutual affirmations of power 
within language. If we agree that rhetoric uses pre-established modes of consensus and also seeks 
to persuade towards consensus, then how can we account for the rhetoric of truth as power over 
others? This referent to power as using the rhetoric of truth or “empty” or “indeterminate” places 
leads to further problems in understanding the relationship between the subject, community and 
the law. This is because the normative language of power as having “no place” or as being 
ubiquitous endows the speaker with a dominating power in as much as the speaker claims 
knowledge of truths or facts. We then return to the problem of how consensus is perceived 
intersubjectively without reviving domination and normativity as pre-requisites for consensus or 
“community”. Underlying this question between the rhetoric of force and the force of rhetoric is 
what Lefort terms the fear that: 
 
The distinction between symbolic agency and power as a real organ disappears [and] the 
reference to an empty place gives way to the unbearable image of a real vacuum. The 
authority of those who make public decisions or who are trying to do so vanishes, leaving 
only the spectacle of individuals or clans whose one concern is to satisfy their appetite for 
power.171  
 
The normativity of violence as decision leads to the problem of whether or not there is any 
cultural value in the writing of violence as a universal, since agreeing to this accepts violence as a 
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naturalised phenomena, including the status of our own domination, and our possible domination 
of others. What follows from this is the question of how to respond to a normative or generic 
language that appears to obfuscate meaning and as such emphasises the limits of interpretation? I 
deal with these two problems next. 
 
 
4. Fish and Hobbes 
 
Natural violence, natural reason 
This line of questioning could lead to the Hobbesian assumption that rhetoric undermines the 
possibility for moral argument. However, in Hobbes’s insistence on practice, which moves 
against a formalised understanding of rhetorical signification, there is perhaps something to 
affirm. As we have seen, rhetoric seeks agreement, but it does not argue for absolute truths in the 
revealing of the facts that Hobbes desires. This prompts an inquiry of the circumstances of 
rhetorical argument and how it is reliant on particular audiences. This also brings into question 
the relationship between the use and the manipulation of languages that argue for certain truths 
and how such contestation relies upon already agreed ideas and conventional structures. As such, 
it is the practice of producing universals that we can now bring into focus. Can a definition of 
power as both quantitative and consensual assist in an understanding of dominant practices? 
 
Stanley Fish takes this up in two essays; On Rhetoric and On Force in his book Doing What 
Comes Naturally. In this text he writes upon the contingency of force and rhetoric and also on the 
root relation of belief and reason. On the plural condition of rhetorical debate he argues: “Not 
only [is] rhetoric - the art of analysing and presenting local exigencies - a form of discourse none 
can afford to ignore, it renders the opposing discourse - formal philosophy beside the point.”172  
 
Taking the stipulation of rhetoric and force as, at bottom, a condition of absolute finitude, we are 
then faced with the problem of the naturalisation of violence in its aesthetic mode and in our 
consensual identifications of it. Like Hobbes, Fish forgoes a theory of self-reflexivity in relation 
to social conditions and hegemonical powers. Also similar to Hobbes, Fish dismisses the 
“mediocre” as a theoretical “natural” state for the imposition or the discovery of justice: 
Following Derrida, Fish writes: 
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 The “obvious” cannot be opposed to the “staged” […] because it is simply the 
achievement of a staging that has been particularly successful. One does not escape the 
rhetorical by fleeing to the protected area of basic common sense because common sense 
in whatever form is always a rhetorical, partial, partisan, interested construction.173  
 
So, like Hobbes, Fish acknowledges a rhetorical condition. However, the contracts that they 
propose for the subject and the notion of law are orientated differently. In Hobbes, the central 
problems that alerts us to both the ubiquity and facticity of violence are, firstly, subjective choice 
as pre-political; secondly, in the acceptance that “truth” will be discovered through a reasoned 
and mastered rhetoric; and thirdly, the enforcement of the law of sovereign to solve the problem 
of plurality of opinions. What we have here is violence as something that is a conventional and 
political necessity, in that Hobbes knows that dominion regulates violence. Hobbes 
simultaneously underscores violence as irrational in that this primal violence - the nature of one’s 
will - needs policing.  
 
Fish notes that for Hobbes, reason is still acted upon as some “essential” or natural capacity, 
“guiding us to the facts”, such that the application of reason seems to be based in an opposition to 
decision being violent. However, this is not the case: the establishing of universals, or the 
argumentation of one’s belief under the name of “justice”, “truth” or “objective adjudication”, is 
interested all the way through and this is clearly demonstrated in Hobbes’s essential fear of the 
power of men’s passions. Instead in Fish’s relativism, we can see that conflict and violence have 
a foundational and unstable aspect, but the illusion of it as foundation (and thus also immanent to 
decision) where, “if we behave like that we will get that,” is acknowledged as rhetoric. The 
foundational character of violence, for Fish, “is established by persuasion, that is, in the course of 
argument and counter argument on the basis of examples and evidence that are themselves 
cultural and contextual.”174 From this we can formulate that Fish’s identification of rhetoric as 
“freeing up” or enabling democratic practices is the exact thing which Hobbes feared most – 
rhetorical persuasion as “perpetual war.” 
 
This persuasion or, violence by principle, introduces once more the question of the subject and 
violence, namely the authority by which the subject achieves power, or the social and cultural 
conditions of the force of rhetoric. Because, there is still room to deliberate the normative aspects 
of the aesthetics of violence as decision in relation to power, the ability to contest normative 
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grounds, could still be seen to risk social freedom, whether this is totalitarianism or the 
Hobbesian extreme of  “perpetual war.” These circumstances are made more complex since 
through critics such as Fish after Hobbes the determinations between such things as the aesthetic 
and the political, form and content, rhetoric and force, theory and practice, and belief and reason, 




The power of rhetoric 
The coarse and mechanistic subject which features as the subject of Hobbes’s political thinking 
and in frequent contemporary cultural representations of power agrees that more strength or 
artistry equals more power. Hobbes writes for example, “What I found pleasing about Thucydides 
beyond all other historians was the fact that he demonstrated how inept democracy is, and how 
much wiser is the rule of a single man than that of a multitude.”175 Here, rhetoric not only 
suggests a skillful use of language but also entertains the particular (and possibly irrational) 
intentions of the persuader. This notion of skill in Hobbes, fuses the idea of rhetoric as an 
authority exercising a dangerous and manipulative self-interest with the idea of skill over rhetoric 
as being a useful linguistic strategy that can endow the subject with the responsibility and the 
power to govern others successfully. Hobbes writes in Leviathan: 
 
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body or Mind: as extraordinary 
Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those 
Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire 
more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call 
Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it 
proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the 
more hast.176 
 
Hobbes goes on to write: “To have servants, is Power; To have friends, is Power: for they are 
strengths united” and “Reputation of Power, is Power” and for Hobbes this is intrinsically linked 
to “Wisdome.”177 So here power is distinctly linked to “uses” and “practices” and also capacity - 
the capacity of a “Naturall Power.” Significantly, Hobbes does not discriminate between power 
over others as mastery and what would appear to be power in agreement, say, that of friends. In 
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this sense power appears to be almost Machiavellian, in that, the will to self-empowerment at all 
times is being pursued. This use or mastery of the rhetoric of reputation as power underscores the 
assertion that Hobbes’s theory is particularly individualistic. This encourages the question of how 
power is effected through communities, and as we have seen, Hobbes leaves this open to religious 
style maxim or the potentially fickle dominance of the sovereign. 
 
To take up this question of community and individual dominance I’ll return to Hindess’s 
examination of Foucault. Hindess considers the contradictions in judging power quantitatively by 
looking at Foucault’s local critique of power. Although Foucault avoids deliberating power as 
capacity and right, and demonstrates that judgements over quantitative power are not universally 
correct as each judgement is effected by its temporal conditions Hindess recognises the historical 
stain of power in theory and practice: “domination […] is an indispensable condition of liberty - 
or at least of the kinds of liberty that we (and Nietzsche) have learned to desire.”178 Hindess 
continues to say that writers such as Foucault, Hobbes and Nietzsche make it hard for us to 
condemn domination because it is naturalised.179 However, as we have seen, attempts to 
normatively condemn domination - for example, if we think the less domination, the better – 
maintain violence, power and domination as universal territories.180 Significantly, what is 
suggested by Hindess and is also implied in the quotes from Hobbes above, is an analysis of the 
fictions, representations and the aesthetics of power as a political and contingent practice. Such a 
thinking through the politics of power, force, and domination through its defining constitutive 
fiction attempts to acknowledge that power cannot be condemned upon the terms of “good” and 
“bad”, and that a naturalised discourse of an ethos of liberty problematically sustains the 
emancipatory ideal of freedom as fate. 
 
Fish and contract 
Fish responds to the problems of self-reflexivity and of theorising violence by looking to the 
problems of principled action. He writes: “the political consequences of theory - do not belong by 
right or nature to theory, but are contingent upon the (rhetorical) role theory plays in the 
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particular circumstances of a historical moment.”181  Fish goes on to construct a notion of 
contract that adheres to Hobbes’s universal instability of the state of nature, in that Fish collapses 
the definitions of reason and belief such that each is confirmed upon the other. For Hobbes, to rid 
oneself of the problems of perpetual war one has to submit to the centralised and enforced 
authority of the sovereign. For Fish, this submission is a contract situated solely within the 
individual. That is, Fish determinedly articulates that “we victimize ourselves” in a pre-given 
historically based set of social, cultural and psychological operations. This inability to rid oneself 
of one’s beliefs, challenges the possibility of a basis for a theory of self-reflexivity that requires 
practice, since thinking through either a use of or mastery of rhetoric bears out a paradoxical 
notion of being both inside and outside of language. Here, the difficulty of theorising the use of 
language draws attention to language’s limits. Such problems produce a particular territory of/for 
rhetoric, as I have argued earlier contra Cavell in Chapter One.182  
 
Regarding this conflation of rhetoric and reason, Fish writes: 
 
It is often claimed that reason itself is what is left when belief, preconception, and 
prejudice have been set aside or discounted, but reason cannot operate independently of 
some content - of some proposition or propositions made up of definitions, distinctions 
and criteria already assumed - and that content will reflect some belief or attitude that 
will inform whatever reason dictates.183  
 
Accordingly, Fish takes from Hobbes not the universality of “self-love”184 but the universality of 
self-constraint. For Fish, contractual consent is not built upon Hobbes’s pre-moral origins, nor 
requires a signature. Instead the basis of consent is moral, social, historical and individualistic: 
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The gun at your head is your head; the interests that seek to compel you are appealing 
and therefore pressing only to the extent they already live within you, and indeed are you. 
In the end we are always self compelled, co-erced by forces - beliefs, convictions, 
reasons, desires - from which we cannot move one inch away185  
 
This is a clear description of a predisposition to an ideological prejudice. It is however, something 
that is unstable, precarious and in itself, unprincipled. Fish writes that this knowledge of 
constraints is only retroactive and therefore is destined to a metaphoric or theoretical 
manifestation. However, he writes, “You may know in general that the structure of your 
conviction is an historical artifact, but that knowledge does not transport you to a place where 
those convictions are no longer in force.”186 This proves force not only to be linked to particular 
practices of knowledge, but to be implicated within all technologies, and the work of historicising 
or conceptualising force does not find it a place where we are free from this relation. 
 
Clearly, for Fish the question of force is not a matter of origins, but a matter of practice and use. 
He concludes that “Force is not unconnected, it is not blind.”187 Fish doesn’t make such 
distinctions between a principled or non-principled force; here force is always principled because 
we cannot divorce belief from reason. However, crucial to this is that we cannot conceive of a 
strategy to hold force in check, because rhetoric becomes just another word for force. As such, 
Fish lays down a temporal and local critique of force, where the use of force implies skill and 
power but this is not based in a purely quantitative understanding of power, because any mastery 
of the rhetoric of force is always subject to the force of rhetoric.  
 
Fish goes on to argue for an ideological principle from which we cannot escape and writes further 
on the feared premise of a Hobbesian state of war as the logic of pluralism. Here, Fish contends 
that the figuring of violence is an impossible object by which to identify autonomy. This is not 
because violence is outside of language but because violence as a universal is linguistic:  
 
I may confirm [a] fear of [a] world without order or principle, wholly given over to force 
in the form either of gunmen or of judges unconstrained in their actions or of wills 
unchecked by any core of rationality. But in fact the implication of my argument is that 
this fear is unrealizable and is based on an incorrect understanding of what force is and is 
not.188 
                                                                                                                                                              
184 Fish, The Trouble With Principle, 180 
185 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 520 
186 Ibid., 524 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid., 522 
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 For Fish, we should never fear the potentiality of a wholly unconstrained law because the law is 
never free from subjective action. In other words, the law is not bigger than its practice or 
enforcement. By aligning the subject and the law, absolutely, Fish theorises an understanding of 
our mutual and universally shared “natural fear” as the basis for our individual practices of 
universal difference. This “bottom line”, unrepresentable, and non-negotiable fear, for Fish, 
constitutes a society free from the realisation of absolute violence and terror. These “forceful 
practices” never risk the absolute violence of unconstrained power, because Fish guarantees a 
fundamentally shifting hierarchy and also naturalises self-constraint.  
 
Subsequently, after following Fish’s argument, we are left to critique his own prejudices. This 
means an inquiry into the relationship between what Fish would describe as those theories that 
hold “an incorrect understanding of what force is and is not,” and his “correct” understanding; 
that force is always subject to the constraint of certain circumstances. Fish holds that thinking 
transcendentally does no good in enabling us to deal with current socio-political problems. With 
this we can see that although Fish co-opts transcendental idealism into pragmatism, such idealism 
forms incorrect narratives that are simply wrong.  
 
Significant to this call to marginalise theories is Fish’s own argumentative force. Here, Fish’s 
adversarial stance has a self-conscious and willfully prioritised attitude of self-belief (there are no 
“ifs” and “buts” about his claims for and against certain practices) and he lives his premise of the 
impossibility of self-doubt through his arguments. For Fish, this free assertion of force both for 
and against whatever one believes is acceptable, but happens to be more acceptable when we’re 
not doing philosophy. As such, the problem is that on the one hand Fish naturalises relativism and 
on the other he understands it as method since Fish’s critique seeks to marginalise transcendental 
theories yet nevertheless relies upon the standard and established language by which such 
judgements are made. In the “Routinisation of Charismatic Modernity” Russell A Berman argues 
that because “every interpretation must respond to established norms” Fish’s adversarial stance is 
implausible. He continues: “Fish’s antitraditonalism turns into a cynical defense of established 
criticism as established. The authority that once adhered to innovative modernism is transferred 
to the critical guardians of culture within the academic literary institutions.”189 [My emphasis] 
                                                     
189 Russell A Berman, “The Routinisation of Charismatic Modernity” in Modern Culture and Critical 
Theory, Art, Politics and the Legacy of the Frankfurt School, University of Wisconsin Press, 1989,130 For 
Berman, Fish’s notion of “interpretative communities” is understood as a radical critique on 
foundationalism. Fish’s interpretative authority is quickly translated by Berman to be a military authority. 
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Although Berman’s critique rather misses Fish’s point about relativism’s ability to judge and take 
up adversarial positions190 (in that Berman argues that Fish’s interpretative practice to re-produce 
and even underscore a militaristic and normative authority), it is also clear that Fish’s 
(circumstantial) distinction between a naturalised ideology evidenced in cultural interpretative 
practices and authoritative performances in ideological theories of emancipation underscores a 
problematic conception of two types of force.  
 
To understand these exercises of force more fully I take a closer look at the problem of the self-
knowing and self-determining subject. Here I reconsider the structure of private and non-private 
practices of interpretation and how an anti-representationalist account of subjectivity reflects 




Similarly to Hobbes, Derrida and Bruns identify the philosopher/aesthete as the person 
responsible for the moral use of language. By witnessing and mastering the rhetorical arts there is 
the possibility, as Bruns puts it, to “out rhetoric rhetoric.” Commenting on the Phaedrus, he 
writes: 
 
My way of reading the Phaedrus situates it within the history of rhetoric as Plato’s effort 
to out rhetoric rhetoric, to beat rhetoric at its own game by showing us what real power 
looks like, to produce the most powerful rhetoric of all, a philosophical rhetoric in which 
we learn to use words as Socrates does, stopping even the great Protagoras in his tracks: a 
philosophical techne of language where language brings not only the interlocutors and the 
audience to silence but also stabilizes its subject matter, unpacking it according to the law 
of division, bringing it to order, bringing it under conceptual control, laying it bear for 
our inspection.191 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Because for Berman, Fish’s theory is “not concerned with knowledge as an approximation of truth” it then 
“becomes a matter of performative capacity designed to persuade the intra-institutional interlocutors in the 
interpretative game.” 
190 For Fish’s argument supporting the ability to make judgements in relativism, see the article “Can 
Postmodernists Condemn Terrorism? Don’t Blame Relativism” in The Responsive Community, Summer, 
2002, 27-31Also a counter to criticism such as Berman’s is provided in Fish’s Introduction in Doing What 
Comes Naturally. In Fish’s antiformalism all our judgements have the same force as that exercised in a 
normative belief system. For Fish, this universality produces an overarching and naturalised relativism 
contingent to such judgments. However, as I have shown, there still remains the question of Fish’s own 
prejudice, in that methods of judgments are distinguished hierarchically under relativism. This is especially 
pertinent, when under Fish’s theory transcendental-style judgments are judged to be the least helpful type 
to make. 
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In order to situate a self-reflexive or inter-subjective experience with language, Bruns speaks of a 
powerful and creative subject who can take language a step further than other people. However, 
the writing of a self-understanding of our relationship to and within violence demands a more 
careful appraisal of the formulation of the mastery or skill of particular individuals as power. This 
comes back to the question of writing and specifically the writing of rhetoric and writing as 
rhetoric. This is because critical discourses, such as Bruns’s, fall once more into the paradox of 
doubling the critique they intend to exceed. In maintaining the use of a style of that language as 
an axis or locus they are subject to that system, making Bruns’s desire to “out rhetoric rhetoric” a 
critique demarcated as excess, or in other words a critical farce. Consequently, such a rhetoric of 
authority immediately returns us to the problems sketched out at the beginning of this chapter 
from Butler and Hindess, where once again we call into question the polemical and hegemonical 
problems brought on by the authoritative force by which that writing is inscribed as control  
 
Significantly, Bruns’s idea seems to re-create something akin to Hobbes’s rationale, in that it acts 
upon rhetoric as a problem to be dealt with and that it has certain limits. In this sense Bruns’s 
position cannot work because it asserts itself both as a problem and a solution, and in doing so it 
underscores the quest for self-consciousness to end up reinforcing a formalised rhetoric of 
subjective power. In turn, and returning to Hobbes’s theory of practice, the problems we confront 
once more are questions of the practice of the rhetoric of subjective authorities as violent, and 
how this impacts on a condition of the political. 
 
Still within Fish’s rhetoric, the process of and locus for our mutual identifications of violence as 
decision is not something based on an emancipatory move or a striking out for or against freedom 
as violence, because any move towards such “ends” demands this impossible split between reason 
and belief in order to act upon our desires. Fish writes: “Just how does one distance oneself from 
oneself? With what part of oneself can one be tentative about oneself?”192 Fish’s ideological 
prejudice here sounds very similar to that of Foucault, suggesting an almost primordial basis upon 
which we make decisions. In this it would seem that Fish’s universalising notions of belief and 
reason’s contingency acts as the imperative and guard to our actions. With Foucault we hold 
ourselves in check, we master the arts of the self, we conduct a work upon the self. However, 
with Fish we victimise ourselves, where we prey upon our consciences with our own kind of 
ideological sedition, a force that can never be disjointed from our practices. As such, Fish’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
191 Gerald. L Bruns. Tragic Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, Language, Literature and Ethical Theory, 
Northwestern University Press, 1999, 116 
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ideological state is based ambiguously as both the boundary of the political and as being firmly 
within the political. We could say that Fish’s subject is constrained to the political, knows it 
retroactively, but is prevented from knowing it “ultimately” or “absolutely”. And because this 
knowledge is not available it is not useful. Self-consciousness, then, for Fish, is a retroactive 
metaphor, and it has no predilection for the ultimate or tragic moment of (traumatic) knowledge 
that the orthodoxy of philosophy produces either as essence or metaphor. Fish’s slippery 
metaphor – “the gun at your head is your head”- illustrates what seems to be an absolute violence, 
and also a metaphor that has no allegorical meaning per se. This is because the gun does not 
entertain an “effect” upon us, and as such it has no particular demand upon us. Fish employs the 
cliché of violent metaphors - a gun as a potential murder weapon in a hostage situation - and 
denies the gun the power to kill. All it has is its threat of potential and essential violence, with no 
reason in mind. Fish uses the metaphor of violence to demonstrate the complex “non-
identificatory” aspect of this situation - the metaphor of the gun as our head is a metaphor for the 
impossibility of self-consciousness and the constraint of ideological thinking. It is something that 
de-centres any attempt to construct difference between internality and externality. Fish constructs 
a critique where violence is always principled, but here the principle of violence as a metaphor is 
to demonstrate its “possibility”. As such we are left, in Fish’s abstraction or generic 
characterisation of violence with a reminder, not of its contingency, but its ubiquity.  
 
Perhaps ironically, Fish’s intentionally insubstantial metaphor, leaves us with something we can 
only trust or believe in - an imposing and messianic history of accumulated and irrevocable 
knowledge effected as a universal and highly abstracted notion of force - something which forces 
home the linguistic aspect of our ideological prejudice but also relies upon a normative use of a 
violent metaphor to produce an understanding of non-identification. On the one hand Fish is not 
interested in theorising the impossible. However, it would seem that here that the image of 
violence acts as a metaphor for both possibility and impossibility. The inherent violence of the 
gun, where we cannot separate ourselves from the force of our own rationality and belief, is 
“impossibility”, written as self-consciousness, and “possibility” as ideology. However, Fish does 
not present a metaphor of contamination, or ambiguity through oppositional contradictions. Here 
we have instead confusion, something that we don’t really want to think about and as the 
metaphor suggests, where our head and a gun are the same. It is an image that manufactures the 
refusal of thinking privately. The metaphor is unprincipled in its abstraction because it is not 
categorised as an originally “motivational” or grounding ethic, or the locus for emancipation. 
                                                                                                                                                              
192Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 517 
 128
 Fish’s subject does not suffer doubt, or any self-conscious experience of failure. Fish describes a 
subject that is always distanced from knowing violence, despite being constantly implied within 
it. Crucially, this distance is not tragic, because Fish allows no space for neutrality which tragic 
knowledge requires.193 This leaves the question of how we can think through the apparent 
universal of force - or in other words, our shared assumptions regarding the identification of 
power, within this situation - without a rational basis for self-reflexivity. Also, if the 
generic/abstract image of power produced in the aesthetics of violence as decision is principled, 
what is it principled for or against? And how can a local analysis of constraints hope to deal with 
something that appears to be a much wider issue? This line of questioning can help us to get 
closer to analysing the politics and consequences of the agreement (the production of a generic 
image) that is our identification of judgement as violence. 
 
 
5. Force and the Unrepresentable 
 
What then can we say of violence’s “universal” aspect? Looking back to Chapter One, Oedipus 
makes his violent move (his self-mutilation) in the context of being given knowledge. However, 
Fish’s subject is never capable of such a transcendental experience as talking to the gods, yet at 
the same time, his/her actions are all in accordance with the implied force of an unidentifiable, 
non-recognisable universal truth:194 that at the heart of the individual’s belief s/he is right and that 
this truth is historically and conditionally derivative. Fish’s subject, as previously demonstrated, 
                                                     
193 For more on “neutrality” and the tragic, see Chapter One, where I looked to Stanley Cavell’s Romantic 
philosophy, in which the tragic self-consciousness of knowledge is inflected around doubts in everyday 
experiences. Here, Fish can be seen to reconfigure this conception of doubt as something that evacuates 
Cavell’s privatised sense of self-consciousness. Instead in Fish, doubt is another responsive interpretation 
of events. However, a notion of subjective neutrality or even objectivity is also relevant to Jünger’s 
literature and Malick’s film making. Here, violence is given a status of “unprincipled neutrality” in order to 
substantiate a transcendental ethical law of violence, and the subject is asked to somehow correlate with 
this in an agency structured on an aesthetics of passivity. This will be discussed in Chapter Four where, for 
the most part, Ernst Jünger writes a non-tragic experience of metaphysical violence as the basis for this 
passive relationship to violence. This is described in varying forms, but most clearly in the novel The Lost 
Outpost. This story tells of a soldier who guards an outpost, alone, without any knowledge of whether a war 
is still being waged, when in fact the war is over. The soldier maintains his task of guarding the outpost as 
if he believes the act of war to be a constant phenomenon - the war will never end. The soldier is 
ambivalent to the facts of everyday life, suspended and dislocated in a (horrific) fantasy where an ignorant 
vigilance is eclipsed with individuated freedom. 
194 This universal is not substantiated by the subject either self-consciously or identified universally as the 
political. Clearly, there are instances when we agree and when we don’t, all of which are subject to force, 
but not the totalising force situated in metaphysical critiques. 
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believes s/he has knowledge because of the impossibility of self-consciousness. The subject Fish 
perceives and his/her relation to knowledge does not differ dramatically to the (Heideggerian) 
figure of Oedipus who is very much alone with his knowledge. Although his knowledge is 
without precedent and he is aware that somewhere someone knows more than him it is important 
to remember that Oedipus does not live a life of suffering or absolute anxiety because of this. As I 
have already said, Oedipus is aware that the gods exist but the knowledge that somewhere there 
are universals does not challenge his everyday practices, nor does he seek out a transcendental 
self-knowledge as his lifetime’s task. For the most part, he gets on with his life without a 
transcendental trauma or anguish, for as we see in part two, Oedipus is moreover the subject of 
comedy. 
 
However, as we have seen Oedipus’s “autonomous moment”, is based in violence, a rupture of 
horror within the text. Fish’s subject is not open to the same degrees of irrationality as we see in 
such tales of decision and horror, because self-consciousness is not linked to rationality. Instead, 
the force of knowing has lost the horrific content of the absolute unknown and yet still is 
inherently violent. So here, it would seem that we return to an old problem, the idea that 
consequences, decisions, or regard to a situation’s import requires a formal hierarchy of value, 
where we need an aesthetic of violence to represent the horror, force, and power we associate 
with ‘free’ action. What we see being proposed in Fish’s version of "perpetual war" or the 
everyday conflicts of vocabularies is the evacuation of the notion of radical or absolute risk, 
which is usually found in the gap between “knowing” and “not knowing”.  
 
However, although Fish evacuates the absolute risk of decision making, he describes the logic of 
a democratic society as a territory of conflict. Because of this, it is necessary to rehearse some of 
the problems that link Fish’s antiformalism, which eradicates transcendentals to a formalism that 
relies upon language as foundational to and for experience. This returns us to an inquiry into 
exactly how Fish conceptualises his non-foundational metaphor, why it takes on an aesthetics of 
violence and how this describes the hierarchy of values that Fish proposes, including an analysis 
of the differences between the violence that characterises Fish’s immanentism and a more formal 
conception of hegemony. 
 
 
Power in the abstract… 
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This “gap” between the representable and the unrepresentable is aptly demonstrated in Ernesto 
Laclau’s essay Identity and Hegemony, where rhetoric is seen to establish the terms of an aporia 
which in turn situates hegemony as the place between the impossible and the necessary. This 
empty place within language is for Laclau the catalyst for hegemony and brings us nicely back to 
the problems I fleshed out in the introduction to this chapter regarding the hegemonical problems 
raised when thinking through aesthetic and political identifications: 
 
The representation of the unrepresentable constitutes the terms of the paradox within 
which hegemony is constructed - or, in the terms we used earlier, we are dealing with an 
object which is at the same time, both impossible and necessary. This is not far from the 
terrain of the Lacanian notion of the “real”, which resists symbolisation.195  
 
This quote also takes us back to the critique of the aesthetics of aporia I laid out in Chapter One, 
and similarly to both Cavell and Zupancic, as Laclau does not produce a theory of the “real” as an 
absolute externality, but instead the nameless - the innomable. Here, he draws up a system of 
order, where the real takes its place as indicative of something that is constantly filled but remains 
empty. Taking up Paul De Man’s theory from his text, “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion,”196 
Laclau looks to the difference between 0 and 1. In this he writes that 0 always designates 
something and as such it is similar to and also remains different from 1. Therefore, it is neither 
something nor nothing, its status within the order of numbers is nothing at all, the un-nameable. 
Laclau adopts this principle to the real, where the real is bound by a tropos. For Laclau, rhetoric 
establishes the real, not by the nature of the real’s externality, but of its essential abstraction or 
ambiguity between the identifications of inclusion and exclusion. Here, we have a split between 
form; the form of the means by which we represent 0 - an abstract representative form - and the 
content which is situated primarily in the use of 0 - the fact of its essential difference to 1.  
 
Nevertheless, I would like to acknowledge that these are both interpretations. That is, to conceive 
of something abstractly is a precise interpretation of it, not something that in-itself challenges our 
perception of the limits of representational possibilities within language. Moreover, the use of 
such abstracts, “universals” or norms provokes problems of interpretation and identification if we 
think that they have some origin from which they are abstracted, or in other words if we conceive 
of representation as something that is essentially empty or content free. The 0 is only un-
                                                     
195 Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and Hegemony,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left, Verso, 2000, 65 
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nameable if we choose or are asked to think in terms of “essence”, and as Laclau points out, this 
doesn’t prevent any application of it in a system. However, more pointedly the application of it in 
a system is only incongruous with the thinking of it as an essential other-ness, not its 
representative faculty as other-ness. When Laclau asks us to think of the value of 0, we 
automatically are invited to give it value - a value in a system where it follows the laws of that 
system. Its representational value is inscribed within its use. The numbers 0, 1, 2 are as full and as 
empty as each-other, each having no essential value outside that system. Only in their use is 
meaning understood, and perhaps Laclau forgets that representing 0 is a use of it. Despite 
Laclau’s acknowledgment that the zero is part of a system he still looks to its exclusivity. Its 
significance as 0 inflects a notion of other-ness, despite and because of its apparent exclusion 
within a system. However for Laclau, following Lacan, there is the insistence that, “the presence 
of that name [“real”] within that system has a suturing tropos.”197 It is the name of an empty 
place, and the attempt to fill it through the very naming of what is nameless. This points to the 
idea that the representational force of naming the real, or the success of meaning, results in a 
disintegration of it. In identifying the real as a “suturing tropos” we are also witnessing the fact of 
its absolute representability. Here language works, and because it works, we are given the notion 
of language as a fragile system. Once again this theory falls into contradiction, in the exposition 
of language’s suicidal ability we end in the prose of critical melodrama. 
 
 
…And interpretations of the normative 
Laclau understands abstract language to be indicative of a substantive political lack and also 
therefore to be the catalyst for ideological notions of emancipation and, with it power and 
violence. With this he dismisses Butler’s assertion that “to claim that the real resists 
symbolisation is still to symbolise the real as a kind of resistance.”198 In objection to Butler, 
Laclau writes; “This would lead to an assertion of total representability, and in that case 
unrepresentability could be conceived only as radical unawareness - but to admit even the 
possibility of existence of something of which we are essentially unaware (that is, not even 
potentially mediated by thought) would break the link between representability and actuality.” 
This is a problem that Laclau should perhaps take up, because, as I demonstrated above, Laclau 
                                                                                                                                                              
196 See pages 67-8 for Laclau’s argument in detail. The Paul de Man text is from Aesthetic Ideology, 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, 51-69, where he responds to Pascal’s 
theory of “infinite smallness.” 
197 Ibid., 68 
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relies upon the total representability of the real as unrepresentable in order to show that language 
is limited.  
 
Following his central point; if we consider the “abstract” as irreducible, as a fact in itself, we are 
then faced with a question as to whether this abstract undermines or unaccomplishes language, 
exposing linguistic limits. In these terms, for Laclau, the “representational success” of the abstract 
always reinforces its superficiality, in as much it constantly exists in the negative - as lack. It is 
here that Laclau neatly returns the problem to that of the real where, once more, the problems in 
interpretation display the abstract as reducible to a fact, the fact of the real. However, Laclau’s 
differentiation between representability and actuality as the means by which to save us from the 
horrors of totalitarianism and quantitative power, deny the very axis and efficacy of power that is 
situated within rhetorical practices. The premise for such a separation is challenged in that the 
territory of total representability allows us to experience a difference between total 
representability, in that we make interpretations, and total agreement, in that we don’t always 
agree on what these interpretations are. Similarly, and staying with Laclau, hegemony is 
construed as the space enacted between aporia and knowledge wherein which they both subvert 
each other. Hegemony is absolutely related to a lack in language, and this lack is given a 
prioritised space within a linguistic system, where it motivates and highlights the radical 
impossibility of representation and of course its ultimate necessity. By placing the problem of 
hegemony in a quasi-transcendental system where, “Hegemony is the unstable relation between 
the ethical and the normative”199 Laclau situates dominance as an unstable abstraction that 
continues to obscure both critique and interpretation. Laclau therefore ignores the condition, 
contingency and performance of language and that our acknowledgment and understanding of 
this “lack” or that facing this insubstantial limit is expressed in genre; i.e., that it needs a 
bystander, author and audience, the likes of which translate radical unawareness straight back into 
the interpretative field. As such, this theory cannot make available the self-consciousness 
experience of these limits in order to organise the possibility of the fact of the real lurking in the 
shadows of the abstract. It is here where we can return to Fish’s solution to the problem of 
representational determinacy understood as, social indeterminacy as freedom - a figure without 
figure. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
198 Ibid., 65. Laclau quotes from Butler’s Bodies That Matter, 1993, 207 Incidentally, Butler argument 
here, reinforces my argument regarding the real and aesthetics in Chapter One. 
199 Ibid., 81 
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Without re-tracing the steps of Chapter One too fully, what I wish to extract from this return to 
the “real” configured in terms of absolute finitude is not only a confirmation of its linguistic 
aspect, but also to demonstrate the complexity of the universalising appearance of the genre of the 
heroic, whereby a system of representation in no way articulates a “success” for meaning or 
knowledge against the other of “not knowing”, or even the “tragic” knowledge of knowing 
knowledge’s limits. Rather, not understanding is not a mark of the unrepresentable, but perhaps 
disagreement or the unavailability of knowledge in that particular instance. In this I can repeat 





This claim regarding radical unawareness becomes pertinent when read through Fish as the 
impossibility of self-consciousness. For Fish, “impossibility” is not the subject of critique, but it 
is something he finds necessary to conceptualize. Fish’s image of possibility and impossibility 
doesn’t acknowledge itself as something which is in a process of “fullness” and “emptiness” 
brought on by an identification of difference between the real and the representational, say the 
zero as void and the zero as image. Instead it is a deliberate cohesion of both of these at the same 
time. As such it is a metaphor that obfuscates the difference between concrete representation and 
abstraction. Each is the other, and this without calling upon a “radical unawareness” or the 
“unrepresentable” as means by which to make decisions. Simply put, Fish doesn’t so much break 
the link between representability and actuality, in the sense that these two things would be pulled 
apart, such that the unawareness exposed in “impossibility” would be the status of an exteriorised 
real. Instead, this “link” is evacuated altogether by bringing the two closer together, and where 
impossibility and possibility are coherent to the basic ideological principle to which we subject 
ourselves and in which we convince ourselves that there is something to be free with and for. 
Consequently, Fish’s theory of the impossibility of self-knowledge refuses to separate “true” 
from “false” knowledges because, firstly, the theme of self-consciousness has a legitimate 
historical and traditional rhetorical force and secondly, this notion of “absolute impossibility” is 
figured to be unreal and antirepresentational.200 
 
                                                     
200 Although Fish adopts a fairly schematic metaphoric manipulation of language in order to achieve his 
non-objective interpretative politics, what he figures undoes any representational claims that aim to differ 
between the real and the representational. In other words, it’s not so much that Fish avoids forming 
proceduralist-style interpretations. Rather, he avoids representing his interpretations procedurally. 
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Fish’s refusal of metaphor goes hand in hand with his thought of a universal and original 
difference. However, his preference for a metaphor that works as an identification of no 
identification is suitably identified as a literary and rhetorical phenomena in Fish’s “self-
interested” critical argument. Because his pragmatism employs a metaphor without object, Fish 
therefore associates the work of theory with the formalism of immanentism and objectivity. 
Fish’s impossibility of “knowing self” is understood as absolute impossibility, and it is this that 
allows for his theory of practicing the jointly rational and ideological faculties of the subject 
within absolute finitude. Consequently, a question of “absolute finitude” turns towards the 
question of the “absolute other”. In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida asks; “What is this 
encounter with the absolutely other? Neither representation, nor limitation, not conceptual 
relation to the same. The ego and the other do not permit themselves to be dominated or made 
into totalities by a concept or relationship.”201 The phenomenon of the other, for Fish, is a non-
phenomena, based in the principles and forces of our self-assertions. In this Fish translates 
Derrida’s metaphysics in order to situate a pragmatic and physical politics as an encounter with 
the other is not the task or the premise for the subject in Fish’s thinking.  
 
However, the practice of Fish’s own principles, and crucially their coherence with formalism still 
needs work because Fish’s accreditation of an “absolute other” with an antiformalist metaphor 
conforms to the mechanics of a philosophical hierarchy of values. Here, an encounter with the 
other may not be the locus of Fish’s antiformalism, rather, the subject is absolutely is the other to 
the point of its non-recognition. As we have seen, although Fish manages to expose his own 
thinking and that of a philosophical hierarchy as contingent and interested, by taking the 
“antiformalist road” he also acknowledges the overarching power and difference between his 
thinking and that of a theological/philosophical-style formalism, which by all accounts is a power 
which threatens or at least is unhelpful to “good” (read here as useful) political practices. How 
such a hierarchical schema appears in Fish’s thinking is crucial because on the one hand it rescues 
a contemplative and rational formalism and on the other it prefers a subject who has the ability 
and savoir faire to use language effectively. For Fish, these kinds of powers are made “risk free” 
in the absolutist sense but are nevertheless politically consequential because we are free to 
exercise power. As a result, Fish’s theory invites a comparative analysis between the rhetorical 
problems of a transcendental-style theory, and the rhetorical forces that are at work within all 
judgments. The rhetoric and politics of transcendental-style theorising is considered in the 
                                                     
201Jaques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics”, in Writing and Difference, Routledge, 1978, 95 Derrida 
writes regarding a conceptualization of the other through antiformalism, specifically on Emmanuel 
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following chapter. However, to conclude here, I’ll take up Fish’s defense of a nonhierarchical, 
mutually contestable understanding of interpretation. 
 
 
Knowledge and power 
Regarding the problem of organised hierarchies within interpretative processes, Fish writes in his 
section on “Meaning and Constraint” in the essay “With the Compliments of the Author”:  
 
There is no epistemological difference between direct and mediated communications 
because, in a fundamental sense, all communications are mediated. That is, 
communications of every kind are characterised by exactly the same conditions - the 
necessity of interpretative work, the unavoidability of perspective, and the construction 
by acts of interpretation of that which supposedly grounds interpretation, intentions, 
characters and pieces of the world.202  
 
For Fish, we are always removed from and enclosed within language, nothing makes us any 
closer to it or any more distanced from it. However, Fish does go on to construct different modes 
of interpretative analysis and these are organised between “direct interpretations” and “more 
mediated interpretations”. This is lived out in classifying of performed “utterances” as more 
consequential because they are more spontaneous than other more mediated forms of 
representations, such as writing etc. In this I could ask if, despite getting rid of a radical 
unrepresentability - of a direct difference between fiction and the real - does Fish still rely upon 
the same process of hierarchical recognitions as any other universalising theory? - We may 
operate within absolute finitude but the criteria for judgment still seems to occupy a formal 
sliding scale of value which goes from the “less mediated” to the “more mediated”, re-inviting 
Laclau’s claim that our use of language points out its essential lack. However, Fish does not 
propose such a scale of values. There is a hierarchy of values but this is by no means a naturalised 
hierarchy that we see in Laclau. Instead, as Fish quotes from Derrida’s Signature Event Context; 
“this relative purity” say, of the performance of less mediated interpretations, “does not emerge in 
opposition to citationality or iterability, but in opposition to other kinds of iteration within a 
general iterability.”203 It is on this basis that Fish makes his interpretative strategy explicit:  
 
It is true that these varieties [of interpretation] can be ordered with respect to their 
distance from an ideal or normative case, the case of ordinary circumstances, but that 
                                                                                                                                                              
Levinas’s Totality and Infinity. 
202 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 43-44 
203 Ibid., 56, quoting from Jacques Derrida’s Signature, Event, Context, 192 
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case as we have seen [and which I have also hoped to demonstrate above. AB] is nothing 
more than a set of interpretative practices…that produce what supposedly underlies the 
practices.204  
 
Fish’s understanding of “essential difference” situates interpretative work as a naturalised process 
whereby we unselfconsciously contest existing hierarchies. This non-recognisable “constraint to 
interpret” is simultaneously coupled with a conception of the subject as a public social actor 
whose power is rooted in the retroactive process of interpretation. For Fish, the linguistically 
constituted individual is intrinsically linked to community in as much as the language of personal 
beliefs is secularised but always public. It is through this contingency that Fish’s relativism could 
be read as a task of interpretation as dominance in that whoever has the ability to demonstrate the 
best knowledge of knowledge wins power. This recalls two themes: one, of the mastery of 
rhetoric discussed earlier in relation to Hobbes’s advocacy of the knowing subject (most likely to 
be the artist or poet) and, the other; Lefort’s problematisation of aesthetico-political unity and 
disunity, in that Fish’s subject is now free to designate the conditions of language and politics 
(albeit temporally) that Lefort identifies to be constitutive of domination.  
 
The narratives that I have concentrated on in this text as a whole can be seen to use the rhetoric of 
such abstractions and are situated firmly within it. The normalisation of violence as decision in 
them works on a high level of shared assumptions. To focus this more clearly, “violence as 
decision” demonstrates a shared assumption that representations of moral and political values 
expressed as innate and quantitative notions of power are part of a natural hegemony. As such, 
the consistent nature of such mediated, poetic or dramatic representations of action as violence 
call upon the task of antifoundationalism to analyse the authorities which produce them. 
Consequently, my argument constantly fluctuates between the authorities that write the normative 
and their vision of it without constructing differences between theoretical intention and the 
products of that practice. 
 
Finally returning to the problem of prejudice and force in Fish’s antiformalism, we can see that 
Fish argues against emancipatory theories because they have a socio-political legitimacy. 
However, his move against theoretical formalism is not made because an emancipatory politics 
invites “absolute terror” and such like. Rather, Fish’s belief is based on his opinion that such 
theories do not assist in good democratic practice. In this way, even in Fish’s antiformalism, one 
is free to make judgements however normative sounding or condemning they may be, because it 
                                                     
204 Ibid. 56 
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is always the subject that contingently situates such claims. In brief, Fish co-opts emancipatory 
thinking into relativism and then gives it a back seat, preferring instead to frame his interpretative 
practices upon terms of temporal circumstance, rhetoric and force. Nevertheless, as I have 
written, it is clear that Fish’s interpretative judgments hold onto a similar rhetorical force as those 
he seeks to avoid due to his apparently unavoidable reliance upon a classical schema. In light of 
this I now consider the problem of the social and political gravity and actual presence of 
transcendental codes read as dominant forces within the political. For this I return to a critique of 
the metaphysical character in narratives and theories of violence to consider how the rhetoric of 
violence as decision, as a tacit structure of the political, is consequential to politics. Taking this 
up further in my final chapter I subject the linguistic conceptions of autonomy, ontology and 
metaphysics to critique, in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the political literature of Ernst 
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What is most thought-provoking, then, could be something lofty, perhaps even the 
highest thing there is for man, provided man still is the being who is insofar as he 
thinks, thinks in that thought appeals to him because his essential nature consists 
in memory, the gathering of thought. And what is most thought-provoking - 
especially when it is Man’s highest concern - may well be also what is most 
dangerous. Or do we imagine that a man could even in small ways encounter the 
essence of truth, the essence of beauty, the essence of grace - without danger?205 
 
Martin Heidegger 
What Is Called Thinking? 
 
 
In the first three chapters I have attempted to raise issues regarding the nature and consequences 
of the relation between subjective agency and violence within political and philosophical 
arguments. The first chapter proposes that our identifications with agency, critique or decision are 
inscribed within political, textual and philosophical narratives of the epic, the tragic and/or the 
heroic. Subjective “action” hovers over the image of violence as something which symbolically 
manifests itself as an “outside” yet is “inside” the narrative. Corresponding to this was the 
significance of the relation between political strategies for organising agency and those evidenced 
in narratives. Resulting from this was the concretisation of tragic romanticism as a genre, 
confirmed through the figures of both a Nietzschean and a Hegelian Oedipus. Here I organised 
the basis for an analysis of the nature of “philosophical themes” at work within narrative and 
political structures in order to ask how these themes condition a concept of subjective critique and 
are relative to the immanence of violence to decision. 
 
This problem was taken up within my second chapter where I initially considered Roger 
Shattuck’s “critical theory” in relation to the character of “metaphysical evil” at work within 
postmodern allegories of subjective agency. Here, I argued that a polemical critique, or a critique 
which demands or looks for serious and effective moral choices does little to redeem the 
problematic that these theories attempt to contest through critiquing anti-foundational discourses. 
Following this, I looked to Foucault as the figure of a problematic poststructuralism. This was not 
only to understand how Foucault’s varying detractors agreed in identifying problems with his 
project, but also because I wanted to consider the relationship and difference between a 
Foucauldian subject - who acknowledges the aestheticisation of the self as a political strategy for 
the conceptualising of agency - and the figure of the post-tragic subject: contemporary culture’s 
mainstream aestheticisation of agency as violence.  
 
This question of agency, metaphysics and violence motivated the return to the question of the 
relationship between philosophy and narrative, or even, philosophy as rhetoric, picking up on 
Rorty’s claim of the “nuisance” of metaphysics in Chapter Two and Fish’s antiformalism in 
Chapter Three. After having established the question of agency to be intrinsically tied to a 
political and ideological rhetoric in Chapter Three, through both Hobbes and Fish, I now consider 
the implications of thinking this through in both philosophy and politics.  
 
Key to this and also a vital question for this fourth chapter is the “nature” of violence at work in 
philosophy and narrative. Such contingency establishes a question of the foundational aspect of 
this relation, where the traditional, historical and atemporal notion of violence and decision, in 
itself invites itself as a metaphysical problem for the task of philosophy, in that the transcendental 
character of violence as decision sustains problems for the work of a pragmatic political practice. 
This understanding of subjective decision as correlative to an “authentic moment” for the 
individual as being both beyond and within language will be developed in this chapter with 
reference to the work of Martin Heidegger. Here, I look at his attempt to overcome a theory of 
decision as a subjective application or power over knowledge. In brief, I am interested in how he 
acknowledges and deals with “the cost of our continuous temptation to knowledge”206 or, in other 
                                                                                                                                                              
205 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, Harper and Row, 1972, 51 
206 Stanley Cavell uses this phrase in the text The Claim of Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, 241-2. 
He writes that “the moral of scepticism […] that the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole […] is 
not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing.” He continues; “Both Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger continue, by reinterpreting Kant’s insight, that the limitations of knowledge are not failures of it. 
Being and Time goes further than the Philosophical Investigations in laying out how to think […] but 
Wittgenstein goes further than Heidegger in laying out how to investigate the cost of our continuous 
temptation to knowledge […] In Being and Time the cost is an absorption in the public world, the world of 
the mass or average man […] In both the cost is the loss, or foregoing of identity or of selfhood. To be 
interested in such accounts of the cost of knowing to the knowing creature, I suppose one will have to take 
an interest in certain preoccupations of romanticism.” Alternatively, the concept of a “temptation” to 
knowledge read through Heidegger (and also discussed initially in Chapter One, 41), is read as a “passion” 
for knowledge written through Oedipus’s actions. From Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale 
University Press, 1980, 102: “We cannot regard Oedipus only as the man who meets his downfall; we must 
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words, the claim that our passion for knowledge is an irrational pursuit that also costs the subject 
his/her identity. Therefore, not only is violence at issue as a foundational question but also its 
intrinsic relation to a conception of subjective agency and also the demand for identifications of 
action.  
 
Crucially, this “foundation” of violence is always unstable on two counts; first, in its inherent 
ambiguity, in that violence is given the quality of an “externality” to the territory of our 
understanding, and secondly, the mark of violence seems omnipresent, in that the facticity of its 
persistence in relation to thinking always hints at its “real” or ineradicable character. Therefore, 
our relation to violence as judgement could be seen to be unstable through the very aspect of its 
consistency, meaning that we are able to premise and identify action within it and as it, and yet it 
is not fixed in our comprehension, for example, as a political tool in the world of things.  
 
Consequently, we have a few underlying problems to deal with, initially regarding foundations, 
secondly, that of limits, and thirdly, a question of the formal - rhetorical and political relation to 
what could be construed as “realism” on the one hand, or normativity or habit on the other. 
Therefore, for a second set of investigations there is: i) the problem of the ethical relation within 
language (when language appropriates us and vice versa); ii) the requirement of a critique of the 
choices of different (poetic/epic) vernaculars which are deemed to “encourage” this experience, 
and; iii) how “universalising” apparatuses are structured in a formal relation to and within 
language and politics. Crucially this requires a critique of thinking as a universal experience, an 
analysis of how universal apparatuses of thinking are experienced contingently and also a study 
of the relationship between a philosophical “universalising” concept of thinking, theory expressed 
as narrative, and also the political legitimacy of theories and narratives of transcendence.  
 
Also, and picking up on the claims set down in Chapter Three, since the use of language and a 
theory of knowledge are inseperable we can ask how it is possible to think through this relation 
without falling into the mechanistic and determinate Nietzschean-style politics as a character of 
autonomy? I respond to this by inscribing from the start the “nature” of transcendental language 
in that my analysis does not attempt to debilitate or historicise these already historical and 
“foundational” language as means by which we can complacently refer to them as “merely 
rhetoric”. In other words, instead of organising a theory which understands freedom as being free 
                                                                                                                                                              
see him as the embodiment of Greek being-there, who most radically and wildly asserts his fundamental 
passion, the passion for the disclosure of being, i.e. the struggle for being itself.”  
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from representation I look to the productions of autonomy within language without strategic 
fissures between form and content or the real and the representational. 
 
Consequently, this chapter deals specifically with the rhetoric of a violent language as 
foundational to decision by looking to its controlling factors and its consequences. For this I 
consider the political literature of Ernst Jünger and also the film The Thin Red Line (1997) 
directed by Terence Malick. The Thin Red Line works to recreate the image of violence as a 
ubiquitous and metaphysical territory, where nature takes on the properties of the ethical 
experience. Here, nature is an ambiguous and powerful locale, a constant and an unknown force. 
It is both the normative and the other, or, constitutive of a brutal earth and a heavenly glory. 
Alternatively, in Jünger we see (a violent) language introduced as grounds for decision, or a tool 
by which to achieve autonomy through the attempt to incorporate metaphysics as a linguistic 
phenomenon. 
 
By considering the work of Heidegger, Jünger and Malick I assess the attempts to negate a priori 
or ontological ground for subjective decision, where problematically, we see that Jünger identifies 
and maintains metaphysics as violence, trauma, and death, which accordingly proposes the legacy 
of absolute finitude to be active-nihilism - the creation of language as “thing” - and a tool for 
“becoming”, specifically orientated around negative or violent performances.  
 
By drawing upon these two Heideggerian influenced narratives I ask if their stabilising of 
Heidegger’s metaphysics, in producing a violent language and images of horror as the grounds 
upon which one can achieve or experience power, can entertain or produce any possibility for 
critical autonomy, without a theoretical pragmatism or a transcendental philosophy.207 This 
problem prompts the following related questions. Do the practices of thinking or aestheticising 
transcendence block non-metaphysical avenues of language and thought?208 If, as we have seen, 
literature is the key to democratic practices (Rorty, Fish and Derrida), then what is the democratic 
value of narratives that rhetoricise and naturalise freedom as and constrained to violence? And, 
when metaphysics is understood as political autonomy and power (based upon an aesthetics of 
                                                     
207 This was explored in my previous critique on Fish’s pragmatism and Hobbes’s politics where I argued 
that an attempt to deliver a non-transcendental and contingent politics invariably held onto transcendental, 
foundational and traditional hierarchical schemas. This, as I have written, prompts this reconsideration of 
the political consequence of such codes.  
208 This question is drawn from Joanna Hodge’s Heidegger and Ethics, Routledge, 1995, 68 Here, she 
refers to Heidegger’s scepticism of metaphysics declared in his response to Ernst Jünger’s essay “Uber der 
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violence), are we then faced with the problem of power as a philosophical problem of 
knowledge? In response to these questions I concentrate upon a critique of the authority by which 
violence is inscribed as the aesthetic and ethical ground for the experience of freedom. With 
respect to this I interrogate the incorporation or production of a normative aesthetics of 
metaphysical violence, asking if this can provide a terrain in which we can understand violence as 
hinged upon various subjective practices and the law. This retrieves the problem of the difference 
between two languages, of politics and the political. Here I consider if the relationship between 
narratives of transcendence and democracy is moreover a problem of the relationship between 
narratives of transcendence and politicisation.  
 
Consequently, I look to narratives of non-deterministic and deterministic violence. In both 
Jünger’s rhetoric of active-nihilism and in Malick’s manufacturing of a mutually “epic” and 
naturalised “human nature” and “nature” I analyse the politics of the production and authorship of 
these narratives, in that both manufacture a coincidence between a rhetoric of active and passive 
conceptions of agency. It is here that I question if they re-invite the essential transcendental 
problem around violence and language that Heidegger originally poses. 
 
 
1. Heidegger: Being and Appearance 
 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger contests the orthodoxy of a separation between 
being and appearance theorised in traditional metaphysics. He writes that “being” and 
“appearance” have “a hidden unity” and that this inner connection is grasped fully “only if we 
understand being in an equally primordial, i.e. Greek, sense,” for which “authentic being” is 
rooted in the historical and as such, the “essential”. For the Greeks “appearing is the very essence 
of being” and from this Heidegger forms a connection between history and authentic Dasein, 
where this “essential” experience is intrinsically tied to a specifically “noble” form of language. 
For Heidegger, “being is the fundamental attribute of the noble individual and of nobility” and 
Dasein is understood through its historical relation: “the supreme possibility of a human being, as 
fashioned by the Greeks, through glory and glorification.”209  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Linie” (Over the Line). Heidegger’s response, subtly re-phrased as “Uber ‘der Linie’” (On the Line) argues 
that such basic metaphysical concepts are unhelpful to non-metaphysical critique.  
209 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 1980, 103 
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The work of becoming and the understanding of historical permanence are specific to a particular 
genre of the glorified, noble and heroic individual, in that the daily project of authentic Dasein is 
fraught with danger and demands the most skilled techné. Heidegger’s conception of essence as 
both a glorified and naturalised discourse poses a problem regarding the understanding of the 
relationship between being and appearance and in turn summons an inquiry into the relationship 
between a specifically noble and lofty poetic language and the experience of being. 
 
For the Greeks glory was not something additional which one might or might not obtain; 
it was the mode of highest being. For moderns glory has long been nothing more than 
celebrity and as such a highly dubious affair, an acquisition tossed about and distributed 
by the newspapers and the radio - almost the opposite of being. If for Pindar to glorify 
was the essence of poetry and the work of the poet was to place in the light, it was not 
because the notion of light played a special role for him but solely because he thought 
and composed poetry as a Greek, which is to say that he stood in the appointed essence of 
being.210  
 
Consequently, for Heidegger, “appearing” is the work of a historical individual, an individual 
who experiences his/her own rootedness in history, as essential to his/her being in general. And, it 
is the motif of the hero that is intrinsically linked to Heidegger’s definition of “authentic 
history.”211 Heidegger translates “Glory” through the Greek term doxa – “I show myself, appear, 
enter into the light” wherein the “essence of Being is unconcealment.”212 Through identifying this 
almost primordial connection between authenticity and language, Heidegger identifies a great age 
of Greek beginnings, a time before a superficial modernism forced a radical disunity between 
being and appearance. For Heidegger, the Greeks provide the alternative to the work of 
modernity, in that they lived out this “natural” unity between being and appearance, where “the 
gods and the State, the temples and the tragedy, the games and philosophy; all this in the midst of 
appearance, beset by appearance, but also taking it seriously, knowing its power.”213  
 
This Greek conception of appearance as essence underscores Heidegger’s theory of historical 
permanence and endurance. This rootedness gives form to a techné, a practice of knowledge in 
that Dasein acknowledges and lives out his noble existence to “form world”, or to practice the 
task of appearance. Crucially the work of “forming”, “appearing” and “becoming” are subject to 
                                                     
210 Ibid. 
211 For further discussion of the (metaphysical) Nietzschean and Kantian influences regarding Heidegger’s 
thought see Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” from, Typography, Mimesis, 
Philosophy. Harvard University Press, London, 1989, 298.  
212 An Introduction to Metaphysics, 105 
213 Ibid., 105-6 
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the techné of both writing history and being subject to it, in itself the task of “forming world”: 
“History as happening is an acting and being acted upon which pass through the present, which 
are determined from out of the future, and which take over the past.”214 These two conceptions of 
appearance as language and being as thought are understood as under a precarious unity where, as 
I quoted above, we must “take appearance seriously” and “know its power,” for it has a 
legitimacy that exceeds itself as a “superficial” image.  
 
Here we are faced with aesthetics as having a concrete effect in the political and as something 
that is produced within it. However, Heidegger is keen to remind us that the task of knowing 
appearance is still to be fulfilled. I think this point is crucial to Heidegger’s thinking and also to 
this chapter, since we are directly presented with the problem of how to know appearance and 
how to undertake the task of knowledge. It is here that we can ask if this is a philosophical and 
metaphysical problem, in that the thinking of appearance as a task or theory returns to a Hegelian-
style philosophical conception of knowledge as a practice of language that is always distanciated 
from actuality, or that our very attempt to think through the problems of appearance expose the 
fissure between appearance and reality. In light of this I will discuss the structures by which we 
understand being and appearance and how the problem, task or passion of/for knowledge is 




Heroic Dasein and violence 
In “Transcendence Ends in Politics” Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s 
philosophical project is intrinsically linked to a political problem of identification. Dealing most 
specifically with the Rectoral Address (at the University of Freiberg in 1933), “The Self 
Assertion of the German University” he quotes Heidegger:  
 
If there is to be a science, and if it is to be for us and through us, under what conditions 
can it then truly exist? Only if we again place ourselves under the power of the beginning 
of our spiritual historical being (Dasein). This beginning is the setting out (Aufbruch) of 
Greek philosophy. Here, for the first time, Western man raises himself up from a popular 
base and, by virtue of his language, [my emphasis] stands up to the totality of what is, 
which he questions and conceives (begreift) as the being that it is.215  
                                                     
214 Ibid., 44 
215 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 281, citing Heidegger’s Rectoral Address “The Self  
Assertion of the German University,” 471-2 
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This extract depicts an essentially Nietzschean inspired language of knowledge as the “will to 
power”, where crucially, it is “by virtue of his language” that Dasein achieves essence or 
power.216 Heidegger’s solution to the problem of finite transcendence for Dasein is therefore 
based in an experience with language. Lacoue-Labarthe observes that, “This solution […] is, as in 
Nietzsche, paradoxically of a Winkelmannian type: We must imitate the ancients to make 
ourselves inimitable.”217 Further reflecting upon the political difficulties in Heidegger’s historical 
project, Lacoue-Labarthe concludes that this “invention” or work as knowledge required by 
Dasein to create a “future history” is:  
 
The determination of (or an imitation of) what has taken place without taking place, of a 
past that is not past but still to come, of a beginning so great that it dominates every 
future and remains still to be effected: in short, of an irruption that must be wrenched out 
of its oblivion or its more-than-millenial reserve through the most extreme violence of 
combat.218  
 
This describes violence both as a necessary and functioning tool, an object by which to achieve 
and identify autonomy, and as a (universal) violence that always already marks Dasein’s history 
and future.219 Here, for Lacoue-Labarthe “the structure of transcendence is the very structure of 
                                                     
216 In Heidegger’s “Will as Will to Power” in Nietzsche, Volume 1 The Will to Power As Art, [trans. David 
Farrell Krell, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, 37-43], he writes on Nietzsche’s understanding of the “will 
to power” as the “will to will”. Because Nietzsche opposes Schopenhauer’s notion of “pure willing” in that 
there is no “willing in general” will is placed firmly within the subject’s reach. Thus, for Heidegger, 
“willing” is problematised as soon as it is called upon to be identified. Consequently, Nietzsche’s “will to 
power” creates the problem of thinking through one’s specific purpose and direction: “For the will, as an 
affect of command, is the decisive distinguishing mark of self-mastery and force.” (Nietzsche’s Gay 
Science) Heidegger writes regarding Nietzsche: “If will is taken to be a faculty, than it is viewed as 
something that can do something, is in a position to do it, possessing the requisite power and might.” Here 
Heidegger critiques the problem of will as being both a faculty and an ungraspable and embodied essence, 
in that “will is power and power is will.” He continues: “But because for Nietzsche will as will to power 
designates the essence of Being, it remains forever the actual object of his search, the thing to be 
determined. What matters – once such an essence is discovered – is to locate it thoroughly, so that it can 
never be lost again.” Heidegger goes on to formulate that Nietzsche risks “abandoning the essence of will 
to the emotional.” Regarding this problem of a Nietzschean will, it is clear that Heidegger’s Rectoral 
Address recoups the same problems as those he has identified in Nietzsche’s work. This is because 
Heidegger’s nationalism takes up the cause of and for will, in the sense that when we “will”, we are set on a 
specific path to identify grasp and determine a (Germanic) object. For Heidegger’s “Rectoral Address”, 
“will as power” re-inscribes the practical problems of Nietzsche’s “will to power” determined specifically 
in Heidegger’s representation of will and power as constitutive of a heroic agency and a German national 
identity. 
217 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 299, quoting Heidegger’s “Self Assertion,” 471-
472,  
218 Ibid. 
219Like Lacoue-Labarthe‘s “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” Hodge’s Heidegger and Ethics, also cites 
Heidegger’s essay “Vom Wesen Des Grundes,” 1929, in order to establish Heidegger’s problematic 
conditioning of ethical and moral practices upon metaphysical and ontological theories. Hodge writes: “In 
this essay Heidegger makes the claim: “freedom is the origin of the principle of sufficient reason”, and the 
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mimesis, of the relation between phusis and techné taken from Aristotle and Kant and 
reinterpreted.”220 Lacoue-Labarthe writes that this becomes politically problematic for Heidegger 
towards the end of Being and Time whereupon the theme of tradition as repetition is introduced, 
which in itself mirrors a Nietzschean-style hegemony in the espousal of the necessity and “power 
of Greek beginning.”221 
 
Crucially, Lacoue-Labarthe’s description of what appears to be both an active and a passive 
violence sets out the central thematic for this chapter in that I deliberate the writing of specific 
identifications of violence which both institutionalise violence as a universal and characterise 
subjective autonomy with violence. This local critique now situates my central question that is the 
one raised here by Lacoue-Labarthe, namely, a critique of the violence, force and/or authority by 
which the identification of violence as autonomy is both assumed and asserted.  
 
Heidegger’s particularly violent and heroic motif of Dasein can be seen to delineate a 
metaphysical experience of or within language, retaining a refusal to give language an external 
ontological ground. However, as we see in this chapter’s opening quote, this experience of being 
to and for language can be seen to bind itself not to language in general, but to specific realms 
within language, particularly that of danger and risk. This unstable basis of language, read 
through Heidegger’s philosophy presents a politics that can be seen to determine a quasi-
transcendental subject, where Dasein’s autonomy is related to a use of one’s power to think 
within language, but also in exposing oneself spiritually to the risk of the world, fate and history. 
Significantly, it is violence that characterises the power or essence of Dasein both in the use of 
language and in this exposure to it. Violence, therefore in Heidegger’s early philosophy and 
politics hovers in a dark space at the limits of identifications, between the practice of thinking and 




                                                                                                                                                              
essay concludes “For in transcendence, the essence of the finitude of Dasein discloses itself as freedom for 
reasons.” In this way Heidegger definitively rejects any separation between, on the one side, ethical and 
moral aspects of freedom and, on the other, ontological and metaphysical aspects.” (142) Hodge also 
remarks that: “Heidegger still uses the terminology of transcendence to capture an ontological capacity to 
detach oneself from the given and to set up a relation to oneself.” (141) This capacity to detach oneself 
from the normative and thus form self is especially pertinent to Jünger’s detached and cool heroic realism. 
220 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 299 
221 Ibid., 298 
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Poetry and thinking 
Moving from Heidegger’s “Rectoral Address” to his later series of lectures collected in On the 
Way to Language Heidegger writes more specifically on what type of language is best identified 
with approaching essence and also the means by which this experience within language is 
organised. The motif of heroic Dasein no longer centralises Heidegger’s thinking in this 
reconstituted ontology. However, again, the language of lofty poetry and ultimates is effective as 
a space in which links power to autonomy, not because heroic Dasein is “willed” into existence, 
but moreover because this language of poetry and power now comes close to a passive ethos of 
“letting entities be.”222 A quasi-conscious state is now Dasein’s territory of Being. From On the 
Way to Language:  
 
It must remain open whether we are capable properly of entering into this poetic 
experience. There is the danger that we will overstrain a poem […] by thinking too much 
into it, and thereby debar ourselves from being moved by its poetry. Much greater of 
course - but who today would admit it? - is the danger that we will think too little, and 
reject the thought that the true experience with language can only be a thinking 
experience, all the more so because the lofty poetry of all great poetic work always 
vibrates within a realm of thinking.223 
 
If we are to think within the poetic experience, how can we organise the difference that Heidegger 
seems to demand? - The difference between enjoying poetry for poetry’s sake on the one hand 
and on the other hand, thinking as an experience of poetry? This relation between philosophy 
(theorising, thinking) as parallel to poetry (rhetoric, narrative) is examined more fully in 
Heidegger’s formulation: “The being of language - the language of being” where Heidegger 
                                                     
222 Frederick A Olafson’s Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics, A Study of Mitsein, [Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, 4, n.5] discusses Heidegger’s moves through subjectivism. Olafson writes: “it is difficult to see 
[Heidegger] as unqualifiedly repudiating the concept of a subject.” Olafson comments further on 
Heidegger’s attempt to de-subjectivise decision moving through his “Letter on Humanism” as a highpoint 
on the attack on traditional humanism, to his attempts to avoid subjectivism and a pre-established ethics 
altogether. Here, Olafson queries Heidegger’s formulation of ethics and ontology: “But then if “letting 
entities be” is the only way to avoid subjectivism, we would have to give up the active life altogether and 
adopt a wholly passive stance as satellites of being. If this were accepted, it would seem to obviate the need 
for anything like an ethic; but Heidegger also wants to claim that the kind of  “thought that thinks the truth 
of being as the initial (anfänglich) elements in a human being as an ek-sistent is in itself the original 
ethic.”” (“Letter on Humanism”187) As such we can see that Heidegger produces an ethical ontology that it 
remains as something the subject has to prepare for. However, we could also say that Heidegger’s 
conception of “letting entities be” points to a naturalised and unstable ethic that does not undermine 
subjectivity in the way that Olafson imagines (i.e., the subject is not “passive” because, in this later work 
Heidegger does not provide clear grounds upon which to identify the subject as “active”.) As such, by 
navigating an unstable and embodied law, Heidegger’s theory could threaten and destabilise the locus of 
institutionalising powers. It is this path between the identification and non-identification of a realist ethic 
that I situate here. 
223 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Herz, Harper and Row, New York, 1971, 69 
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structures thought as the site upon which we endure undergo and experience language. He writes 
regarding thinking in relation to the poetic experience: 
 
Language is the house of Being. By this procedure we would seem to have adduced from 
poetry the most handsome confirmation for a principle of thinking which we had stated at 
some time in the past- and in truth we would have thrown everything into utter confusion. 
We would have reduced poetry to the servant’s role as documentary proof of our thinking 
and taken thinking too lightly; in fact we would already have forgotten the whole point, 
to undergo an experience with language. [Emphasis added].224 
 
Poetry, here, is not an example of thinking, it allows for the philosophical experience and it seems 
that this experience is of a complicity, or even, when one is caught up in the thrust of a poetry of 
“ultimates”. This characterises something like a giving up to language, an immersive encounter 
with language as the “other”, in which we can, as mortals, recognise our infinite finitude as an 
ontological experience of “being with language”. In this Dasein as the “hostage” of language and 
operates within a certain quietism, in that thinking is construed as listening, and specifically 
“listening to the grant”225 that language gives to the subject. Importantly although this listening is 
understood as something that avoids Dasein’s problematic and heroic self-confidence the motif 
for this experience of authenticity is again best activated through “extreme” or dramatic language 
and as we have seen, still calls upon reason. Again from On the Way to Language: “This is why 
we consider it available to prepare for a possibility of undergoing an experience with language. 
This is why we listen now more attentively where such experiences is put into lofty and noble 
language.”226  
 
In both of Heidegger’s texts, language is dealt with circumstantially and historically, in that 
Dasein is open to language, being for language and also being towards language. This complex 
account of Dasein shows up the problems for taking language to be an object of knowledge, but 
simultaneously it describes certain circumstances for what that experience may be. 
 
This problem of identification and its hegemonic relation aptly takes us back to Lacoue-
Labarthe’s text where through identifying an unacknowledged and fundamental mimetology at 
work in Heidegger’s thought he asks: “Why would a problem of identification, not be, in general, 
the essential problem of the political?”227 Following Lacoue-Labarthe’s privileging of a political 
                                                     
224 Ibid., 62 
225 Ibid., 75 
226 Ibid., 62 
227 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 300 
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problem of identification I consider the following problems: First; that the act of thinking is 
deeply associated with combative action, a result of Heidegger’s mapping of Dasein’s 
identification with an immanent history and fate. Second; that through Heidegger’s mixture of a 
productive metaphysics and an onto-theological nihilism we are given a complex account of an 
ontology that problematises ethical ground on the one hand, and produces it on the other. Third; 
and resulting from the above points is that the task of Being, for Heidegger, foregrounds a 
problem of identification that situates the problem that knowing knowledge is quantitatively 
relative to power. Further, we face the problem that because transcendence ends in politics, such 
a politics is characterised as a totalitarian practice of domination.228 As a result, a key question for 
this chapter is how the rhetoric of transcendence produces and problematises power. 
 
 
2. Jünger’s Heroic Realism 
 
Ernst Jünger (most prolific in the years between 1930-40) produced writings of his war 
experiences; he wrote of dramatic dream-like fantasies, tales of science fiction and also bombastic 
renditions of what we could call “conventional” or “everyday” life experiences. The 
understanding of Jünger’s work as heroic realism is taken up by a number of critics but 
significantly here I look to Jeffery Herf’s articulation of the term in his text Reactionary 
Modernism, which concentrates upon Jünger’s aestheticisation of technology as an irrational and 
redemptive “other”. I then examine Marcus Paul Bullock’s text The Violent Eye, which critiques 
the political implications of Jünger’s metaphysical violence as literature. Herf describes Jünger’s 
heroic realism as “a symbiosis of irrationalism and technics” in that Jünger’s hero combines “a 
celebration of total calculation and functionality with its apparent opposite, adventure and 
dynamism.”229 He also comments that Jünger’s various appeals to the will “compromise an ironic 
complement to his essentially passive and spectatorial stance towards the instrumentalisation of 
human beings.” Duly, Jünger’s identification of technology as linked to the “primordial forces of 
                                                     
228 Hodge refers to the problem of the distinction between metaphysics and politics in Heidegger’s work as 
a problem of violence: “The moment of violence would be […] the moment at which the conceptions 
holding in place the distinction between politics and metaphysics are disrupted. The results of this 
disruption are to be seen in globalisation, the actualisation of metaphysics and the de-restriction of ethics, 
and in the spread of technology throughout the world.” 134. From a similar understanding of a distinction 
between metaphysics and politics in Heidegger’s philosophy, I take up Jünger’s actualisation of 
metaphysics in order to submit this violence to critique. 
229 Jeffery Herf, Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 78, Here Herf also comments on Christian Graf von Krockow’s 
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the will” structures “authentic experience” to be conditioned upon the subject surrendering to the 
violent and anonymous territory of industrialisation and technological processes. 230 In Feuer und 
Blut Jünger writes: 
 
We have to transfer what lies inside us onto the machine. That includes the distance and 
ice-cold mind that transforms the moving lightning stroke of blood into a conscious and 
logical performance. What would these iron weapons that were directed against the 
universe be if our nerves had not been intertwined with them and if our blood didn’t flow 
around every axle.231 
 
Bullock picks up on Jünger’s work as an allegory of Heidegger’s ontology noting that Jünger’s 
literature is seen to rhetoricise Heidegger’s ethics of “letting things be” in order “to disrupt the 
standard criteria of academic or professional philosophical language.”232 From this we can see 
that Jünger perverts Heidegger’s philosophy of language and being, and produces a violent 
political literature where “being towards death” is conceived of as a literal experience, a violent 
practice of being towards an image of death. He translates Heidegger’s lofty poetry of heroes and 
ultimates to that of a concrete and identifiable authentic goal for being: the violent and cold face 
of technology and war. In Jünger’s conceptualisation the technological process and 
industrialisation of the normative or the “everyday” as a heroic territory brings physics and 
metaphysics together. Here, autonomy is understood through one’s ability to offer oneself up to 
violence with the aim to rationally rise above it and to control and use it without the 
encumbrances of a weak humanism. Consequently, we are presented with the problem, first, that 
the logic of aesthetic and political unity is a totalitarian practice, and second, that this product of 
the totalitarian is intrinsically linked to the politicising (theorising and practicing) of (a 
Heideggerian) metaphysics.  
 
In its founding of violence and aesthetics as the motivating and grounding impulse for a 
“successful” existence, Jünger’s heroic realism shares many fascist traits. However, it is not my 
intention to deconstruct or attempt to redeem Jünger’s position in terms of his proximity to the 
politics of Nazi Germany233 and I also avoid the same question on Heidegger’s Nazism. Instead, 
                                                                                                                                                              
description of Jünger’s heroic realism as discovering “pure adventure in the heart of functionality” in, Die 
Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, Stuttgart, 1960, 86 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid., 79, Herf quotes Jünger from Feuer und Blut: Einer Kleiner Ausschnitt aus dem grossen Schlacht, 
Berlin, 1929; reprint, Stuttgart, 1960, 81 
232 Marcus Paul Bullock, The Violent Eye, Ernst Jünger’s Visions and Revisions on the European Right, 
Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1992, 323 
233 Bullock provides a history of Jünger’s work with the Nazi party, including Jünger’s political critiques of 
the Nazi party and his invitation (and subsequent refusal) to collude with the attempted assassination of 
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this chapter concentrates on how Heidegger’s ontology is easily translated through variable 
applications to be an aesthetic and political force. As such, it is relevant to this text to look to 
Jünger’s theoretical and practical attempts to “unravel the logic of violence.”234 
 
Jünger organises a literature of “blood and soil” and “fire and steel” where one is caught up in a 
science-fiction style rhetoric of violence. In this exposure to language one is drawn into the 
experience of a heroic struggle where the subject is asked to recognise and facilitate his/her235 
own machine-like coolness in order to deal with the horror of the machines of technology and 
capitalism. As such, Jünger’s literature not only offers the textual and political aspects of violence 
and aesthetics as symptomatic of an attempt to incorporate a Nietzschean-style non-
transcendental critique; it also includes the Heideggerian question of cognition as an experience 
within language. What Jünger’s heroic realism therefore offers is an attempt to organise a 
political and workable concept of a metaphysical experience of language which is inscribed 
within language. With this in mind I consider how Jünger’s metaphysical literature navigates a 
relationship between the rhetoric of metaphysics as a totalitarian politics that unifies the 
transcendental and the political and as a fanatical political literature. This is a question of the 
whether or not the violence of transcendence as a linguistic and relativistic practice in the social 





Jünger’s political position can be seen to be a version of the antimodern anti-enlightenment 
thinking espoused during the early twentieth century in Germany, made stronger by the crisis of 
the experience of WW1 seen to variable extents in the work of other writers and theorist such as 
Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler, Gottfried Benn and Thomas Mann. The politics of heroic realism 
in the work of Jünger is produced by the desire to construct a political position that could escape 
the threat of capitalism and by-pass communism. However Jünger did not look to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Hitler. This description details Jünger’s hatred of politicians and his disinterest in being involved with any 
political activism. Bullock puts this down to Jünger’s pre-disposition to and constant interest with only the 
work of metaphysics and “deeper” and timeless, historically understood values and his attempt to fix them 
onto everyday experiences. 
234 Ibid., 155 Jünger’s desire to rationalise violence demands a self-cultivation and self-transformation that 
results in the positioning of himself outside of human communities. This is mentioned in Bullock’s 
translation of Jünger’s Paris Journals, III, 270 
235 Significantly, Jünger’s heroic realism is dedicated to a “manliness” in as much as his romantic prose on 
the glories of war translate easily into orgiastic Homo-erotic fantasies. 
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revolutionizing of capitalist culture in order to achieve this. Instead he recognised that “it was not 
the labour process that robs it of its deeper meanings, but liberal and Marxist interpretations of 
that process.” [Emphasis added]236  
 
This description of Jünger shows that he doesn’t wish to make radical breaks with capitalism. 
Instead, Jünger recognises the value and power of interpretation in that his interpretation of 
capitalism and technology seeks to magnify and interpret the experience of it as an anonymous, 
irrational and powerful “other”. This is in order to imbue the subject with the status of the heroic 
individual, reinstating the deeper biological, historical, and scientific values of the labour process. 
Here, Jünger negates the conventional interpretations of the labour process to qualify his own 
deeper and more timeless meanings. Now we see a radically different interpretation of events. 
 
By politicising Heidegger’s metaphysics as metaphor Jünger takes the concept of the primordial 
truth of Being from Heidegger (set up in his desire to theorise a precarious unity between 
philosophy and narrative or thinking and poetry) and transforms the (lofty) poetic language of 
metaphysics into an instrument of agency through powers of political and aesthetic interpretation. 
In this a ubiquitous and tangible violence is now the universal territory for Being. Significantly, 
for Jünger, this is an experience that approaches us, or even, it is us. However, most crucial to this 
is exactly how Jünger practices this ontology and bases this ideological thought of transcendence 
upon the temporal practice of language. Politics, for Jünger is exposed as a superstitious belief, 
where “real” conviction and “real” beliefs are either naive or false. Upon such terms the only 
things worth considering are, for Jünger, the scientific facts of life and death. Here, Jünger 
invents his own naturalised mythology of a historical and reliable set of natural or scientific facts 
to make up for the deficit he recognises in the temporal practices of political conjecture and 
argumentation.237  
 
                                                     
236 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 90 
237 Bullock, The Violent Eye, 174-6 Here Bullock notes Jünger’s devotion to a “deeper” concept of living: 
“The collective domain, where the masses, the political parties that manipulate them, and the consciousness 
of a public controlled by propaganda hold sway, has nothing to do with these ultimate stakes. The 
collective motivation where propaganda rules corresponds to the cunning, the tricks, and the lies of 
superstition, as opposed to a real conviction and a real totality of life.” (174) Bullock also writes a 
comparative account of Jünger’s desire to find a deeper meaning to politics in the “Song of the Machine,” 
against Walter Benjamin’s endeavour to rationalise technological powers. In “Theories of German 
Fascism” Benjamin reviews Jünger’s collection Kreig und Kreiger (War and Warriors) arguing that without 
a rationalisation of its technology powers, society gives way to a hypnotic fascination with technology. 
Benjamin also claims that to master fear of technology through intoxication deprives society of 
rationalising powers over it.  
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Jünger does not seek to guard the parameters of thinking and poetry as parallel and separate 
entities, but utilises them as a condensed experience in order to organise agency. In this Jünger 
witnesses philosophy as a matter of language and persuasion, openly identifying the force of 
philosophy as driven by one’s power to make interpretations. As such, he not only recognises the 
Marxist position as an “interpretation” of capitalism but motivates a Nietzschean style anti-
Enlightenment assertion that one’s own subjectivity exists as an interpretation and a 
manufacturing of oneself. 
 
Jünger’s theory springs from the recognition that in the advent of technology and capitalism there 
was a dissolution of recognisable polemics from which to perform a dialectics of political and 
revolutionary power. In his 1927 essay “Fortschritt, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit,” Jünger writes: “In 
our technical era the individual appears to be evermore dependent, “unfree” and endangered.”238 
He continues “but the nature of these bonds are less visible than those of the feudal era. Hence 
they are even more absolute than the absolute monarchies.”239 Jünger associates the ability to 
have power performed through the recognition of the other, by identifying the “other” as that 
which is the possessor of an omnipotent power. Instead of criticising this process, Jünger 
assimilates it into the rhetoric of heroic submission and sacrifice.240 Here, submission is not 
related to a defect but as an advantage, a theatre in which to play out one’s own power struggle:  
 
The machines are not only directed against nature, but against us as well. We depend on 
these steel translations of our blood and our brains, just as the actor depends on his act. 
No power is in a position to offer the stars to us other than we, ourselves. If it is not our 
intention, so it certainly is our innermost will to sacrifice our freedom, to give up our 
existence as individuals and to melt into a large life-circle, in which the individual as has 
little self-sufficiency as a cell which must die when separate from the body.241 
 
Jünger constructs a vision of technology quite distinct from the Volkish, pastoral aesthetics 
preferred by other philosophers and theorists including Heidegger, where countrified lifestyles 
and rustic technologies were preferred over the threat of these “anonymous” technologies of cities 
and steel. Consequently, by undertaking and assimilating the aesthetics of the high speed modern 
life, something more associated with an avant-gardist or specifically “modernist” vision,242 
                                                     
238 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 87 “Fortschritt, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit,” Arminius 8 1926, 8-10  
239 Ibid., 88 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
242 For more information regarding Jünger’s conception of technology as being opposed to that of 
“traditional” antimodern thinkers, see Herf’s theory of “reactionary modernism” as an alternative to the 
antimodern  
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Jünger creates a politics of “total mobilisation” through the manipulation of and surrender to 
“futuristic” technological forces which he identifies as being present in the subject’s “innermost 
will.” Here an unrestricted drive to one’s own sacrifice embodies not only an anonymous slavery 
and the romanticism of the loss of reason and feeling but also the possibility that one could be the 
avid spectator of one’s own death in a comprehension of one’s own subjectivity through an 
intimate relation with an aesthetics of violence.  
 
As such, Jünger’s paranoia around technology, “reason” and “progress” as the ultimate 
encroaching power allows a freedom from itself that is activated through the surrendering of the 
subject to it, in the most poetic and spectacular way. This theory of power in “negative freedom” 
grounded the subject in a position that Jünger believed could overcome the “tragic 
consciousness” which haunted the (Marxist) theories of the dialectics of power. Jünger sought to 
overcome the antinomies of reason and unreason through the unification of blood and technology, 
where desire, identified as the desire for truth manifest as the desire for one’s own death produces 
a functioning moral law. This conditional construction of desire and destiny could be seen to act 
as the supplement for the evacuation of transcendental critique made available through Nietzsche. 
The subject of heroic realism is thus politicised through its ability to poetise itself as an actor and 
in action.  
 
Heroic realism does not therefore, assert itself around tragic limits set by the subject’s 
“impossible” relation to the technology but instead assimilates the aesthetic of steel and the 
rationalistic processes of machines. Heidegger’s noble and glorious conception of authentic 
Dasein laid down in The Introduction to Metaphysics is now literally and mechanistically asserted 
as the agent of violence. In The Violent Eye Bullock writes: “Jünger’s heroic realism demands 
that one acknowledge the world of iron and steel and fire as having grown so potent as to 
demolish all other measures of reality.”243 Upon the same terms we can conceive the violent 
images of iron, fire and steel as the only reality worth considering. This is Jünger’s historic 
subject: not the subject of appearance or language in general but instead a direct referent to - and 
an empirical work upon - Heidegger’s philosophical and literary identifications of autonomy; the 
subject of, and subject to a specifically violent language. 
 
 
                                                     
243 Bullock, The Violent Eye, 140 
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Jünger’s war aesthetic 
Crucially, it is in the aestheticisation of war that Jünger identifies a collective moral experience. 
War was transformed into a “gigantic labour process.”244 In Jünger’s book, The Storm of Steel, a 
diary of his service on the battlefields of the Great War he writes regarding his expectations of 
war: 
 
We had grown up in a material age, and in each one of us there was the yearning for great 
experience, such as we had never known. The war had entered us like wine. We had set 
out in a rain of flowers to seek the death of heroes. The war was our dream of greatness, 
power, and glory. It was a man’s work, a duel on fields whose flowers would be stained 
with blood. There is no lovelier death in the world.245 
 
However, war was not restricted to the battlefield. “Blood, tradition and race were seen as 
metaphysical rather than primarily biological ideas,”246 and Jünger’s radical aestheticisation of 
both the subject and the world at large construed a dramatic space for everyday activities. This 
aestheticisation of the symbolic forces of war and idealism at work in everyday life, whether it be 
the battlefield or the factories, was Jünger’s attempt to rescue society from the overarching power 
of commodity relations. Herf recounts Jünger’s aestheticisation of everyday life as a heroic 
experience from Jünger’s Arbenterliche Herz: 
 
A machine ship has a “heroic image.” The “whistling buzz of steel in the air” is “lulling 
and exciting.” Street noise has about it a “most threatening” quality. A street café can 
“arouse a devilish impression,” whereas the ringing of an alarm clock recalls 
“catastrophe”. Neon signs, a modern bar, an American film, are “all slices of a powerful 
devilish rebellion, whose spectacle fills the individual with raging lust as well as crushing 
anxiety.”247 
 
This “universal reality” of violence is confirmed in the status of violence in Jünger’s work as a 
means and ends. He writes on war: “It is the song of life devouring itself. To live is to kill.”248 
Jünger’s heroic renditions of the war experience confirm violence as a foundational underpinning 
to his work and underscore the experience of autonomy in the ongoing struggle of war. In the 
novel The Lost Outpost Jünger describes a lone soldier who fights without any prospect of rescue 
and of no knowledge whether the war is continuing or not. A similar sentiment is evident in 
Jünger’s reactions to the losing of the Great War, where he identifies the loss of life and war as 
                                                     
244 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 90 
245 Ernst Jünger, The Storm of Steel, From the Diary of a German Storm Trooper on the Western Front, 
Chatto and Windus, London, 1929, 1 
246 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 86 
247 Ibid., 98 citing  Arbeneurliche Herz, Berlin, 1929, 86 
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equal to the “success” of winning, for it is in the violence of the combat itself that Jünger seeks 
and finds redemption. However, Jünger clings to a concept of an external agency. He writes: 
 
The representative power of the individual can be enormous. There are processes in 
history whereby though millions remain silent, one good witness can turn the judgement 
about.249 
 
Jünger’s appreciation of the individual certainly conflicts with the indifference proposed by 
Heidegger. However, this conception of agency demarcates the central contradiction in Jünger’s 
thinking, since although he represents his hero as the lone soldier, indifferent to the “reason” of 
war, or the imperative to fight, Jünger still manages to revere the individual agent, the one who 
makes decisions: the individual who recognises the violent state of affairs in which he is always 
complicit. Clearly the agent who is able to recognise this complicity, is forced beyond the 
parameters of violence, and is asked to look rationally upon it. This is the performance of a 
rhetoric of subjective power manifest in an aestheticisation of the self within the other of 
violence. The characters depicted in Jünger’s fictions perform a patient complicity, or a calm 
acceptance. However, the agent at work here is the aesthete, the reader, or the writer of such 




Realism as violence 
Herf identifies Jünger’s interest in aesthetics to be always correlative to the act of coolness or 
distancing from the horrors of “real-life” death and war. He describes how Jünger discovers 
power through the mastery of aesthetics (precisely through the admitted difference between the 
plastic artificial aesthetic image and the real thing), as is demonstrated in the book, The 
Dangerous Moment. Here images that enable the heroic realist are documentary photographs of 
disasters. Through the “mechanical eye” of the photograph Jünger identifies images such as plane 
crashes and other disasters as emblematic of and also acted as a piece of the real, the “moment of 
danger,” the capturing of “essence”. As Herf points out this produced a world that was “frozen at 
the level of conscious perception to avoid subconscious traumatic encounters.”251 
 
                                                     
249 Ibid., 71 
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Jünger asserts that despite having an experiential encounter upon looking at images of real life 
crashes and disasters in all their documentary evidence, or their evidence as documents, our 
power is exercised through a rigorous mental control. Here, Jünger demands the expert - and 
perhaps moreso the daring expert - someone who is a romanticised literary and aesthetic 
equivalent of the philosopher. Crucially this is also someone who accepts and recognises the very 
real consequence of aesthetic power as being something to heroically understand, to manipulate, 
and also to fear.252 Now, in contradiction to Jünger’s literal and factual understanding of a unified 
aesthetico-political ideology of violence, we can see that Jünger designates power for the 
individual heroic realist as enabled precisely through the knowledge that one can separate an 
image of violence from real violence, that these images of violence are not real despite their 
documentary-style or unmediated aesthetic proximity to it.  
 
Consequently, Jünger crafts an “everyday violence”, which is always reliant upon the mental 
control or “rationality” of the subject who can face this “moment of danger”. By taking part in the 
poetising of the world around him/her as violent the subject accepts that this “world of violence” 
is in itself a fiction that ultimately is separate from the subject.  
 
It is this separateness that Jünger asserts at the basis of his critique of violence:  
 
I must reach a point from which I can observe things in the way I can fishes on a coral 
reef or insects in a meadow or even the way a doctor contemplates a sick man…There is 
still weakness in my disgust, still too much participation in the real world. One must 
unravel the logic of violence.253 
 
Importantly, it is the subject’s acknowledgement, identification and willed participation within 
this ethos that allows Jünger’s project of heroic realism to be practiced. As such, for Jünger the 
“moment of danger” is also identified as a moment of freedom constructed through poetry and 
rationale, where the subject wills itself to be unstable, overtaken or caught up in violence in the 
hope of fulfilling Jünger’s aim to close down the antinomies of reason and unreason. It is this 
strategy that highlights the problematic element to Jünger’s dialectics, since at bottom, despite 
Jünger’s interest to combine a rational and a self-representing subject, what Jünger ultimately 
demands is a subject who is a rational by-stander to his/her experience of violence. Accordingly, 
                                                     
252 It is here where we can return directly to Heidegger’s description of a Greek conception of “being 
appearance, and power” in An Introduction to Metaphysics mentioned earlier in this chapter where he 
defines the work of Dasein to be situated between knowing and appearance, and that appearance is to be 
“taken seriously” within the political. 
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Jünger’s central premise - to close down the antinomies of reason and unreason upholds and 
insists upon the same formal structure that separates them. Jünger’s determination to manufacture 
a subject whose autonomy is situated in immersive linguistic experiences still relies upon a 
subject that can separate thinking from language. In this, a belief in the force of scientific reason 
as an a priori provides a radical doubling of violence, where the specific uses of a (generic) 
violent language by which the subject represents himself as rational, sharpen the character of 
violence as abstract and universal. 
 
 
The problem of authority 
The problem of “choice” that Jünger offers his “powerful” subject is reflected in Heidegger’s 
Being and Time: 
 
If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, 
Dasein understands itself in its own superior power, the power of its finite freedom, so 
that in this freedom, which “is” only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can 
take over the powerlessness (Ohnmacht) of abandonment to its having done so, and can 
thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been 
disclosed.254 
 
What we can see here is precisely the difference between Jünger’s literature and Heidegger’s 
ontology. Jünger clearly takes up “anticipating Dasein”, and in doing so demonstrates the 
problematic element of Heidegger’s conception of “letting things be” in being open to the 
experience of language understood as the route to being, is also translated into a pro-active 
passivity, or a willed surrendering. In this, Jünger’s project illustrates the consequences and the 
political impact of our desire to philosophise, wherein the will to knowledge as power that 
Heidegger demarcates is quickly interpreted as the will to the image of power as violence. 
Further, this image of violence is construed as a literal path to being and is acted upon as having 
such a power. As such, Heidegger’s attempt to draw up a project where destiny can be kept free 
by communicating and struggling is perverted in Jünger’s literature as a narrative of destiny as 
violence.  
 
Consequently, the political problem of Heidegger’s philosophy (in that destiny is thought - or 
even, the notion of a figure is presented, even if this is without actual figure) is clearly 
                                                                                                                                                              
253 Bullock, The Violent Eye, 155 
254 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwells, 1962, 
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demonstrated in Jünger’s literature, and is again highlighted as a problem of identification, 
namely in the inability to identify the difference between the agency or thinking required in the 
forming of the world and the thinking of passivity required in letting world happen. In grounding 
Heidegger’s philosophy as violent literature Jünger creates a space in which Heidegger’s “lofty 
poetics” are not only something whereby we undergo an experience with language. This theory 
also aims towards language in order to have that experience. This is, perhaps, no longer the dark 
place of the Heidgerrian real, the place between poetry and thinking. Rather, Jünger aestheticises 
the realm between philosophy and poetry as an “everyday epic”, where he locates metaphysics in 
the excessive rhetoric of a perverse kind of realism. As such, borne out of Jünger’s desire to 
collide reason and unreason and poetry and thinking is a subject who is distant from community 
and civilisation. Instead of forgetting the task of metaphysics, Jünger forgets the political 
altogether. Moreover, this subject cultivates self as the rational by-stander, who by merging with 
history and the cosmos grants itself a God’s eye view. This subject is not exempt from death but 
can face it as an equal. 
 
 
Metaphysics as politics 
As Heidegger’s philosophy invites the problem of an a priori use of, or thinking of, knowledge to 
think the thought of experience, so Jünger’s political poetics of heroic realism, acting precisely 
on this basis, takes up this a priori as the role of the aesthete as the superficial agent of 
experience. 
 
Jünger does not propose that we give ourselves up to language and knowledge but that we 
construct the sacrifice of our identity as an experience. In order for us to think inside of violence 
we have to organise and involve ourselves with it as external agents. This commits Jünger to a 
subjective idealism and a subject centred rationality, which his heroic realism willfully places 
under threat since the subject is encouraged to stage a sacrificial move by leaving itself open and 
even willing the irrationalist or violent aesthetics of the “other” - technology and war. Jünger’s 
literature offers the textual and political aspects of violence and aesthetics as symptomatic of an 
attempt to incorporate a Nietzschean style non-transcendental critique, where violence is the 
necessary and apparently only means by which to identify autonomy. However, as literary 
fragment, Jünger’s work prompts a re-examination of the Heideggerian question, raised in On the 
Way To Language, and the problem described in my initial remarks from Lacoue-Labarthe. With 
this in mind, a reading of Jünger’s heroic realism returns us to the question as to whether the 
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local and specific elements of identifying violence as grounds for freedom (such as that seen in 
Heidegger’s philosophical, political and literary heroics of “lofty poetry” or mythological 
histories and futures) ultimately theorise an experience of autonomy that inevitably directs us 
towards the horrific political potential of a universally recognisable violence.  
 
Jünger’s insistence on the aesthete and his predilection for a Kantian rationalism and “duty” can 
be seen to marginalise agency to those who wish to identify that agency with violence. This 
underlines the difficulty of organising agency in Jünger’s work as a socio-political, democratic, 
or, as Bullock suggests and I return to this later, a totalitarian politics. Jünger’s structure of the 
“aesthete” and “violence” also confirms that Jünger cared little for a political or social theory 
attached to his work that could have identified “results”. For example, first of all these terms are 
both difficult to identify exactly, and secondly, Jünger’s violence was not a typically Benjaminian 
“modernist” violence.255 He did not suggest the practice of revolution in order to institute new 
governments. His violence had no end in sight. 
 
Herf comments that Jünger “never discusses anything on the social,” he is “always poetic” where 
labour is equated with “the tempo of the fist, of thoughts of the heart, of life in day and night, 
science, love, art, belief, cult, war…the oscillation of atoms and the force that moves the stars and 
the solar system.”256 In this, Jünger’s biological-metaphysical-philosophical poetry is criticised 
not for its lack of political motivation but because that political motivation in terms of a society 
makes no tools available to put its own predilection for violence into question. In other words, the 
subject is free for violence and death, but is still un-free to deliberate the question of why those 
ends are orchestrated as such around violence. 
 
                                                     
255Walter Benjamin’s essay “Critique of Violence” in One Way Street and Other Writings [trans. Edmund 
Jephicott and Kingsley Shorer, NLB, 1979], identifies a divine violence outside the law of government and 
institution. For Benjamin, law making is power making, which is violence as “the origin of every contract 
also points towards violence.” 142 This “mythical violence is pernicious” and extinguishes revolutionary 
possibilities. However “this violence outside the law as pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes 
the proof that revolutionary violence, the highest manifestations of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, 
and by what means.” 149 Crucially, regarding the work of Jünger, it is important to point out that despite 
Benjamin’s bow to the sublime violence of the divine name and his acceptance of violence within politics, 
his motivations were essentially more politically driven and counter-revolutionary than Jünger’s 
“linguistic”, philosophical, historical and spiritual motivations. For instance, Benjamin regards Jünger’s 
mystical fetishisation of technology as unhelpful to more “rational” or useful political processes. For a 
comparative reading of Benjamin’s notion of “authentic experience” and political violence with Jünger’s 
see Bullock’s The Violent Eye. Benjamin’s essay is also discussed at length in Beatrice Hanssen’s text of 
the same name. Critique of Violence, Routledge, 2000, 3. 
256 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 103 
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Jünger’s image of others and the concept of the “agent” is brought more clearly into focus in his 
comments on biology and politics. Here Jünger’s desire “not to discuss anything on the social” 
can be seen to take on a distinct and radical anti-social character. This confirms Herf’s 
“metaphysical” description of the distracted romantic but also pulls Jünger’s politics more 
ardently towards that of a negative concept of freedom – a romantic nihilism. Upon scientifically 
inspecting the biological workings of a squid, the Loligo Media, Jünger recollects another 
experience: 
 
Strangely enough I sometimes had a similar feeling when I listened to some dull prattler 
going on in a political meeting somewhere. In spite of everything, I still had to admit that 
there was a supreme wisdom at work in his organs, that there were all kinds of glands 
feeding their secretions ceaselessly into his bloodstream, that the miracle of digestion 
taking place inside him, that every cell was carrying out its special function - in short, 
that he was governed by a wonderful life force. Was it then too bold a conclusion that 
perhaps the prattle also fulfilled a more secret end, a hidden task more profound then 
anything in the prattler’s conscious intentions?257  
 
Quite clearly there is a horror and a violence to Jünger’s story in that the “dull prattler” is laid 
bare before Jünger’s scientific eye as some biological manifestation that somehow deludes utter 
comprehension. Here, there is a mystical truth to the human form and its workings; the subject is 
not described sociologically, it is rather, biological/technical and mystical. Significantly, language 
is intrinsic to this metaphysics since Jünger asserts that it can possess the power of things beyond 
consciousness. However, by giving a social stage to his biological-mystical experience, the 
sociological potential of politics is evacuated from Jünger’s concern. Jünger remains as the power 
or authority figure in this arrangement, where he is the grand inquisitor, poking humanity with a 
stick in order to scrutinise its workings. In this Jünger separates himself from the human 
community, realising that understanding has to be understood from above. 
 
I must reach a point from which I can observe things in the way I can fishes on a coral 
reef or insects in a meadow or even the way a doctor contemplates a sick man…There is 
still weakness in my disgust, still to much participation in the real world. One must 
unravel the logic of violence.258  
 
Jünger’s diaristic angst explains his desire to cut himself off from a notion of community, where 
to “unravel the logic of violence” he has to be in a position to see the larger whole. In this Jünger 
confirms that violence is something which he can stand apart from, and it is only in this standing 
                                                     
257 Bullock, The Violent Eye, 57-8 
258 Ibid., 155 
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apart, or in having a dialectical experience with it that he can put violence into question. This not 
only reverts back to his innate rationalism but also markedly contradicts any similarity between 
his and Heidegger’s conception of “thinking”. However, when Jünger speaks of his relationship 
to others it is interesting that this should take on the attitude of disgust. Quite clearly it is through 
such emotion from which Jünger attempts to perfect a resistance from empathy in order to 
organise and sustain his utter indifference to humanity. For Jünger, rationalism is antihumanism, 
and through heroic realism Jünger defeats the “tragic” or finite aspect of the heroic tendency, 
replacing it with the impassioned rationalised subject who acts at the willful cost of community. 
 
 
True and false languages 
Therefore, Jünger is determined to offer an ongoing relation with violence that has its basis in 
irrationalism. It is in its “infinite pointlessness” that Jünger offers violence up as a metaphysical 
experience, through its conventional or “everyday” character. In other words, under Jünger’s 
theory our relationship with violence is generally available and yet the politics of our relationship 
with violence is not to overcome, revolutionise or to change anything in particular; it is solely to 
experience or identify one’s power or agency in relation to the “other”. Consequently, Jünger’s 
violence occupies a “political terrain”, the world of the social - and yet as “party politics” it is still 
maintained as a “higher force” written purely as relational to a metaphysical essence and truth. 
This problem of only “metaphysical intention” is particularly relevant. Bullock writes that 
violence in the work of Jünger being without rational justification remains almost impossible to 
hold in focus: 
 
Though [Jünger’s violence] should press cultural, national, racial or class interests into its 
service at crucial junctures, ultimately it does not have the capacity to represent any of 
them, for at no point can it transform itself into a true language.259  
 
Bullock’s notion of “true language” presses towards the idea that without any clear rationale 
attributed to violent action, violence itself threatens to become unfixed from the locus of the 
“world of things”. This is significant considering Bullock’s description of Jünger as “non-
political”, in that Jünger’s violence is deemed ineffectual and inadequate for politics, first because 
this “non-political” or “false” language-realm of violence exists in narratives alone and second, 
because Jünger’s universal, metaphysical and historical interests simply aren’t able to secure 
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partisan interests. Looking at Bullock’s theory more closely, the difference between a “true 
language” and Jünger’s language of violence is in respect of the social use of language.  
 
This raises questions as to whether it remains society’s choice not to put Jünger’s language into 
use, or whether it has an innate uselessness in being a language of universal violence, Reading 
Bullock one would assume the latter. Despite Bullock’s somewhat awkward terminology of “true 
language”, presumably indicative of social and political effectivity, Bullock’s theory of Jünger’s 
violence as narrative moves to highlight the difficulties of processing the language-violence 
relation. From Bullock’s theory, one could surmise that the difficulty we have in navigating 
Jünger’s violence is viewed in two ways, initially in that all the immoral potentialities of Jünger’s 
violence resist an absolute identification to be able to be put to (political-fascist) use; and 
secondly, that Jünger’s concept of subjective agency holds no political sway in that it is 
marginalised, and when put to use it is a very private notion of experience.  
 
Ultimately, what we can identify when looking at Jünger’s political metaphysics is that although 
he concretises metaphysics by writing of “violent forces” as evident within the normative, he still, 
romantically and consistently describes violence to be for the most part a ubiquitous metaphysical 
experience only to be experienced properly by the heroic realist. This again reflexes easily back 
upon Heidegger’s notion of heroic Dasein in The Introduction to Metaphysics, as worked through 
the Greek notions of celebrity and glory, wherein authenticity is the experience of a discreet few. 
Realism coincides with reality in Jünger’s violence and yet they remain separate through the 
infrastructure of tension and risk orchestrated around the subject as agent who acts as 
interlocutor. Through Jünger’s assertion of the relationship between metaphysical authenticity 
and power in the social, made evident through the work of a literary fiction, it is clear that the 
work it takes to create a mutual identification as to this state of violence, or indeed a community 
of heroic realists in itself marginalises the ubiquitous and universalising essence of violence and 
metaphysics to the specifics of a literary genre, not dissimilar to Edgar Allen Poe or Charles 
Baudelaire, since Jünger’s heroic realist is either the “rational” self-aestheticised aesthete, or the 
“irrational” cultic fanatic.260 
From this, the politics of Jünger’s narratives are viewed as not so much “political”, but as 
philosophical narratives. However, crucial to this is that Jünger’s narratives are stained with 
allegorical overtones. This underscores the problem of exactly how Jünger’s narratives 
                                                     
260 Jünger’s radical transformation of the everyday as a place for intoxication and horror is closely related 
to the perverse horrors in Poe’s work, and also the “dandified” refinement of the imagination in Baudelaire.  
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incorporate our identification of the philosophical. In other words, the political problem of 




The question of the performance of indifference, calm or coolness, which heroic realism requires, 
calls to mind many cliches of representations of “violent agency” within film narratives where 
alien-like or non-human perverse, cruel, and “unthinkable” decisions are thought and executed. It 
is in this performance of “coolness” that the construction of heroic realism is brought home, in 
that Heidegger’s experience of thinking as a space in which we undergo, enjoy or endure an 
experience with language is made into a strategy for action where we are compelled to 
manufacture and identify with the experience, as an individual or as a society.  
 
Before thinking through the relation between Jünger’s literature as significant to the postmodern 
narrative, I’ll take a brief look at Heidegger’s expression of how the mortality of Dasein is 
specifically a “lingusitic” experience is recounted in On the Way To Language:  
 
In order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the being of 
language, and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else. Thus we 
always see the nature of language only to the extent to which language itself has us in 
view, has appropriated us to itself. That we cannot know the nature of language - know it 
according to the traditional concept of knowledge defined in terms of cognition as 
representation - is not a defect, however but rather an advantage by which we are 
favoured with a special realm, that realm we are, who are needed and used to speak 
language dwell as mortals.261  
 
Heidegger’s description of our being unable to step outside of language and yet to never “know” 
it according to traditional concepts of knowledge is identified here not only as without defect, but 
as an “advantage”, as a favourable experience. Here, Heidegger identifies the experience of being 
as the impossibility of an experience of our mortality and, moreover, the living out of Dasein’s 
passionate existence for knowledge. However, exactly how this “advantage” is construed in 
Jünger’s literature remains important. Clearly, for Jünger, this mortal realm is somewhat clumsily 
but also epically re-figured as the locus for philosophical questioning. Here, this “special realm” 
and the “advantage” of mortality is targeted and appropriated by Jünger as the natural territory to 
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employ the technological means to use and speak language, because now language is imbued 
with transcendental powers. 
 
In order to think through Jünger’s identification of ethics and autonomy, although for the most 
part I have concentrated aspects of Jünger’s literature in relation to (party) politics, it is also 
worth considering exactly how the aesthete is considered within Jünger’s fiction, not only as the 
reader but also as the central character of his novels. Significant to this is that his protanganists 
could be seen to act as a standard of how to behave under Jünger’s more “political” conceptions 
of agency. Here the characters do very little and yet they are exposed to all manner of horror. In 
Jünger’s transcriptions of nightmarish visions, he translates Heidegger’s absolute finitude in 
language, incorporating and confirming it as an exercise of the limits of mortality, as being 
towards an image of death in the exploits of a fictional hero: 
 
The Black Knight:262 
Leipzig 
 
I stand in a suit of black steel armour before a satanic castle. Its walls are black, its 
gigantic towers blood red. By the gates white flames shoot up in glowing columns. I 
stride through, cross the courtyard, and mount the stairs. Room after room, flight after 
flight, reveal themselves as I go. The sound of my footsteps echoes against the rough 
masonry, but otherwise it is as still as death. Finally, I enter a round tower room whose 
door a red helix has been carved into the stone. There are no windows, yet one can feel 
the massive thickness of the surrounding walls; no light is burning, yet a shadowless 
brilliance fills the chamber. 
 
Two girls are sitting at a table, one a blonde and one dark haired, together with a woman. 
Although the three do not resemble one another, they must be mother and daughters. On 
the table in front of the dark-haired girl lies a pile of long, gleaming horse-shoe nails. 
Carefully she takes up one after the other, tests its sharpness, and sticks it into the 
blonde’s face, limbs, and breast. But she does not move and utters no sound. At one point 
the dark one draws back the other’s skirt, and I see that her thighs and lacerated body 
have been reduced to a single bloody wound. These silent movements have an 
extraordinary slowness about them, as though secret arrangements were holding back the 
course of time. 
 
Even the woman sitting opposite these two remains mute and motionless. Like images of 
saints in the country, she has a large heart cut out of red paper covering her entire chest. 
In horror I notice that this heart turns snow white, like glowing iron, at every stab of a 
nail that the blonde receives. I rush from the room, looking for the way out, with the 
feeling I am not man enough to endure this test. Door after door flies past, each secured 
with steel bolts. Then I know: behind every door, from the deepest cellar up to the attic in 
the highest tower there are scenes of endless torture about which no person will ever hear. 
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I have penetrated the secret castle of pain, but the first of its offerings was already too 
much for me.  
 
(“Der schwarze Ritter,” Das abenteurliche Herz-zweite Fassung, IX, pp. 195-96) 
 
Already we can find ourselves recovering images of the aesthete as the one who is privileged with 
the knowledge and the realisation of horrors that no other man could stand or even get to know of 
their existence. The character, the Black Knight, is already equipped and prepared both physically 
and mentally for the horrors he witnesses, in as much as he is not surprised at what he sees. 
However, it is important that he still suffers shock, terror or trauma from the experience. This 
prepares the metaphysical aspect of horror within the text to be something that occupies the 
whole world of the Black Knight, something that faces him wherever he turns and therefore is 
something he must face. The aesthetics of metaphysics as a textualised narrative here become a 
pulp erotic fiction where Heidegger’s hero Dasein participates in sado-masochistic voyeurism. 
The “cool”, rational delivery of the traumatic images of initiation and penetration brings the 
realm of the dream-like narrative to a level of reality or document. This reality is founded upon 
violence that smacks of what we see to be the conventional images of death, or even the kitsch 
melodrama of pulp horror. However, it is important to Jünger that this rhetoric is difficult to 
contemplate and that through these images of horror we experience their intimidating 
consequence.263 In the reader’s “thrilled tranquility”264 there is an experience of jeopardy or 
danger where the image addresses the reader and the author as voyeurs, both complicit within the 
narrative experience.265  
Jünger’s theory of shock without surprise has clear similarities to Baudelaire’s dandy. Baudelaire 
writes in The Painter of Modern Life:  
                                                     
263 This difficulty to contemplate the image of ethics returns us to the aesthetics of “contamination” in 
Chapter One and also to Fish’s “figure without figure” – or, “the gun at your head is your head” - in the 
previous chapter. Here, we can think through the accounts of aestheticising ethics and the way in which 
ethics are prepared as consequential by negating or problematising figuration. In terms of this, Jünger, 
Zupancic and Cavell’s aesthetics of paradox co-opt a more cliched rhetoric than that of Fish’s more 
“difficult” metaphor. However, as I have already written, Fish’s theory still adopts the same schema by 
persisting in a metaphor that resists the symbolisation of an ethic, despite his arguing for the temporal and 
circumstantial nature of universal and transcendental codes. I return to this theme of aesthetics and law later 
in the conclusion. 
264 Bullock, The Violent Eye, 248 
265 The way Jünger understands the aesthete in his fantasy styled literature is similar to his description of 
the heroic realist at war. In the essay “Totalen Mobilmachung” Junger asserts that the precondition for 
“total mobilisation” is not “determination” (entscheidende), but rather a specific “readiness” (Bereitschrift) 
in order to respond best to the demands of total mobilisation. Jünger writes: “Die technische seite der 
Totalen Mobilmachung ist indesen nicht die entscheidende. Ihre Voraussetzung liegt vielmehr, wie die 
Vortaussetzung jeder technik, tiefer: wir wollen sie hier als die Bereitschrift zur Mobilmaschung 
ausprechen.” Ernst Jünger, Die Samtliche Werke, Essays 1, Betrachtungen zur Zeit, Stuttgart, 1980, 129 
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 What then is this passion which becoming doctrine, has produced such a school of 
tyrants? What this unofficial institution which has forced so haughty and exclusive a 
sect? […] It is the joy of astonishing others, and the proud satisfaction of never oneself 
being astonished. A dandy may be blasé, he may even suffer; but in this case, he will 
smile like the Spartan boy under the fox’s tooth. […] The distinguishing characteristic of 
the dandy’s beauty consists above all, in an air of coldness which comes from an 
unshakeable determination not to be moved; you might call it a latent fire which hints at 
itself, and which could, but chooses not to burst into flames.266 
 
Jünger’s narrative clearly deals within the same territory as the “dandy”. Fusing a Nietzschean 
style self-aestheticisation through decadent “dandified” narratives Jünger provides a reader who 
exercises authority at his/her most private point of resistance vis-à-vis a public literary text, which 
eschews this experience of “choice” as a private, dangerous and erotic encounter.  
 
Looking at heroic realism in general, we can see such descriptions of the subject as being 
somehow ambivalent, passive or indifferent to violence – a modern subject - correspond to many 
representations of the subject’s indifference to violence and cruelty within the postmodern. As 
such, the expression of this association between agency and violence as a rhetorical contrivance 
(and not necessarily purely as a parodic satire) is particularly relevant when considering how we 
understand the implications of the totalitarian style violence of heroic realism today. For the most 
part, and as we have already seen, the work of condemning totalitarian style violence in 
contemporary culture announces a violence of its own. For instance, the film AI (2001 dir. 
Stanley Kubrick and Steven Speilberg) depicts a scene in which a totalitarian style state within 
which cyborgs representative of the “socially unwanted” (i.e., they are represented as having a 
Jewish physiognomy or dressed as gypsies or are prostitutes etc.) are exposed to savage public 
humiliation and spectacular and banal executions. This, from the director of Schindler’s List, 
(1995, Steven Speilberg) is not a surprise, but the desire to re-tell the Holocaust or, even the 
calamity of the dialectic of enlightenment as a non-ironic drama still persists within narratives 
produced here as over-sentimentalised Hollywood schmaltz. This not only desires to tell the story 
of the “victim” but also of the oppressors, and to re-tell and re-tell. Here totalitarianism and 
specifically Nazism become the ubiquitous and impending other – the absolute identification of 
the immanence of violence.  
What is significant to this notion of heroic realism is evidenced in allegories of the act of 
theorising or “thinking as violence” at work within the postmodern. Such allegories still invest in 
                                                     
266 Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life”, in The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, 
trans. and ed. Jonathan Mayne, Phaidon, 1995, 27-29  
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a non-ironic belief in the relationship between violence and agency. In other words, these 
narratives still take seriously an immanence: not the immanence of a particularised violence to 
decision, but more often than not the immanence of the political other – totalitarianism to the 
democratic narrative.267 This aspect of a “diabolical evil” rehearsed within postmodern 
“reproducable” and non-foundational narratives268 retrieves the question of if re-producing 
“decision as violence” as an immanent force only historicises it. Here (similar to Jünger), 
Spielberg’s devotion to a meta-narrative shows up the very singular nature of his priorities. In 
comparison, the post-tragic heroic narrative literalises the stipulation of decision and violence 
where there are no forces greater than the subject’s own force. The singular nature of force is the 
priority. Here, the dynamic relation between Jünger’s heroic realism and the post-tragic heroic is 
brought into focus. In both, a fear of total domination is not written as being immanent to the 
subject’s actions.269 Instead, the potential force of domination is written through action. 
 
Ultimately, what Jünger’s heroic realism delivers is two-fold, first; a political concept of a 
metaphysical experience of language which is inscribed within language, as temporal and 
contingent narrative experiences; and secondly and conclusively, it stresses the problems of 
organising a theory of self-reflexivity within violence, when the rhetorics of authoring agency are 
left apparently unthought and we are left with the question of the transcendental subject. In this, 
Jünger’s translation and rhetoricisation of a Nietzschean-style active nihilism does not fully 
consider the rhetoric of subjective power as violence, only as a possible power over it and in 
relation to it. As I have written, the post-tragic subject does not recognise the law as something 
that is external to his/her actions, the law is tied up within them and duly is either unrecognisable 
or is naturalised within the subject’s actions. In comparison the antimodern subject of Jünger’s 
heroic realism identifies technology as the powerful other, the violent ground that inhabits the 
ultimate experience of authenticity. As such, although the two figures of agency don’t fear what 
could be termed the ethical other, they still show different relations to it. The former shows an 
                                                     
267 In Did Someone Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion Vero, 2001 Slavoj 
Zizek discusses how totalitarianism is understood as immanent in democratic practices. Here Zizek argues 
that this threat is misperceived: “The return to ethics in today’s political philosophy shamefully exploits the 
horrors of the Gulag or the Holocaust as the ultimate bogey for blackmailing us into renouncing all serious 
political engagement.” 4 Zizek also takes up a critique of the Holocaust narrative in cinema, to ask how the 
“serious” message of these films is communicated. This, for Zizek is played out in heroic and tragic 
narratives and non-comedic and pathetic speeches.67-72 
268 The concept of narratives as having a postmodern character is raised in Chapter One, through Cavell’s 
The World Viewed, Reflections On The Ontology of Film, Harvard University Press 1979, 103-4. Cavell 
writes that film unlike art does not have an “emancipatory project” at its origin. In other words, film seeks 
to underscore itself as a tradition and a convention unlike art, the conventions of which (as an avant-gardist 
structure anyway) are to rebel against institutionalised norms. 
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embodiment of the law and, the latter a distanciation, achieved through the subject’s mechanistic 
appropriation of the law. However, the legacy of Jünger’s rhetoric of metaphysics as (violent) 
language can be seen to clear the way for the possibility of thinking the transcendental subject 
within language as another formal and political question. 
 
 
Language as power 
Jünger’s heroic realism attempts to assimilate the other (technology) as a subjective trait and 
vice-versa. The subject is stylised as a faceless “type” and “reality” is no longer approached by 
the high avenue of philosophical thought but is, as Bullock claims: “concealed beneath the heroic 
appropriation of the subjective sphere to create an irreal collective domain as the alternative and 
entirely sufficient true location of a worthy life.”270 This emphasises the power vacuum upon 
which Jünger’s object of political “truth” is founded. By this I mean that Jünger’s swift move to 
by-pass a dialectics of power (such as Marxism) takes up and even celebrates the Nietzschean 
critique of transcendental power as something that deepens the polemics of good and evil through 
the acknowledgment of the subject who “creates itself” in relation to “metaphysical evil”. In this 
celebration of irrationality, the “will to power” is accessed and manifest through a paranoid 
relation to technology. This synthesised structure of aesthetics allows an experience of moral 
choice and works in as much as the object is (an image of) death. 
 
This is evidenced in Jünger’s identification of the heroic realist as a person who is sensitive to the 
“risks” in everyday life, underlining the idea that one either has to make oneself sensitive to such 
risks through some notion of practice upon the self, or that one is naturally pre-disposed to 
experiencing them. This recalls a hierarchical politics familiar with Nietzsche’s Genealogy of 
Morals, where politics becomes a Darwinian-style theatre of brutal power relations. 
 
With this in mind the Heidgerrian concept of thinking as experience and vice versa would seem 
redundant, in that it merely repeats and emphasises the problems of “reason” and “unreason” and 
the problem of agency as persisting in a demand for the application of knowledge in a polemical 
framework. Jünger’s thinking within experience is therefore marginalised under a hegemonical 
structure and the antimonies of reason that he sought to close down are emphasised almost 
ludicrously in the excesses of his rhetoric. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
270 Bullock, The Violent Eye, 163 
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 Consequently, Jünger’s translation of Heidegger’s theory restates the problem of identifying and 
experiencing the space between poetry and thinking as violence, and as such takes us to a 
question of the practices of particular authorities that theorise violence as a ubiquitous force, 
and/or manufacture of violence as success. This is because Jünger’s theory demands a notion of 
the “artistic” or “sensitive” aesthete as the subject who can experience thinking as experience 
within language through the facility of representation. This language is violence, and the 
ubiquitous nature of forces that characterise agency are now represented in the manner of war, 
technology, speed, steel and capitalist energies. Crucially, it is the aesthete who is prepared and 
able to manufacture and undergo an experience with the violence and mysticism of technology 
and war to ultimately rise above it.  
 
Accordingly, Jünger’s theory can be seen to formally reproduce the logic of violence that it seeks 
to unravel, in the name of the aesthete. In this it requires a cultic investment in the rhetoric of 
one’s own subjectivity. This demands a private sacrifice of one’s subjectivity to violence as 
“image”, which in turn dislodges any essential or totalising public or social affect. Jünger’s 
territory of the modern everyday world as violent is mediated as a fictional literature, distanciated 
from the social politics, but always ready to be put into use by them. Its direct political enterprise 
is instead situated in a cultic and marginalised readership induced to fictionalise power through a 
decadent fantasy in a made-up unpolitical world.  
 
Consequently, Jünger’s disinterest in partisan politics juxtaposed with his absolute engagement 
with producing a metaphysical experience as the normative emphasises the metaphysical as a 
fragmentary and contingent experience. In light of this, we can view Jünger’s realism as 
something that fails to “represent”, or even, that it shows the failure of representationalism for 
politics because realism shows reality to be a (linguistic) object. Thus, the stabilising of 
Heidegger’s quasi-transcendental violence in Jünger’s literature underscores a political question, 
this time situated within the very use of power. 
 
 
3. The Thin Red Line: Violence as the Universal 
 
Having understood the problem of identification, originally raised in this text by Lacoue-
Labarthe, as a problem that situates the rhetoric of violence as a foundational tool for autonomy, I 
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now intend to make a closer examination of the uses of abstract metaphors in narratives of 
violence which move to support violence as a ubiquitous and naturalised phenomena.  
 
The Thin Red Line (dir. Terence Malick 1997) seems the most suitable place to continue this 
critique. As a war film it has all the traits of a “traditional” representation from the action/war 
genre. Malick does not so much re-make the typical war narrative, but attests to its tradition by 
accepting certain rules of drama, such as the heroic (sacrificial) death, the fight against all odds 
(the suffering of humanity at its own hand), and a hierarchical and moral clash of personalities 
revolving around those in charge and those who are not. The Thin Red Line does not write against 
other war narratives but complies with that tradition in order to examine itself as a genre.  
 
Nature as “the ethical” can be seen to act as the central motif of the film, and this can be read as 
one thread interwoven throughout the script. However, the points in the narrative that are starkly 
symbolic moments demand particular interest. By this I mean that images such as “redemptive 
rain”, used in too many films to mention here, as a moment of change, realisation, 
acknowledgment and also of course renewal, seem to be made yet more sophisticated or inventive 
in Malick’s script by the actors’ performances. However, and more to the point, it is in the 
inclusion of these tropes that we are offered the experience of a Heidegerrian notion of “letting 
things be” and simultaneously, “forming world.”271  
 
This double aspect is reinforced through the ambiguity of time and place that is played out 
throughout the film, despite being told what year the film is set and where - Guadalcanal, 
November 1942. Also, Malick’s use of multi-layered narratives and voice-over evacuates any 
possibility of making specific associations with any individual character. The film loses time, in 
that it presents us with the persistent space of being neither before nor after the event. We are 
unaware of the locations of these voice-overs and from what time they are being spoken. They 
float ephemerally above the film, hardly heard, and yet within and through the soundtrack, often 
taking the place of the voices of the characters that we see on the screen. They act as hypnotic and 
poetic lyricism, giving the action an unreal quality, equaled by the saturated colours of Malick’s 
cinematic “nature”, seen in expansive subject-perspectives of panoramas of the long grass and the 
                                                     
271 This is picked up by Stanley Cavell in The World Viewed, where he writes in the introduction regarding 
Malick’s Heidgerrian influence by interpreting Malick’s previous film Days of Heaven, as a direct 
reference to the aesthetics of this “inbetweenness”; a timeless realm given up to nature, between heaven and 
earth. Also, Simon Critchley’s essay “Calm – On Terence Malick’s The Thin Red Line” in the on-line 
journal Film-Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 38, December 2002, foregrounds Malick’s Heideggerian influence.  
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unceasing movement and sound of the wind through it. Here the documentary-style realism of 
recording action, in all its slowness, patience, and uneventful dialogue is eclipsed by the “other 
worldly” rendering. In this sense the voice-over can be seen to occupy the Heideggerian realm 
between thinking and poetry, offering a sensation where the voice is active, or present and yet it 
is also out of reach, inconsistent, unlocatable and apparently without any specific interest or 
direction. 
 
When watching the film, we can say that we are always already aware of Malick’s presence, or 
that Malick has chosen to make the movie, not through the enterprise of film packaging or 
advertising, but through what I bluntly put as the “universal” of Malick’s directorial style.272 We 
know it is a “Terence Malick film”, but we are also aware of its cinematic quality - its aesthetic 
content, and the effect Malick’s authorship as part of this equation. To underscore this point, the 
magazine Vogue produced a fashion shoot entitled “Badlands” wherein models were depicted 
wandering through lakeland, woods and dilapidated farmland absolutely reliant upon our 
recognition that this is symbolic of Malick’s filmic style.273 Through this we can clearly see that 
Malick’s authorship is already in the cultural loop, a signature style of romantic realism of a dusty 
epic expanses of nature and wayward characters. This not only demonstrates that Malick’s 
personal signature style is available for any cultural use, but that in general Malick’s style has 
reached an iconographic point in the work of images. 
 
 
Malick’s “complicit” authorship  
The heightened aestheticisation of the territory of violence in The Thin Red Line is understood as 
a necessary and immersive space. It is where the natural (nature) is the given condition and as 
such the characters refrain from putting it into question. In this the violence of nature is either 
accepted as a timeless backdrop for action or an immersive space for it. Accordingly, the film 
qualifies violence with a notion of beauty that is suspended from politics, where the characters are 
always immersed within the landscape, either in the long grass, in the water or half-hidden in the 
tangled jungle. Malick re-deals the Heidegerrian narrative where violence is not sensationalised 
by the characters (i.e. it is not deliberated). It is rather, slowed down, made mesmeric, and made 
poetic. Unlike Jünger’s nihilistic agency of “being towards an image of death”, Malick structures 
                                                     
272 By this I mean that the film resembles his other movies, Days of Heaven (1978) and Badlands (1973), 
not only through style and imagery but also in script and “philosophical” motivation. 
273 “Badlands” photographer Justine Kurland, narrative artist, John Kelsey, Vogue, Conde Nast Publication, 
August 2002, 148-159 
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a more ubiquitous account of decision, in that the characters in the film operate on a number of 
levels. They are not all heroes in the sense that they fulfill the traditional role of self-sacrifice and 
they constantly offer their differing opinions of death. However, overriding this plurality is a 
central thematic: the quasi-metaphysical understanding of human nature as being both subject of 
violence and subject to violence. Here, the violence of war is depicted as (human) nature. And 
again, in opposition to Jünger, violence is not played out as the means to an end, but instead as 
something that is naturally immanent to decision. As such it is important to begin to think through 
how we can articulate Malick’s ubiquitous images of violence as natural, when to all extents such 
images propose violence as being a metaphysical force - without figure.  
 
In light of my previous work on Jünger, the question that needs to be addressed here is to what 
extent a non-ironic, non parodic narrative that appropriates and centres the theme of decision as 
violence - by enforcing violence as a natural and therefore also necessary predicate to action - 
could perform any helpful analysis regarding the problematic and formal relationship between 
violence and decision? This question not only takes up the problem that Heidegger finds in the 
Greeks at the beginning of this chapter – the problem of taking the power of appearances 
seriously - but also reflects back upon the my previous chapters, particularly the last, wherein I 
discussed the problems of thinking through transcendental ethics as a foundational rhetoric.  
 
To end this chapter then, I will concentrate upon how decisions are recognised, when in Malick’s 
minimal critique of the generic war genre the territory of violence is protected as the best place to 
experience authenticity. In this film we are looking at an authorship that produces images of 
another passive complicity with violence as decision. But perhaps more important to this analysis 
is the way in which Heidegger’s correlation between autonomy, authenticity and power - made 
available through the relationship between being and appearance, and glory and authenticity - is 
re-invited through an aesthetics of violence, presented as the locus for the authentic or universal 
experience where, once again, we find ourselves facing the question of force and rhetoric. 
 
 
Producing the transcendental 
Beauty and death collide in Malick’s narrative. However, this violence as “natural”, whether it is 
the actions of the soldiers at war or of the awesome power of nature, is heavily conditioned upon 
our cultural associations of “nature” as a category of the representable–unrepresentable paradox. 
By this I mean that The Thin Red Line on occasion reads like a wildlife documentary or simply an 
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advertisement for the beauty of nature. For instance, small moments are arrested within the 
soldiers’ passage through the jungle where Malick shows us, the audience, “nature”. These 
accounts of the ocean, forest and jungle act as deliberate, albeit attractive unwieldy metaphors of 
the natural and transcendental forces within life that we cannot control, namely, the force of the 
other.  
 
Experiencing the aesthetics of the universal in these apparent moments of poetry and even 
sentimentality it is clear that despite Malick’s knowledge and use of the trope of nature as 
emblematic of an earthly and yet unknown force, he invests in the rendering of this trope 
personally, with hand held camera angles of parrots sitting in trees, almost as if it were a personal 
record of the location during the filming of the movie. In other words, these scenes or shots are 
created with a degree of naiveté that seems to travel away from the central discourse on death 
foregrounded in the script’s narrative drive. Such passages in the film depict a wonder and a 
proximity to nature, a particular use of nature as a trope of childlike innocence as the camera 
inspects its surroundings as if in a Jüngerian-style fascination; a wish to unravel its impossible 
logic.  
 
This exposure of violence as something both near and far underscores a non-ironic investment in 
agency, where the politics of life are located within survival and ambivalence. Delivered as an 
rhetoric of freedom the violence of nature in Malick’s film (demonstrated in the fact that however 
ambivalent the violence is, it is always beautiful) proves more interesting when we consider the 
particularity of the writing of this as a tradition and in turn, the notion of ideology as imagination 
or construction. Malick’s apparently less-subtle/over-theorised camera shots exemplified in many 
of his nature images shows nature as it is, in a documentary-style real time effect. However, the 
images Malick’s produces are the work of an auteur director, scenes are dramatically lit and the 
timing of the shots and camera angles are carefully chosen. Here, Malick shows nature in all its 
force, apparently as it is, but this document does not invalidate the Malick’s deliberative and 
personal love affair with the aesthetic and the theme of nature. In these moments of realism 
Malick’s film delivers itself as a performance of a belief in the philosophical theme of knowledge. 
The lonely coconut 
It is directly through the use of abstract metaphors that the film’s allegorical aspects are brought 
sharply into focus. This upsets the balance of knowledge within the film (between audience 
anticipation and directorial intention), where Malick’s over indulgent handling of nature as a 
traditional symbol of the quasi-transcendental is explicitly forced home. This imbalance is 
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produced by feeling that as the audience we understand only too well the director’s intentions 
while at the same time being treated as if we need to be told them nevertheless. For me, this is 
most obviously depicted in the final image of the film, the contemplative image of a lone coconut 
on a long beach, half submerged in the gentle tide of an expansive ocean. The coconut has a 
tender fresh sprout of life emerging from it. What else could this coconut represent but humanity? 
What else could this mean but hope in the face of adversity? Here we feel the full weight of its 
representative and allegorical force, so much so that the coconut doesn’t wish to represent 
humanity, it is humanity, buoyed up by an expansive contemplation upon death and the aesthetic 
and physical power of nature. To end the film on this “small thing” smacks of a far fetched 
aesthetics, or the bad rhetoric of a “little bit of the real” that we are privy to in this particular 
coconut, which appears, for Malick, so much more real than any generic contemplation of nature 
seen in other parts of the film.   
 
More clearly, perhaps, the coconut image seems to be forced into taking on a metaphor it cannot 
hold, whilst at the same time, the use or choice of the coconut as the metaphor for nature, 
humanity and the rest of it, seems to be taken on as if it is in itself a natural vessel for that 
meaning. In this final poignant image the coconut represents abject life; it grows without regard. 
However, it is in this solemn poignancy that we are offered the point at which the coconut stops 
being nature and becomes Man. Malick’s cinematic image escapes what we saw previously in his 
more ambiguous imaging of nature as both a metaphor for its own earthly and specific materiality 
and for its representative, universal possibilities. In previous images such as the strangling vines, 
sunlight, and the hills of long grass, the materiality of the image bore the weight of the 
metaphor’s universal possibilities. The coconut as an object becomes impossible, ludicrous, 






The rhetoric of authority 
After identifying Jünger’s forced unity between politics (the practice of ideology) and the 
political (the theory of political practice) as the rhetoric of active nihilism, it is clear that his 
political literature is open to contestation and also does not mechanistically assume an absolute 
totalitarian violence. In considering Malick’s and Jünger’s work as a rhetorical practice of 
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philosophy, and philosophy as the identification of violence, what we are faced with is 
circumstances of the use and practice of force. Both Jünger and Malick visualise and interpret 
philosophical themes and, for the most part, stay clear of partisan politics in order to speak about 
a deeper existence. As we have seen, Jünger’s aesthetics of violence falls into a marginalised 
literature or the prospect of totalitarianism because violence is always redemptive. Malick’s 
violence, on the other hand, falls into a fateful relationship that reflexes moreover on a tolerant 
liberalism. For example, Malick’s scenes of nature illustrate the point that death is a part of life. 
Here “this war in the heart of nature”274 is reflected not only in the ensuing war, but conflict is 
also made natural and embodied shown in the fact that characters contest each other freely. With 
this, Malick’s scenes of natural conflict provide us with a comforting sense of equilibrium and 
community - it’s natural or even necessary to disagree in particular circumstances – because 
violence is a part of life. As such, this conflict is naturalised and universalised but not specifically 
identified by Malick in one image, that is, until we are faced with Malick’s aesthetic of nature, an 
omnipresent conflict that overrides and frames these temporal arguments. Here violence and 
death are not so much a part of life but something that looms over it - the nature and necessity of 
death is universal- made tangible through Malick’s use of metaphor.  
 
Significant to this politics is that both Malick’s and Jünger’s authority is clearly written through 
these transcendental narratives. Jünger’s conception of violence forces together the biological and 
the technological, creating a man as machine. This poetry of flesh and steel seems a much more 
crude, but nonetheless equally deliberate notion of understanding a relationship between the 
ethical and the normative as that produced in Malick’s film. In The Thin Red Line, we see a 
conflation between the concepts of nature and human nature. Being both consistent and 
tumultuous these “natures” act as a more subtle version of an identification with the other. Here, 
Malick does not require any labour or particular agency from the subject in order to experience 
freedom or essence, as we are generally provided reflections of others’ life-choices through the 
different approaches of the characters. For Malick, there is no guide-book and violence is not the 
means by which we experience freedom. Instead, it is articulated as the ubiquitous force that we 
practice and in which we live. This is close to Heidegger’s conception of being with and for 
language where the metaphor of nature in Malick’s film expresses language as a foundational tool 
and as a historic and ungraspable force. However, crucially, it is in the process of manufacturing 
this mutually active and passive moment that we are shown the techné of this rhetorical project. 
And despite the more subtle mastery of the rhetoric of violence as the normative that Malick 
                                                     
274 I’m quoting here from the character Private Witt, one of the central characters of the film. 
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employs over Jünger, in that he chooses the rhetoric of nature over the rhetoric of technology, we 
are still subject to the experience of a specific force of aesthetics.275  
 
It is only when Malick appears to deliberately “write” or to “speak” or to “represent” where the 
coherent balance of the film is upset. These are not moments when Malick is freed from the 
generic narrative of war, but moreover, when Malick is seen to enforce his own addition to that 
narrative. It is in these few moments, in this process of recognition, in which the coconut is both 
an awkwardly abstract and a particular object, that the force of the author is brought into 
question. Our experience of dissension and disagreement in response to these “illustrative” points 
in the narrative alert us to the fact that a universal and unconditional truth cannot be manifest in 
such circumstances.276 However, this unavailability is not recognised as impossibility but rather 
this recognition re-asserts an identification of the legitimacy and the facility of such codes.  
 
In Malick’s sentimentality, seen in his personal investment in the narrative we can again identify 
the force of authorship as a formalised structure of force. In other words, we can see that in these 
various locations of the film, Malick’s discourse of the personal collides with a sustained and 
historical discourse of the generic identifications of meaning. Crucially these passages appear to 
function differently to the progressional movement of the central narrative, somehow being 
grafted together, but also absolutely significant to the emotional mood of the piece. Malick’s 
authorship more clearly here creates a rhetorical double of force, an abstracted notion of the force 
                                                     
275In “Calm – Terence Malick and The Thin Red Line”, Simon Critchley remarks that “Malick’s art 
demands that we take seriously the idea that the film is less an illustration of philosophical ideas and 
theories […] and more a form of philosophising, of reflection, reasoning, and argument.” 6. However, the 
notion of pinning down the act of philosophising calls into question how Critchley manages to construct 
such a hierarchy when both terms are identified through the medium of representation. For Critchley, 
Malick is “doing philosophy” because his film is seen to ponder upon the meaning of life and death. 
However, these ruminations on death are hinged upon the performative force of the interpretation of 
philosophical themes. My point here is that particular scenes of nature in The Thin Red Line are rhetorical 
and forceful displays of philosophical paradigms. With this we are left with a pure abstract symbolism and 
the singular force of Malick’s vision that consists of an aesthetic of paradox, disagreement and reflection. 
Certainly, Malick’s aesthetics of difference, played out through the characters, shows a more subtle 
representation of philosophical themes but crucially these are framed by a univocal inscription of nature as 
a universal force. In this case I won’t distinguish between philosophising and philosophical example, but 
rather, because we recognise philosophising as bound to certain rhetoric, we are faced in the end with the 
act of philosophising as politics.  
276 In the article “Private Irony and Public Decency: Richard Rorty’s New Pragmatism” [Critical Inquiry, 
Winter 1990, Vol. 16, No. 2, 355-370], Thomas McCarthy writes of the relevance of transcendental 
rhetoric: “Without that idealising moment, there would be no foothold in our accepted beliefs and practices 
for the critical shocks to consensus that force us to expand our horizons and learn to see things in different 
ways.” 370  
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of authorship and individuation, but certainly a knowledge that does not go unaccounted for, and 
something that is not outside of interpretation.  
 
In Malick’s representational (and more crude) visions of nature as ground, the Heideggerian 
space between poetry (the representational force of nature) and thinking (the force by which 
nature is represented) is not exposed - we do not seek nor are shown anything “more real” or 
“further beyond” these images, despite perhaps Malick’s wish that we do so. Malick’s poetry 
does not therefore produce a ubiquitous conception of reality as violence. Instead the poetry aims 
towards itself reproducing more interpretations that point us to “meaning” precisely through the 
facility of their communication. Violence, seen here as the quivering and yet constant ground 




Both Jünger and Malick attempt to show and to understand the notion of the subject as immersed 
and participating within the territory of violence, where this stands for a universal (normative) 
and ethical (original) ground for action, forcing what they define as the universal aspects of 
violence into existence. In order to offer violence as a universal in these narratives, the subject is 
at some point required to stand outside of this universality, thus exposing its impossibility and yet 
also reproducing or doubling its character. Heidegger’s dually “active” and “passive” Dasein, 
which combines a person-centred theory of combative action with an equal measure of violence, 
shown in the sacrificial move of a giving up or surrendering of one’s power to language, is 
problematised as soon as it faces the necessity of practice – the practice of surrendering or of 
giving up one’s reason. This impossibility of splitting the subject, foregrounded here through 
Heidegger, is underscored in the work of both Jünger and Malick in different ways although both 
utilise a realism that directly exposes the performative force of such abstract categories in that 
they show the contingency of being appropriated by knowledge whilst putting knowledge to use. 
 
As I have shown, “use” is brought into question particularly with Jünger when considering of the 
relationship of his literature in relation to the political. Here, it became important as to how 
Jünger’s literature is used by others. Significantly, this does not undermine Jünger’s responsibility 
to his work, but emphasises that the political problem of Jünger’s work is if, or how these 
metaphysical ideas could or would be taken seriously within the political. Also in Malick’s film, 
“use” or application is once again brought into question when we are faced with the metaphor of 
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transcendence, and particularly how Malick foregrounds his complicity not only with the genre of 
war films but also in that tries to stay true to James Jones’ novel from which the film was 
adapted. In response to both Jünger and Malick’s narratives we can say that the literature of 
transcendence calls practice into question because the use of such rhetoric desires representation. 
Consequently, rather than the question of “use” being claimed a question for metaphysics we 
instead return to a political question in an antirepresentationalist sense, since there is nothing 
behind or beyond these rhetorical performances. 
 
As such, despite offering what seems to be the worst case scenario – totalitarianism - in terms of a 
violent and antihumanist politics, Jünger’s perversion of Heidegger’s philosophy as a nihilistic 
political rhetoric, underlines philosophy as literature and by doing so brings to light the specifics 
of violence’s immanence to decision, as opposed to an overarching paranoia regarding its 
ubiquity. Certainly, by acknowledging Jünger’s politics as rhetoric, we may find ourselves no 
more able to condemn it normatively. However, what Jünger’s practice points us to is that we are 
left with the opportunity to think through the processes of how we go about acknowledging 
rhetorical force within language and then to consider upon what grounds we can situate our 
agreements and disagreements. Turning once more to Malick’s film, we can see that similar to 
both Jünger and Heidegger, we come face to face with the problem of understanding difference 
between the passive and the active subject. Crucially, what this demonstrates in both cases is that 
in the process of identifying Heidegger’s philosophy as a theory for action (Jünger) or as a 
description of “world” (Malick), Dasein is re-delivered as intrinsically active and passive, where 
these two terms are no longer able to be judged discreetly. Accordingly, the rhetoric of violence - 
understood in terms of language having no relationship to the real as such, but rather a 
relationship to power and autonomy - unaccomplishes any existential fatalism and also 
undermines the thought of the immanence of totalitarian domination to political practice. As a 
result, what we can turn to finally in this thesis as a whole are the problems of power relations 
and their correspondence to their advertisments in rhetoric. Here the aesthetico-political subject 
defines a problem for identification and, as I have already stated, the ways and means by which 
these are orchestrated, acted upon and understood. 
 
Crucial to the aesthetico-political subject, or, a dually active and passive notion of subjectivity 
within language, is that this notion of subjectivity does not identify an immanent and absolute 
violence. Ultimately, the language by which violence is interpreted and described through 
Heidegger, Jünger and Malick underlines violence as something that is constant, natural and 
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traditional as a genre. Following from this, the language of violence as grounds for decision, 
coupled with the impossibility of ultimately separating poetry and thinking or, of defining limits 
to those faculties (as we have seen most explicitly through Malick), in no way proposes the 
totalitarian violence vis-à-vis active-nihilism laid out at the beginning of this text. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Three and now here in this chapter, it is clear that the potential for 
linguistic interpretation does not demand any such recognition of finitude from which to act. 
Significantly, the rhetoric of transcendence does not aim towards the real or describe an implicit 
relation with it, despite its description of the real. Nor does such rhetoric aim towards an agreed 
upon notion of the consequence and use of powerful codes. As such, transcendence written as a 
violent power draws us towards a problem of performance, use, and the consensual legitimation 
of these codes. Although Bullock determines such transcendental rhetoric to be moreover a 
“false” language, rather than a feasible part of political practice, it is clear that the rhetoric of 
“realism” is a crucial part of political and cultural codes. With this we avoid a naive realism and a 
philosophical foundationalism, but the rhetoric of philosophical ontology is not postponed. And, 
reflecting back on Fish’s neo-pragmatic split between a de-politicised theory and a de-theorised 
politics we can see that these two languages are brought closely together.277 Now, both the 
rhetoric of antirealism and the rhetoric of realism, seen here, reinforce a problem of hegemony, 
wherein we are left to deliberate the processes and consequences of identifying our agreement for 
meaning within the actions of ourselves and others. 
 
Considering the writing of violence as a quasi-transcendental universal as I have done here, 
Malick and Jünger can be seen to demonstrate a political contingency in their narratives by virtue 
of their central theme of violence as the locus for decision, whether this is produced in Jünger’s 
transcendental subject - the aesthete, an identification of violence as the other - or Malick’s 
natural violence, which presupposes a different notion of affinity or immersion within violence. 
The desire to fathom human relationships in the context of struggle and suffering under the trans-
historical text of violence is confirmed most prominently in Jünger through the act of writing as a 
                                                     
277 Here I’m picking up on Thomas McCarthy’s critique of Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, a theory that 
to some extents mirrors the same prejudices as Fish’s interpretative practice. Commenting upon Rorty’s 
paper at the 1985 Congress of Philosophy in Guadalajara, Mexico which stated that “philosophy should be 
kept as separate from politics as should religion…the attempt to ground political theory in overarching 
theories of the nature of man or the goal of history has done more harm than good” (355), McCarthy writes 
that as a result of Rorty’s argument “critical thought is aestheticised and privatised, stripped of any socio-
political implications. There can be no politically relevant critical theory and hence no theoretically 
informed critical practice.” “Private Irony and Public Decency: Richard Rorty’s New Pragmatism” 367. In 
light of such criticism, I have attempted to draw out above, the problem of how, and if, an embodied sense 
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univocal conscription of the rhetoric of force. However, in both of these narratives, the 
determination or the force by which rhetoric is brought into existence incites greater 
consideration as to the politics of the identification of that force which uses violence and invites, 
of course, its own “violent” question. 
                                                                                                                                                              
of reason, justice, and truth retain a regulative and critical force and if transcendental codes can be 
subjected to critique without de-politicising them.  
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Concluding Remarks: Autonomy and Absolute Finitude, or, 
“Heroic Pragmatism”: Out For Justice, Commando and “Bond” 
 
 
We are left then with the problem of the status of our consensus on autonomy as violence. This 
problem of identification is complicated, and more so when we can say that “violence as 
judgment” is a naturalised condition of belief. Consequently, I wish to return to the question of 
what agreements about the genre of the heroic - which prefers an individualistic, self asserted and 
often brutal subject - tell us about how we negotiate a history and tradition of decision as violence 
without the availability of a redemptive space beyond it. This means that we have to consider 
once more the relationship between being and appearance, theory and practice, and an image of 
violence as well as the ubiquitous category of the violence of images. This returns us in due 
course to an analysis of aesthetics and power, and specifically how the practice of rhetoric 
implicates itself constantly with the question of force, mastery, use, and also with mechanistic 
notions of power. 
 
As I have argued in the preceding chapters, the rhetoric of active nihilism at work in the post-
tragic genre does away with the existential and fatalistic concept of violence. We are instead left 
within language and its discreet performances. Situated in this dynamic the aesthetics of judgment 
turn upon a question of contingency where, through pragmatism, we are directed to interpret 
motivations and causes for actions with the embodied force of the law. These issues re-invite the 
problem of conflict as both normative and perpetual as well as being the basis or foundation for 
identifications of self-empowerment. In other words, we are faced with imagining the 
consequences of attributing “success” or “freedom” to quantitative notions of power. What we 
return to then is the problems of identification and understanding, first in the possible 
determinism that can come with this recognition and, second, in that understanding violence as 
principled may exonerate it.  
 
Having put forward a critique of the application and circumstances for the aesthetico-political 
condition of violence I move finally through a number of narratives, some of which I have 
already mentioned earlier in this thesis, in order to readdress the problems I have been concerned 
with throughout. These include the question of how we negotiate and understand power in 
absolute finitude without the overarching immanence of violent domination (often read as 
totalitarianism). Indeed, as we have seen (particularly in Hobbes) this understanding of irrational 
power (exercised in perpetual war) is prevented by another domination (The Leviathan), which 
consolidates decision as violence. In these terms the narrative of the foundational and irrational 
immanent violence is “useful” to all extents. It promises the assertion of our own individuated 
power and through the organisation of our self-protection. Consequently, when faced with such a 
foundational understanding of the violent act as comparable to moral evil (in terms of law) we are 
left with a fairly scant notion of society on the one hand and despotic rule on the other.  
 
This problem of authority returns us to Stanley Fish’s argument in Chapter Three where I situated 
the difficult relationship between a pragmatic antiformalism and a philosophical formalism and 
how these theories impact upon politics and the political. Such questions bring us face to face 
with the political and moral implications of agreement and disagreement within the territory of 
absolute finitude. Most significant to this is that non-emancipatory theories are constrained within 
the rhetoric of emancipation written as a hegemonical system. In other words, we often find 
ourselves believing in and subscribing to the same grounds of violence implied within power and 
freedom, when thinking through our various identifications of domination and judgement. For 
example, “being” or as Fish would call it “doing what comes naturally” is on the one hand, 
constituted by practices of normative judgements, whilst on the other, it is offended by certain 
“ideological” practices. Here, prejudice in Fish calls into question the formulation and 
understanding of a naturalised ethic, in as much as we could say that Hobbes’s “Leviathan”, and 
Fish’s uncompromising metaphor bear a striking resemblance. 
 
Alternatively, in Chapter Four, I considered the unavoidability of normative judgements. 
Following from this, the evacuation of violence or evil as reliable or foundational grounds for 
decision returned us to the problem of forming values contingently through narratives. Here, a 
rhetoric of emancipation, or narratives that identify an external law invigorate the performative 
aspects of language as force. In light of this, we can ask if, and how, the institutionalising of 
emancipatory theories as the discreet performances of subjects who embody the law alerts us to 
the universal and actual constraints of an externalised law. This question is made more significant 
if we figure Fish’s pragmatism on the post-tragic subject, since although the post-tragic subject is 
a law unto him/herself there is always the militaristic and conventional authority that the subject 
ultimately finds him/her self being in alignment with. Likewise, in Fish’s pragmatism we can 
draw out the central contradiction of theorising a subject who embodies law in that the subject 
judges passionately and convincingly on the one hand, whilst being cynical of emancipatory 
theories on the other. In this case, the post-tragic narrative and Fish’s pragmatism describe a 
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subject who is, in the end, a good conservative. To consider these problems further, I now return 
to the figure of the action hero and Stanley Fish’s pragmatism.  
 
 
1. Out for Justice 
 
Quoting Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, Butler remarks that: “The individual in his 
individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work.”278 This corresponds in a 
formal way with what I have already established with Fish in Chapter Three: that the subject 
speaks with the authority that he/she believes is “right” and as such is compelled to 
universalising. In addition the subject is unaware or unconscious of this universalising. More 
directly: the force employed by the subject is situated in the impossibility of self-consciousness. 
The practice of universalising is then consistently associated for Fish, with the power and force of 
competing hegemonies and is also intrinsically related to freedom as an ideological imperative. 
Unlike a theory which seeks freedom as being free from representation we can look here to the 
productions of autonomy within language without strategic fissures between form and content or 
the real and the representational.  
 
It is in these terms that I will finish with re-staging the problems that the films of/by Steven Segal 
present. As the subject who combines thinking (ideologically motivated actions) and doing (the 
means by which the subject carries them out) we can see that the immanence of violence in 
decision portrayed in these action adventure movies acknowledges and identifies their historical 
and traditional relationship. That is, the character of the postmodern heroic articulates precisely 
the problem we have in negotiating ideologically driven action as a pragmatic subjectivism. 
 
The hero-genre provides us with both a consistent relation between agency and violence and also 
a changing relation in our agreements with it within aesthetic identifications, which is to say with 
what power looks like, its contextualisation within the narrative, and how we respond or interpret 
meaning from these violent instances. Looking at the typical “action adventure” heroics we can 
identify many similar characteristics. Here I’ll take three. First: there is a consistent singularity of 
consequence for the central character. Thousands may die, but what is of concern to the character 
in question is made our concern as the audience. We care locally and by corresponding to the 
hero(ine). Second: this character operates on an internalised notion of duty, a duty to what is right 
                                                     
278 GWF Hegel Phenomenology of the Spirit, (para. 351) in Butler’s “Re-staging the Universal” Ibid., 20 
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and good for her/him self and what s/he cares about, whether this is for one’s country or for one’s 
family. Significantly, narratives such as this very rarely contradict these two imperatives. 
However, they often force home the fact that the hero acts out of his/her own interest first and 
foremost and this contingently coincides with that of the country or state’s desires, not the other 
way around. Third, and finally, the hero performs a violence that is artful and natural, where the 
skill of the character is almost demonstrated without effort.  
 
It would seem that we were back in the territory of the lone heroic individual, the man who stands 
outside any State law. However, he is not without laws. Rather, law often falls back on personal 
ideology that coincides with that of the State. It is this production of the subject as “naturally 
violent”- in as much as this exercise of decision seems to stand outside any jurisdiction and in 
itself is seen to be inevitably for the good and to be lawful in the end - that I now wish to return 
to.  
 
In Out For Justice (dir. John Flynn 1991) (and also discussed in the Chapter One) Steven Segal 
plays a character who is torn between many conflicting authorities: his Mafia family, his job as a 
cop, and ultimately the thing that throws all these things into question – if he should risk his 
family life for the act of revenging his partner’s death. This character is a complex constitution of 
many circumstances that conflict and accommodate the hero at various points.  
 
It is important that any violent action Segal takes is deemed as part of his natural reactions, 
almost as if these responses were pre-ordained. However, what we are looking at here - and we 
know it - are the skillful articulations of martial arts, where self-defence is given the 
characteristics of a spiritual energy. As such, the violence of martial arts movies could be seen to 
be an essential example of the art of rhetorical violence, where this apparently abject approach to 
violence wins over the audience because we still can believe that the carefully learned, 
choreographed and orchestrated actions of the individual are utterly objective, even passive. 
Perhaps it is even more significant to note that these natural actions, whether they are Segal’s 
character’s own principles (and they are particularly forced home as his own during the movie) or 
his artful violence both ultimately coincide with the law. Segal can perform all kinds of acts that 
break the law throughout the movie, killing and maiming gratuitously. However, it is the ends 
that count; that the bad guys end up being “put away”, Segal remains on the police force, his 
family are safe, and importantly, he avenges his partner’s unwarranted murder. Accordingly, 
despite being the terrific loner Segal is always the cop, the upholder and representative of State 
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law that co-incides with a more general truth that reflexes upon notions of good and evil. In this 
the narrative exhibits a universalising allegory of justice, which does not act upon the rhetorical 
arts of deliberating and confusing the two (good and evil) in the sense of motivations or cause, for 
we are quite sure that Segal’s violence is more “true” and good than his enemies. Instead the 
nearness between good and evil is expressed in their use of violence. As such the heroic character 
is essentially static, whilst actions are left open. What I mean by this is that although these “ends” 
to action matter, they are hardly put into question, and even if they were we would not conceive 
realistically of a tragic figure because we know that Segal will return again with another movie. 
What is the “stuff” of the action is the way in which Segal achieves his relative destiny and that 
the passion or “need” to achieve these already understood ends is what counts. 
 
This film (and others like it) features a subject that does not separate “knowing” or “thinking” 
from “doing”. This unity of appearance and thought is carefully choreographed as a violent and a 
natural phenomena. In regard of this, we run up against the question again, as to whether an 
aesthetico-political totality risks the same violence that is immanent to its performances. In other 
words, if we are faced with an aesthetico-political totality where is there room for disagreement 
with, or even an unequivocal recognition of, dominant authorities without creating strategic 
separations between appearance and thought or the real and the representational? This concept of 
“knowing-doing”, expressed more often than not as a natural skill or an in-built sensibility is 
hinged upon what the subject desires and how the subject acts upon this. Although we see an 
alignment of aesthetics and politics performed within this subjectivity, we still find ourselves with 
a question of the nature of contesting discourses between the theorising of an emancipatory 
agency and its acting out.  
 
It is also clear when we look to this notion of subjectivity and its production that the work of 
underscoring such traditions subjects them to interpretations. Significant here is that we clearly 
see that such movies do not require parody or irony to re-interpret these interpretations. These 
action adventure narratives are non-ironic and sincere. They offer what seem to be the force of a 
personal account of justice. What I mean by this is that Segal as an actor, producer, writer and 
sometimes director makes his motivations very clear regarding these films. In this, his beliefs and 
motivations are crucial to the script in the sense that he lives out his beliefs through fictional 
narratives on screen. Certainly Segal plays a character, but it is also clear that he has a personal 
and political interest in the narrative, whether this is for ecological and spiritual issues, or to act 
out his beliefs of a natural justice. These beliefs are crucial to the fluidity between Segal’s on 
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screen and off screen presence and his beliefs are underscored even more when we know that 
Segal would rather break a studio contract incurring severe financial penalties than play a 
character that contradicts his personal beliefs.279 However strange Segal’s motivations may be 
these movies are the culmination of a strong belief in an Eastern-style mystical spirituality 
coupled with an American-style conservativism, and even a naive and idealistic belief in social 
harmony and justice for all. These narratives are not allegorical in the sense that they perform 
violence as a tool by which to achieve freedom. Instead, what we see here is the rhetoric of 
decision and violence, an aesthetics of violence as a transparent performance of the naturalised 
phenomenon of the law. Ultimately, this is the universalising work of an author and, although it 
of course seeks agreement upon fairly abstract notions of right and wrong, justice and the law, 
through the traditional means of a naturalised violent-decision stipulation, what we are left with is 
a force situated not between the real and the representational, but the force that produce such 
images and the circumstances of our agreement with them.  
 
 
Natural and unnatural ethics 
Similar to Out for Justice, Commando describes the central character, John Matrix (played by 
Arnold Schwarzenegger), as a man of action who is also the doting father yet, once again, the 
brilliant soldier. Matrix’s central task does not release him from his everyday lifestyle, but is 
structured in defense of it and because of it, instigated as the narrative is by the kidnapping of his 
daughter by terrorists. With this, a political threat to his country is symbolised and targeted as a 
personal threat to his life and family. The action is not dislocated from the world, it is performed 
in shopping malls and in streets. Although Matrix makes it clear that he has left the army and 
plans to make a normal life for him and his daughter he is compelled to exercise his beliefs 
publicly in his dual role as a “soldier of the State” and a “family man”. This knowledge acts as a 
buffer throughout the film offering the audience the knowledge that Matrix is always protected by 
the power of good that is larger than himself and the State, but acts as both. The State as a “higher 
authority” is undermined throughout the narrative as benign and inactive, incapable of upholding 
                                                     
279 In 2002 Segal famously tried to break out of his studio contract because his developing religious beliefs 
meant that he would not make the planned four movies of his contract. This was because Segal’s spiritual 
adviser told him that he would be reincarnated as lesser being if he continued to make violent movies. 
Unfortunately, (?) Segal lost the case and is now working on the last films of the contract. Crucially, the 
distinction I make between Segal’s life as an actor and his life as a character makes no claims to distinguish 
between the “actual” Segal and a representational notion of character. Pertinent to this is that in many films 
where we are encouraged to suspend our disbelief (forgetting that the characters are played by actors), in 
Segal’s films we are asked only to believe (and to remember that this is Segal). For more information on 
Steven Segal see the official web-site, http://www.stevenseagal.com 
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any law without their “main man”. When the army turns up for the final scene they are too late, 
the action has already happened and Matrix’s choices are definitely his own. Again, similar to 
Segal’s character in Out for Justice, Matrix is constantly representative of the power of country 
and a bottom line patriotism that goes beyond the local jurisdictions of the army or the police, but 
consolidates itself as aligned with a purer notion of these same powers. Even when he acts 
according to his own wishes and against those of the state he finds himself doing the right thing 
under both the law and his personal principles. This is a subject as will, the renegade who always 
acts according to what is right: in both of the narratives, the heroes are men of the law, a soldier 
and a cop. This subject has identity, control and community and is rooted to community as 
country through such tropes as patriotism. As I have already written, their actions correspond 
exactly with a notion of a “higher good” - a general notion of what is right - yet ultimately these 
are not these characters’ concerns. The moral choices of each are made as natural choices. They 
are not considered self-consciously as motivations, duties, imperatives or even “rights”. What 
motivates the subject is his own needs and his own ideology, essentially what is right for him, or 
he responds to the circumstances he finds himself in.  
 
Discussed earlier in Chapter One, Timecop (dir. Peter Hyams, 1994), and Robocop (dir. Paul 
Verhoven, 1987), shed more light upon representations of the subject and a naturalised law. Both 
of these films centralise the theme of law enforcement after the destabalisation of a central and 
trustworthy authority. Crucially, in these films, although the law is privatised, the police are not 
wholly corrupt, rather, it is the often a singular leading authority that acts as the site of the law’s 
corruption. With respect to this, the hero’s law is only truly enforced when the wo/man in control 
of the corporate (and often corrupt) law (the CEO or a politician) is confronted. However, apart 
from this apparently insurmountable or uncontestable institutionalised law there is a general 
moral plurality. Robocop’s tag-line is “Part Man, Part Machine, All Cop” also attesting to the 
presence of a higher governing law that is naturally beyond cyborgs or humans. This law that is 
“all cop” goes beyond Alex Murphy’s (Robocop) “prime directive” - a central ethic that has an 
unquestionable force over him, programmed into his system by the company who made him, 
OCP - and is a natural part of his cyborg/human psyche. Murphy’s “prime directive” prevents 
him from arresting any of OCP’s high-ranking officials. It is only in the final scene that Murphy’s 
directive is aborted and he is made free to contest corrupt individuals and uphold the “natural” 
law. Significant to this, once again, is that Murphy’s natural sense of justice and his life as a cop 
fit nicely with his personal task of a revenge as OCP’s corruption was responsible for Murphy’s 
original tragedy.  
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 Comparatively, in Timecop, even the villains of the piece are shown to be potentially and even 
naturally, “good”. For example, both the evil crime-boss and Fletcher’s (Van Damme) double-
crossing rookie sidekick are shown in other time periods to be good and innocent people. Here, 
the narrative draws attention to he fact that behaving immorally or evilly is something that 
happens through a mixture of choice and circumstance. Significantly, the law is put into question, 




Fish and formalism  
With this individual in mind I’d like to recall Fish’s description of the principled subject and 
return to how this subject acts in the social realm. As I have shown, Fish’s subject is subject to 
his/her own ideological constraints, an internal policing that seems to innately protect and prevent 
the subject. As such, it raises anxieties around consent and autonomy, such as the problem of the 
inevitability of one’s decision as an agreement with institutionalised authorities. This could 
problematically lead to understanding the “constraint of the political” as the object that defines 
our freedom. However, because the identification of this universal constraint is always 
impossible, the act of consent from the subject to higher authorities such as government is itself 
acted upon and identified as a choice. For Fish, the contingent constraints of law are recognised 
because they are constraints, they exist, even if they are fictionalised as normative conditions of 
everyday life. Unlike Hobbes’s pre-moral choice to social submission and general passivity, Fish 
presents the subject with the faculty of interpreting belief and choice because i) the truth of 
constraint is never made available to the subject and ii) because hegemonical constraints, no 
matter how natural or consistent they appear, are always interested.  
 
As such, if we constrain ourselves this does not create a system of the social where our values are 
always held in check. Law is the product of our beliefs manifest upon others in the social and 
ourselves. In drawing a link between natural justice as our un-selfconscious belief system and the 
political processes of interpretation we return to the problem that the use of fictions as practices 
of manipulation and dominion mean that those with the best or most sincerely delivered 
narratives of justice are those with power. Crucially, this is not necessarily governmental power 
but also our specific experiences of power shown in the many narratives I have drawn attention 
to. This could be seen to be the legacy of Fish’s subject for whom the most convincing 
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interpretations are essentially linked to success. Fish’s notion of society draws a picture of self-
interested individuals equipped with their own (impassioned) principles of rationality, where the 
thing that prevents ruthless practices of domination is the multiplicities of interpretation, and the 
impossibility of an absolute or universal figure by whom we can assert our freedom.  
 
This raises once more the issue of skill or mastery at the heart of Fish’s pragmatism, which can in 
turn be seen to be a question of hierarchies - when knowledge as power can be interpreted as the 
circumstantial behaviour of “more knowledge more power”. Quite clearly the question of 
antiformalism as an ideological task comes back into sight: can the practice of securing an 
antiformalist multiplicity feasibly be understood as “doing what comes naturally” as Fish puts it? 
If so, democracy must surely be working for Fish. It seems we can only answer with a vague - 
nearly. As we have seen, Fish’s antiformalism openly confesses an ideology at its heart that 
describes how we act upon an unnegotiable and unavailable assertion of our own sense of 
integrity and belief. Here, as we have seen, the work of antifoundationalism is a practice, and also 
a precise critical tool. It is in this precision that an ideological formalism - the task of achieving 
disparity through the practices of cultural relativism - is swallowed whole by an overarching and 
immanent antiformalism, read as the practice of cultural relativism simply because we can only 
identify constraint contingently.  
 
In light of this, we can assert that the figure of the post-tragic subject does not in any way 
“figure” pragmatism or antifoundationalism essentially, but neither does it avoid being figured. 
However, in this sense, to be clear, I am not identifying this Segal-style heroic figure as the 
logical figure of an antifoundationalist pragmatism. This is because the process of representing a 
naturalised ethic as moral action in the post-tragic genre problematically shows the subject to be 
always aligned, in the end, with a bureaucratic and conservative law. Comparatively, although 
antiformalism takes up the rhetoric of normative judgements as intrinsic to decision, it does not 
identify the language of normative judgments to be unequivocally tied to such institutionalised 
dominations. Instead what I have attempted to consider through an analysis of this subject is the 
way in which ideological and relativist discourses both work together and contest each other, and 
then to interrogate the particular problems of violence, force and power that are thrown up 
through this. Consequently, Jünger’s heroic realist, as the figure of the rhetoric of violence within 
postmodern narratives is not the hero of pragmatism; the post-tragic hero does however perform a 
 191
heroic pragmatism - he/she is a pragmatic hero.280 Here, we can say that attempting to figure 
subjectivity in this way does not describe the implicit tragedy of pragmatism, but rather, the 
tragic aspects of representationalist theories.  
 
 
2. Critique and Theory 
 
In Fish, power never gets too out of hand because it can never operate outside of its system and 
also because we know what it looks like. Knowing what power looks like not only ensures that it 
works upon us, but it also holds the promise that we can recognise it and subject it to critique. As 
we have seen, however, a critique that moves against such power in the hope to minimise, 
evacuate, or even control it reproduces the same universalising problems of power, as a rhetorical 
double of force. Consequently we are invited to be sceptical of our normative agreements with 
others. To be sceptical about how interpretations are manifest as assumptions in the social is 
made more difficult because the language of naturalisation and objectivity is so convincing. In 
other words, the law does its best work as law, by distinguishing itself from principle and force; it 
works best as the law because it is naturalised.  
 
The fact that we are subject to a power which is a product of our own identifications of it, and 
which therefore could be expressed as our consent to it, raises important questions regarding the 
organisation of critique. If we are to be sceptical of such normalising forces through theorising a 
circumstantial process of re-designating contexts and analysing interpretations we have to ask if 
this in itself either risks normalising antifoundationalism as a theory or if it risks 
antifoundationalism as the procedure of making “alternative” readings from the norm. Here we 
see, once again, the metaphysical character of theorising and the impossibility of ignoring or 
postponing the rhetoric of freedom. However, as I have shown, the theme of freedom and the 
work of philosophy are written through interpretative practices. Following my assertions in 
Chapter Four, the metaphysical aspects of judgement can now be considered as argumentation, 
made up of circumstantial disputes. Significantly, it is because we can identify constraints within 
the political as being interested rather than neutral, that refreshed interpretations of power result 
                                                     
280 This subject can be construed as a heroic pragmatist because as I have written, his/her actions are not 
directed towards or away from any absolute law. This subject believes in self. In this way we can say that 
the post-tragic subject is a pragmatist, and a hero, but this does not mean that pragmatism is identifiable by 
the method of these subjective traits, or the “path” set down by the heroic narrative.  
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and the processes and practices of power are allowed to be essentially fluid. Certainly this does 
not mean that we can all have power, but it does mean that to exercise power we need consent. 
 
This returns us to a question running throughout this thesis, the question of how exactly consent 
is established and acted upon, and if the work of producing consent to and within power 
demarcates differences between the real and the representational.281 Barry Hindess reflects upon 
the subject’s consent to higher authorities as a fiction of consent: “While acknowledging the 
world as a fiction, Western political thought nevertheless continues to make use of that world; 
both as a surrogate for the present and as a model of what ought to but does not exist.”282 Here, 
such fictions work as practices of domination, but on the other hand, as we know, the work of not 
taking them seriously, in the sense that we judge them as merely fictions or superficially light 
practices that hide real agendas, only re-produces the same problems of domination. To this end 
we can read fictionalised consent as naturalised justice. We are left duly with the problem of 
negotiating these very concrete repercussions of language. Consequently, the term fiction seems 
to misdirect the problem at hand. 
 
Both Fish and Hindess significantly understand dominion not as something to be vanquished or 
as something whose cause can be found but as something to analyse contextually. Of course, as 
Fish insists, while contexts are productive of interpretation, they are also the products of 
interpretation283 and it is here that the multiplicities of force and the territories for social 
agreements gather. The question still lingers regarding particular aspects of the production of 
consent, however, and, as such, it remains a question of the individual, community and history. 
With this in mind I now return to a study of the processes and principles of the naturalisation of 
violence and decision and how these narratives negotiate subjective autonomy and consent. 
 
 
Criticism and complicity 
In the above narratives violence is given a rationality, it is accepted as the tool by which to get 
power, and the bigger the better. This can be the violence of a gun-shot or the plotting artfulness 
of a plan of action, where both have particularly bombastic and uplifting theme tunes. The cool 
                                                     
281 This was established centrally in Chapter Three in Laclau’s argument against Butler. 
282 Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power, From Hobbes to Foucault, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996, 157 
283 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary 
and Legal Studies, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 53 
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and at once atmospheric tension in these images of violence does not create an implicitly rational 
distance from violence but instead acknowledges its necessity and at once its particularity.  
 
This rhetoric and choreography of particular action sequences to the appropriate theme tune is 
essential. To demonstrate its importance most clearly, we can return to the “Bond Movie”. In one 
of the plethora of documentaries which advertised the most recent Bond film, Die Another Day 
(dir. Lee Tamahori, 2002) the experiences of writing the music score were commented upon by 
the composer David Arnold, who has worked on the last few movies in the series. His main 
comment regarding the scores was that he had inherited the sound track from the series of Bond 
films before that. This by no means refers to some original notion of the score but that certain 
arrangements and elements of the score had been used mimetically in every film to signify 
“Bondness”. As such there was no original to copy, but rather a tradition of mimesis, to live up to 
and to keep going. He then commented upon the value or height of meaning historically inscribed 
in the use of the central and most rousing aspect of the signature tune. He goes on to say that he 
always saves this for the most risky and artful moments in the film, the places where Bond has 
not only escaped the jaws of death but where he also “got one over” on the villain and has done 
so with great panache. Arnold’s particular example of this was the sequence in the film Golden 
Eye (dir. Martin Campbell, 1995) featuring a boat chase on the river Thames. Here, Bond (Pierce 
Brosnan) not only gets dragged under water whilst still driving his boat (taking this as an 
opportunity to fix his tie) but ultimately escapes by driving his boat around the narrow streets of 
London before making this final escape. Crucially, it is here where the big blast of Bond music 
kicks in triumphantly. This description is important because it attests to a notion of what we want 
and what we expect. Here the composer admits his status as the audience directing his skills to 
engineer a soundtrack that has already been written and yet of course hasn’t.  
 
Arnold, in understanding the inheritance of the soundtrack, demonstrates the fact that he feels that 
he has already collectively written it. His experience of autonomy in composing the score does 
not come from making radical decisions regarding sound or timing, but rather seems to be rooted 
in a use of the tradition as it stands, where his work on how to keep an old tune engaging is 
eclipsed by his engagement with an old tune. This recalls both Fish and Hobbes in that 
demonstration and representation coincide and the subject, here the composer, defines the Bond 
theme tune as an almost religious experience. This is because we are absolutely assured of its 
meaning, so that we know what is happening - even if we hear the music and we are not looking 
at the TV and even if we don’t hear the TV or watch the film and we read it in a text like this, we 
 194
have an understanding of and know what is supposed to be happening. Even if it is as banal as 
that, it is something to believe in. 
 
On the other hand these principles of violence, power and action reflected in both the theme score 
and the narrative are something that is not so assured. The cliched lines are drawn out every time, 
but still, each time we watch when the music starts up because we want to see what is different 
this time because we also know that it will be different. Crucially this awareness does not indicate 
an existential anxiety around “impossibility” and neither does it indicate a revitalised spilt 
between the real and the representational. The impossibility of the repeat is not identified as an 
impossibility in a sense of exteriority. Moreover, and recalling my point on Austin Powers in 
Chapter One, in examples such as “the Bond film” the repeat produces another filmic fragment, a 
constant affirmation of difference and an underscoring of the tradition of invention.  
 
The brutal individualism demonstrated in Hollywood narratives is in this way open to 
contingency. And in this it is also open to the audience’s demand for invention and for risk, 
where the display of the “nearness between good and evil” still produces an inherent experience 
of consequences in the audience through the force and skill in using a rhetoric that belongs to a 
tradition. Accordingly, and finally to finish with Fish, we find ourselves with the relativism of 
interpretations where any decision has its basis in belief and that belief has the (universalising) 
force of principle. Fish’s antifoundationalism responds to this condition without a theory of 
emancipatory ideals and without an absolute condemnation of dominion. Consequently Fish is 
not the political idealist, nor the cynic, and antifoundationalism upon these terms of autonomy as 
consensus interestingly returns interpretation as a critical faculty for individual subjectivities to 
act upon and contemplate.  
 
The identifications of violence and decision that I have looked at in this thesis are not purely 
procedural. They do not underscore the deterministic notion that complicity is criticism - by the 
way of “bad Nietzscheanism” - as if complicity with violence is a means to a “critical” end. This 
points us once more to the problem of understanding the difference between complicity and 
criticism when they are conditioned upon each other. The complexity of their relation rules out 
the fatalism of performing complicity as means to critical autonomy (where for example, as we 
see in the previous chapter, Jünger’s heroic realism sites violence as reflective of complicit 
passivity). Rather it at once demonstrates the problems of thinking through criticism as 
complicity. Ultimately we can say that the conventional nature of our thoughts does not equate 
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with a diminution of their value, meaning or effect, but points us to the politics of their use and 
the interpretations of our actions. How this space of authority is produced, manufactured and 
subjected to critique vis-a-vis pragmatism is my final line of inquiry. 
 
 
3. Some Conclusions 
 
Recalling some of the theories I have looked at in this text which underscore the ubiquitous, 
metaphysical or quasi-transcendental element of violence, I have focussed on two beliefs; first 
that an emancipatory social model offers the tools by which to condemn violence, and second; 
that a non-emancipatory politics is required to sustain a good democratic practice. With this 
problem of autonomy, justice and subjectivity still lingering, I will briefly return to the moral 
implications of identifying violence as judgement raised in some of the issues in Chapter Two 
regarding the understanding of violence as aestheticised transgression. In previous chapters I have 
attempted to articulate a subject within language and more often than not, this has run up against 
problems such as the foundational nature of violent language, whether it is asserted or avoided, as 
for example in the writings of Jünger and the politics of Hobbes. Working through the rhetorical 
aspect of these strategies I have argued that they exclude an existential and absolute fatalism and 
instead open up a particular need to critique power. With this however, we are faced with the 
prevailing question of how one goes about making decisions, and if there are any such things as 
criteria or guidelines that are available for this: Does the inability to identify difference between 




Mary Midgely’s argument in her book Wickedness returns the question above to some of my 
opening questions in this thesis, in that she looks to the limits and problems of identifying 
immorality and our social and political potential for agency, criticism, justice and decision with 
regard to others’ actions. In Wickedness Midgely writes: “To say that evil actions are 
understandable means that we are falling for propaganda, another working of power where to 
understand evil is to excuse it.”284 I think Midgely is quite right to say that understanding 
violence has a question of power at its source, and also correct in her assumption that our 
understanding as a product of another’s force upon us is also relevant. However, she seems to 
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forget that if it is read as a practice as opposed to an essential truth, understanding is not 
exoneration or a means by which to entertain absolute complicity with other’s actions. In this 
sense it doesn’t matter if we say “evil actions” are understandable. Rather it is in how we say that 
they are that we can begin to look at “understanding”.  
 
The process of understanding what we would wish to call immoral action relies upon consensus 
and agreement, but this in no way suggests or means that the agreement changes a “bad” action to 
one that is acceptable or even encourages a refreshed moral positivity around acts which we 
designate as immoral. “Understanding”, when reflected as a multiplicity of interpretations does 
not produce one definable truth or a single explanation for what we would consider to be actions 
that are outside of our understanding such as the Holocaust, the Gulag, the genocide in Rwanda or 
Al Qu’ida’s terrorism. However, as I have written, this also does not produce an “absolute 
plurality” of disagreements. As such, Midgely’s argument, which equates understanding with 
excusing or normalising actions, forgets the fact that although there may be no understandable 
truth to base our absolute condemnations upon, we still argue for the condemnation of other 
people’s actions that we see to be wrong.  
 
Instead, Midgely prefers to put a case forward for the irreducibility of understanding. This is 
focussed sharply on the idea that some people will never understand others, and that some events 
will never be understood, not because of the conditions, and effects, but because of the cause; the 
impossibility of getting into someone else’s head. This may be so, but as I have written earlier, 
the process of understanding the workings of someone’s mind is a question that aims at another 
quasi-transcendental formulation and, as such, another interpretative faculty is at work. In 
conclusion we can ask exactly how helpful this is to answering social and political problems 
when it seems to go over so easily to re-producing the violent metaphors of philosophy which we 
saw earlier.   
 
 
Naturalisation and fatalism  
The production, tradition and repetition of violence as decision demonstrated particularly in 
contemporary “heroic” narratives holds onto the agreement of identifying violence as our 
autonomous moment. As Midgely suggests, this problematises our ability to identify the 
                                                                                                                                                              
284 Mary Midgely, Wickedness, Routledge, 2001, 65 
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difference between agreement and disagreement. Here we are dealing specifically with the 
problem of violence as a domesticated norm and as fate.  
 
In the last section I wrote on images of decision (Commando, etc) and the nature of the authoring 
or writing of decision (Bond) where both problematise an ability to discriminate between 
criticism and complicity, demonstration and representation and invention and tradition. What 
these examples demonstrate is that violence is not significant because it is merely “there”, it is 
significant only in its application that in turn reflects moral standards. This process of 
signification problematises the naturalisation of violence as decision since the application of 
violence strongly holds onto a symbolic moral code. This is an interested violence, where the 
image of violence in narratives of decision is skillfully invented within and as the law; the 
production of natural (undeliberated) physical and moral action. 
 
To recap: it seems that the production of narratives of violence as justice reveal violence not as a 
blind and irrational end in itself but as a (ir)rational means. Accordingly, the means by which we 
make our agreements and disagreements do not stop because we think that our actions imply a 
force over others, nor do we stop associating violence with autonomy. However, because violence 
is identified as a means the question of a choice of means arises since violence as physical 




Returning to the main thrust of Midgely’s anxiety, based on the moral problem of understanding 
as exoneration (understanding evil makes it acceptable and domesticated), Midgely argues that 
we will never understand violence, and when we think we do, we are subject to a decoy or ploy 
from the enemy. This prompts my suspicion of the forced naturalisation of strategic action in the 
form of Cavell’s “Live your scepticism!” discussed in Chapter One. Midgely seems to be 
advocating something similar, in that we are told to cultivate a suspicion of other people’s 
rhetorical re-descriptions of evil.  
 
This leads to a question of how to think through a scepticism of foundations and the normative 
without risking a paranoiac cynicism and without an available political strategy. How do we 
participate in the structure of reality? And can this only be construed historically? This anxiety, I 
feel, is warranted because such pessimism inherent in the phrase, “Live your scepticism” assumes 
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the worst case for pluralism, in the sense that this theory assumes that because evil is a pre-
linguistic innate phenomena, language only corrupts or irrationalises “truth” in practices of 
domination. In this, Midgely explains that our processes of understanding are interested, but 
underneath this there exists a general right and wrong. This results in the theory that anyone who 
tries to understand evil risks also becoming evil or is at best morally dubious. Midgely’s critique 
ignores the politics of its own principles, in that it results in a refreshed demarcation and 
interpretation of justice as objective.  
 
 
4. Convincing Arguments 
 
Finally, what we have in Fish’s pragmatism is the problem of interpreting authorities of 
normativity. What governs the changing status of what we accept and what are we sceptical of? 
Fish writes: “What authorises the assumption that everyday life is characterised by continuity and 
determinacy?”285 Taking up this question, we can ask finally if the requirement for continuities 
and determinacies from which to organise a critique of, or against, particular authorities returns us 
straight back to the problems of a rather dismal and fatalist pre-destined notion of a submissive 
agreement. This assumption could be made if we identify these authorities from which to reflex 
our criticality as the natural and unquestionable boundaries of political constraint. However, in 
this, who are we agreeing with? Do we really identify a base of natural justice from which to 
agree? Or, is it more so the case, as Fish would argue, that we believe that the place from which 
we operate our critique is the right place? Consequently, if we cannot subject our own 
convictions to critique, as soon as our convictions are shared or expressed as beliefs in the social 
sphere they are not only open to interpretation but they also convince others to share the same 
assumptions. Central to this are the recognitions of the values of others, and through 
interpretations of these we produce shared assumptions, which situate themselves around the 
basic ideal of freedom. As such, autonomy is read here as an inter-subjective experience, not as a 
direct transgression from it. 
 
This reading returns to and also evacuates the equally distressing interpretation of individual 
recognition in the social, described by Axel Honneth, as sketched out in my introduction. There, 
the possibility of autonomy is argued as a fatal blow to the social, if read through a Nietzschean-
style politics of identification, for this inevitably reads as an aestheticised transgression against 
                                                     
285 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 85 
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the normative. This is understood as a general, personal and social belief in “success as violence” 
against the institution and each other. However, a critique of the authority which convinces us 
that everyday life is characterised by continuity and determinacy does not seek to identify 
freedom as being “free from” such constraints, as would a Jüngerian-style violent fantasy of the 
everyday or in a Hobbesian nightmare of freedom as the chaotic fate of un-policed communities. 
Instead, my critique looks to analyse the systems by which we understand authority and freedom. 
Autonomy in absolute finitude offers no concrete assurances of universal law by which to 
recognise freedom. However, this “lack” doesn’t so easily go over to an out and out violence or 
guarantee “evil” as a necessary culmination to our actions without transcendental guarantees. 
Instead, we live out the practices of our own authorities as relative to those of others. Certainly, a 
concept of our own freedom may be correlative to our identifications of our being “more 
powerful” than others, but first we have to consider that power is not a universally recognisable 
object in itself, and second, that to have power, at some point we need other people to recognise it 
as such. Finally, and I wish to underscore, these interpretations of authorities by no means result 
in a situation of understanding that frees us from their influences (towards an absolute plurality of 
natural violence), nor does it describe interpretative theory as a cumulative progression towards 
the eventual limits of language – or  “truth” as the abstract violence of the ethical other.  
 
Throughout these chapters I have made various criticisms of the legacy of formal theorising 
which centres upon the separation of representational meaning from use value and that describes 
an immanent and transcendental violence at the heart of any consideration of subjective 
autonomy. In light of this I can ask if a recognition of the problems of formalism is enough to 
take us down what Fish would call “the antiformalist road”? The logic of pragmatism points to 
the fact that we probably will get “fooled” or “duped” or, more realistically, persuaded, or even 
for a short time to agree with someone else’s convictions that may contradict our own, because 
the force of rhetoric is given equal status to the rhetoric of force, in as much as we will be 
convinced by other people’s convictions.  
 
Fish describes such an irreducible individual for whom any agreement in the social is subject to 
the force of other people’s rhetoric and yet the individual recognises this shared assumption as 
his/her own. This again returns us to Honneth’s complaint regarding “depleting social 
autobiographies” and also his claims that the “culture industry” is responsible for duping citizens 
by manufacturing personal biographies as fictions; a strategy which enables the smoother running 
of business and State. Honneth’s critique demands a recognition of difference between State and 
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citizen, while Fish’s critique problematises an identification of any particular notion of 
government as having such absolute dominion over citizens and, as such, creates problems for 
organising radical political change. Here, criticism for individuals is not what Honneth fears as an 
aestheticised transgression from the normative (behaving badly), nor is it a cultural performance 
of criticism as a “passive” complicity with dominant forces (behaving in the same way as the 
institutional norm in order to transgress the inherent notions of transgression).286 This is because 
our shared convictions of the normative are interested and therefore cannot and do not provide 
the natural or foundational resource for agency. Accordingly, pursuing an oppositional or 
negative critique of authority does little to undermine that authority, it only either confirms its 
power as anonymous or ubiquitous, or reproduces it. For Fish, it is in the places that we share 
assumptions that interpretative practices set in. Consequently, interpretations of these 
assumptions inherently critique the authority that produces them and in turn demonstrate the 
rhetorical dimension of this power as capable of convincing others of its universal dominion.  
 
Faced with this problem - of a failure to recognise the force of other people’s assumptions as 
principled, because of their rhetorical force - we are left in a similar situation to the one that 
Honneth identifies as a society ignorant of its imprisonment. However, the possibilities of the 
aesthetic transcending its own contingency, is available only if we understand a clear difference 
between aesthetics and politics and that the grounds to make recognitions are not available to us. 
Moving past the problems of method in pragmatism it is evident that under the auspices of an 
aesthetico-political relation we certainly risk being convinced of universal truths, but we are also 
free to condemn such claims. Such judgments are not made on a theorised scepticism that tells us 
that normative judgements do not have the universal truth they may claim to have. Such a 
distinction between true and false is inconsequential because our facility to judge is not based on 
what theories represent but how they are performed. Rather our decisions are invested in because 
we are not sceptical of our beliefs, and circumstantially sceptical of others’. Such judgements are 
relative to being convinced by others, and whether this is ultimately for our own well being or 
not, is pivotal to our notion of community.  
 
Although the uses and practices of power remain open to contingency and to interpretation, they 
are also subject to agreement; the practices of skill and the knowledge of techniques of power 
                                                     
286 For more on criticism as complicity in critical methods of cultural production, see “From Criticism to 
Complicity,” a discussion moderated by Peter Nagy between Peter Halley, Philip Taffe, Sherrie Levine, 
Haim Steinbach, Ashley Bickerton and Jeff Koons. Ed David Robbins, Flash Art, no. 129, Milan, Summer, 
1986, 46-9 The argument above is a simplified version of what is being discussed here. 
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count for a lot. This describes a brutal realism, a world of competing narratives, and a working 
Hobbesian-style “power as reputation”. This work of interpretation describes a condition of 
competing narratives, as Richard Rorty puts it: interpretation is an operation in which the agent - 
be he the judge or a literary critic – “simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his own 
purpose.”287 This underscores the problems of pragmatic theory because it could either be seen to 
prefer mastery on the one hand or settle for the status quo on the other. In other words, 
ideological narratives are substituted for individualised and secularised practices of power. 
However, unlike, say, a Nietzschean theory of the aesthete as having a privileged path to 
authenticity or “becoming”, this “mastery of interpretation”, is never beyond interpretation and 
thus the contestation of others. It is structured by it, and, is indebted to it. As I have underscored 
in my critique of Midgely (and finally quoting Fish): “contingency acknowledged is not 
contingency transcended.”288 Knowledge of structures (such as evil) does not relinquish their 
rhetorical force over us, but we are free to interpret the use of these forces.  
 
Consequently, and I will repeat, this practical critique doesn’t leave our access to autonomy 
hinged upon the identification of our tragic state, paralysed in the belief that the world is a fiction, 
in which the only remaining option is to convince ourselves of a belief that we really don’t 
believe in. Instead, we supply a world of fact and conviction and with it the faculty to make 
distinctions in how these facts are interpreted. This means that our everyday identifications of 
criticality and autonomy don’t necessitate the philosophical drama of violent aesthetics. 
Accordingly, the rhetoric of heroic realism, and the genre of violence in culture as the normative, 
now underscores the impossibility of the tragic as a useful way to theorise knowledge universally, 
and instead points us to the availability of different rhetorics of knowledge and their political 
employment. In this way, the rhetoric of realism proceeds to demonstrate autonomy as an 
effective and rhetorical enterprise, thus leaving the strategic use of violent or forceful aesthetics 
as the product of an interested authority open to critical interpretation.  
 
In closing, I would like to reaffirm this avenue of critical inquiry not as an attempt to move 
towards what Foucault called “the utopia of perfectly transparent communications” but to witness 
the techniques and forces of abstract and rhetorical terms of communication - such as violence as 
decision - in order to stay close to the forces of what appear to be our shared principles and 
prejudices. Certainly such a critique produces another question of force to reckon with. Crucially, 
                                                     
287 I'm quoting Fish’s use of Rorty’s Consequences of Pragmatism, in Doing What Comes Naturally, 516 
288 Ibid., 524 
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this is not the immanence of violence that is identified and secured ideologically or 
mechanistically as a necessary and ubiquitous political “risk”. Neither is it a force that is to be 
analysed as a result of its inherent ambiguity - between appearance and being. Reflecting upon 
Derrida’s comment in the opening of this text, we have understood discourse as an “economy of 
violence”. However, in the discourse of absolute finitude we are left with the productions and 
interpretations of “radical evil” and the “normativity of violence” as things to be reckoned with, 
and to be reckoned for. 
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Guide to Key Terms 
 
 
This guide acts as a subsidiary to some of the arguments in the thesis whilst also clarifying some 
of the key terms used in it. The problematisation of many of these terms is central to the 
methodology and these terms are taken up and debated through different critical lenses across the 
thesis. This index acts as a supplemental architecture and as a means to guide the reader through 
the various analyses. 
 
The contention of certain phrases and terms is central to the critique. Crucial to this is that the 
thesis does not give nominal definitions of particular terms. Rather, it is interested in how 
particular definitions are established through their use. Consequently, the guide below 
concentrates upon the employment and circumstances of the qualification of these terms by re-
tracing the sequence of particular arguments. Therefore, the terms below appear in non-
alphabetical sequence that privileges a hierarchy of their use and relevance to the thesis as a 
whole.   
 
The core argument of the thesis discusses the current socio-cultural legitimacy of what I term as 
“the worn out and violent metaphors of modernist and philosophical theoretical narratives.” The 
thesis therefore takes up terms that are related to emancipatory, (quasi) transcendental, idealistic, 
utopian, and also nihilistic subject centred theories. Persisting with such themes that are widely 
understood as a “nuisance” to “postmodern”, relativist, anti-formalist and anti-representationalist 
practices the thesis deliberately identifies and utilises these universalising theoretical terms as a 
means to; i) acknowledge them as persisting rhetorical codes; ii) ask how and upon what terms 
these codes continue to condition our agreements/disagreements; and, iii) consider how the 
language of representationalist theories can be understood in practice.  
 
Accordingly, it is key for the thesis to consider the various consequences of these often abstract, 
paradigmatic and generic codes that manufacture “otherness” in action and belief. The main text 
points out the problems regarding various procedures and methodologies in the pursuit of 
comprehending realism (the belief that abstracts and universals have an objective existence) 
within a postmodern, relativist antiformalism. Consequently, this thesis tests terms such as 
“absolute finitude”, “autonomy”, and “violence”, in order to examine the rhetoric of 




The term “pluralism” is the condition that incites the original questions for this thesis. Here, 
“pluralism” is understood simply as the condition under which we can no longer be assured nor 
certain of a central monolithic narrative founding the operations of law and our personal decision 
making. The thesis asks: if the task of decision making is understood to be so problematic, or is in 
crisis, what characterises and what are the consequences of the decisions we still make so 
confidently?   
 
“Pluralism” is taken up in the thesis as something that carries the argument away from a 
Categorical Imperative and absolute transcendentals towards quasi-transcendental critique. This 
happens through: i) a study of the aesthetics of aporia vis-à-vis judgement (see the critique of 
Cavell in Chapter One) as a means to a self-understanding without any absolute metaphysical 
identification; ii) in Chapter Three, how “pluralism” is understood by Fish once more as a natural 
condition of difference, but nevertheless one that coincides with an anti-theoretical and 
ideological relativism. And, iii) an examination and criticism of how a theory of agency under a 
pluralist condition invites what I call at one point in the thesis “bad-Nietzschean” (Chapter Two 
87). This is the “will to power”, self-transformation through self-aestheticisation and is taken up 
in the thesis in relation to problems with the orthodoxies of poststructuralism. (This Nietzschean 
parlance is also foregrounded in Eagleton’s criticism in the introduction (14), and further in 
Honneth’s argument which claims that a natural and necessary violence in the social is the 
product of a “Nietzschean politics of identification” (17-19)) 
 
Consequently, the argument that begins with “pluralism” and quasi-transcendentals originally 
turning away from a central monolithic narrative now actually turns back upon itself. Here, the 
thesis critiques the co-incidental character of Fish’s “impossible” and seditious ethic with 
messianism (135) and Berman’s claims regarding the problematic institutionalisation that is a 
consequence of Fish’s neo-pragmatism (189-191). By examining these different responses to 
“pluralism” the thesis ascertains the prevalence of idealising narratives and their political 
consequence, how they come about through the processes of decision making, argumentation and 
belief, how they are manifest through both agreement and disagreement, and how they are written 





The thesis refers to “foundational narratives” in relation to arguments and stories that claim trans-
historical, universal, timeless and normative spaces and rights. In other words, “foundational” 
narratives refer to narratives that are convincing. They are naturalised to claim fact and truth.  
 
The term “antifoundational” in this thesis is mostly used in reference to Stanley Fish’s neo-
pragmatism. It is important that the circumstances of terms such as “antifoundational” are 
interrogated since this thesis works to examine thoughts that pursue a critique of dominant 
narratives, whilst accounting for the contingency of the implied forces at work within such 
contestations. In Chapter Three the thesis debates whether the implied methodology connoted in 
the phrase “antifoundational” in fact undoes its own non-methodological objectives by exposing a 
radical formalism and also foundationalism at its heart. The thesis argues that 
“antifoundationalism” does not contest foundational narratives either in a mechanistic way or in a 
strictly oppositional sense (see Chapter Three (125-6, including the footnote on Fish’s essay “Can 






In the thesis “absolute finitude” is discussed in terms of how it is identified, utilised and 
comprehended. The identification of “absolute finitude” is tied to “autonomy” as self-
consciousness (see “Autonomy” in this section) and the aesthetics of paradox (see “Tragedy and 
the Tragic” in this section). The critique of “absolute finitude” works in the thesis to expose the 
problems of theorising knowledge or knowing knowledge by asking whether or not the 
recognition of “limits” or an identification of “impossibility” is necessary and useful to politics. 
This prompts the thesis to consider how a theory of self-knowledge is practiced rhetorically. 
 
This brings the thesis to understand the consequences of thinking “absolute finitude” as a fact 
within language, by understanding it as an aesthetico-political contingency of such 
argumentation. The thesis tests the path set down by Richard Rorty; that philosophising is 
unhelpful to political practice, but also asks what consequence such narratives have in the socio-
cultural domain. Hence, the thesis looks to discourses of universals as forceful, persuasive and 
performative practices in order to understand their prevalence. 
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“Absolute finitude” is considered most fully in Chapter One. Here the section “Oedipus as Two 
Figures for Knowledge” (23-32), demonstrates the implicit contradiction that is available when 
considering this term. On the one hand Oedipus is shown to be the Hegelian, tragic philosophical 
figure for knowledge. Here, absolute finitude refers to its “absolute” character. Knowledge is 
written as a theory of Oedipus’s practice of “never knowing”. Here, Oedipus’s “lack of 
knowledge” organises his perseverance (his desire to know), and his perseverance itself, 
repetitively underlines and makes us aware of the tragic gap in his knowledge. Oedipus keeps on 
going, and this prompts the recognition of Oedipus as tragic par excellence.  
 
On the other hand we see a Nietzschean-style Oedipus. Now Oedipus, as the figure who “keeps 
on going”, does so unselfconsciously. Here, knowledge is practice (31). Oedipus is not in a 
position to identify his knowledge as “limited” since this identification paradoxically recognises 
even a lack of knowledge in a positivist sense: A theory of “absolute finitude” disputes any 
(quasi) transcendental claims the term has, because “absolute finitude” becomes a “thing” in 
itself.  
 
Chapter One asks if the impossibility to choose between the two figures for knowledge actually 
characterises the task of thinking as another tragic philosophical process of knowledge (“return” 
as “figure without figure” (45)). The answer is no (46-49). This is because the means of 
comprehending this absolute and contradictory factor of absolute finitude are always 
representable within language (“doubt is performed discursively” (46)). As such the first chapter 
conditions self-consciousness, tragedy, metaphysics and formalism upon each other and goes on 
to make a case for a study of absolute finitude in language thus grounding a linguistic and 
political territory for analysis for the rest of the thesis.  
 
The thesis throughout looks at how “absolute finitude” is problematically written as an affect of 
language, in that language points us towards its own limits, and of course these limits are 
represented as and within familiar language codes. In Chapter One, see the aesthetics of paradox 
in Zupancic (40), the aesthetics of doubt in Cavell (“the robot story” (36-37), and “with 
language” (33-34)). In Chapter Three, see the representing of the unnameable in Laclau (131-4) 
and the understanding of a pre-linguistic violence in Hobbes (the sections “Hobbes Original 
Covenant”(107-9) and “The Politics of Religion” (110-113) where we see Leviathan as metaphor) 
and in Chapter Four, the aesthetics of natural and cultural violence as timelessly pervasive with 




“Autonomy” is linked throughout this thesis to power, responsibility, will, (self) knowledge and 
freedom. The term “autonomy” is useful in that it characterises a subject who makes decisions 
individually and singularly. In this individuality “autonomy” describes a subject of “difference” 
who makes decisions based on his/her knowledge as a means to transcendence and/or power.  
 
The thesis is led by the description of a violent heroic subject whose autonomy is not something 
to be attained, nor given up. “Autonomy” is both natural right and natural power and violence is 
neither avoided, nor mechanistically asserted as a means to an end. Because this thesis looks to 
the efficacy of transcendental theories as rhetorical forces, the term “autonomy” points the thesis 
to the problem of how our understanding and experience of “autonomy” is contingent upon 
language. 
 
“Autonomy” is discussed specifically through quasi-transcendental theories such as: i) the tragic 
model, where “autonomy” is linked to the limits of language and self-knowledge and is a task to 
be worked upon vis-a-vis a duty or responsibility set down by belief in a central law-giver; ii) a 
Nietzschean-style nihilism based on sacrifice, evidenced in Jünger’s heroic realism. Here, 
freedom as “autonomy” is achieved through the confident practicing of knowledge and power in 
order to give up ones “autonomy” to a founding “history” that in turn maps a future, and; iii) 
Hobbes’s political science, where autonomy is a natural, violent, and pre-moral foundational 
condition – something to be given up through contract to the sovereign. 
 
As an affiliate to quasi-transcendental theories (discussed through Cavell’s conception of aporia, 
(45) and also through Hobbes (112) “autonomy” usefully retrieves the violent rhetoric of 
nihilistic and/or emancipatory ideologies. Further, the thesis shows that on the one hand 
“autonomy” encompasses the humanitarian and social problems in the claims leveled against 
antimodernsim as well as a Nietzschean influenced poststructuralism. Whilst, on the other hand, 
“autonomy” sustains the vitriol of utopianist determinism and a problematic notion of tolerance 






Tragedy and the Tragic: 
 
“Tragedy” and “the tragic” are taken up in the thesis as two discreet terms that are shown to be 
situated upon each other. Linked to the themes of “autonomy” (see “Autonomy” in the section 
above) and “absolute finitude” (see “Absolute Finitude” above) the terms “tragedy” and “the 
tragic” also correspond to a critique of the identification of “limits”, “paradox” and “doubt”.  
 
Because the thesis identifies various problems when it comes to making strategic separations 
between aesthetics and politics or the real and the representational, the thesis examines how 
“tragedy” and “the tragic” claim “truth”. Initially, in Chapter One, the two terms are discussed 
separately. Here, the understanding of the term “tragic” assumes an essentialised and fragile state 
of aporia through Hegelian dialectics (30) or through a Nietzschean concept of return. (See the 
section on Cavell: “Self recognition as the Tragic Success of Language” (44-6)) This recognition 
of “the tragic” understands and describes the insufficiency of tragic discourse as truly “tragic”. In 
other words, this insufficiency produces tragedy par excellence. (See the critique of Oedipus in 
the section “Tragic Recognition” (24-6)) From this received doubling of “tragedy” and “the 
tragic” the thesis agues three points: i) that the tragic meta-narrative is another tragic discourse; 
ii) that self-consciousness is impossible and also not tragic in a universal sense; and, iii) that the 
naming of any event as tragic calls upon an identification of some standard of insufficiency or 
limitations present in that event, that paradoxically appeals to and therefore recognises normative 
criteria for defining this failure. (See the argument in Chapter One: “It is a theory of half a 
theory…”(48))  
 
In other words, the thesis argues that the claim of “the tragic” is conditioned by an understanding 
of “tragedy” (as a narrativised and recognisable structure). This correlation is identified through 
the claim that the representation, the naming, or the identification of “the tragic” from the 
supposition of “insufficient criteria” actually acknowledges what “appropriate criteria” are, and 
this offers (albeit implicitly), the optimistic model of “tragedy”.  
 
The thesis does not claim that a discourse or a citation of “the tragic” is unavailable in 
contemporary culture, nor does the identification of a situation as “tragic” prevent us from 
empathising with the suffering of others. (This is claimed to be the advantage of tragic theories 
(see Eagleton in the Introduction, (14)). However, the tragic is also not the only discourse that can 
claim such empathy. (For this see the argument on community, understanding and exoneration in 
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the concluding chapter, (201)) The thesis holds that naming an event as “tragic” is not helpful 
because this claim either reflects an acceptance of the status quo, i.e. “It’s tragic - and there’s 
nothing we can do about it…”, or, conversely this naming operates as a vitriolic call to action; a 
dutiful imperative to recognise the event as “tragic” and to therefore deal with the event as a 
problem to be transcended or taken into hand. Here we see a self-invited law that adjudicates the 
situation from a “knowledgeable distance”. In both cases, saying something is “tragic” does not 
deal with the circumstances of the event. Instead it merely makes a claim about these 
circumstances, and as such problematically delineates events formally. In presuming “limits”, in 
such a way, naming an event as “tragic” claims gaps in knowledge and then at the same time 
assumes the authority of filling them in. This kind of passive/active formalism thus re-invites the 
type of universalising authorities that the thesis seeks to critique. 
 
The thesis contends that a theory of “the tragic” does not transcend “tragedy”. Instead “the 
tragic” understood as a claim about language and politics is considered to be unhelpful to 
political practice because it only articulates or considers its contingency upon language as built 
around a theory of transcendence (the acknowledgment of the limit of knowledge equals 
freedom). (See the argument that the claim of “the tragic” comes from an impossible “death-
space”, 26). The thesis instead chooses to look to the performative and linguistic aspects of the 
naming of such events as rhetorical exercises in terms of an antifoundationalist critique (61). 
Here, notions of “freedom” and “knowledge” are concretised as questions of “power”. It is 





The term “post-tragic” is understood as a description of a type of subjectivity. It is a claim about 
certain narrative genres. This is the subject that makes tragedy an option but rejects it, and 
overcomes it, without the constructs of irony or parody. What is particularly interesting to the 
thesis is how this “post-tragic” subject shows what are considered to be the universal laws that 
govern decision-making to be political, secular and interested. This is in marked opposition to the 
tragic narratives discussed above that theorise agency as hinged upon something that is 
disinterested and beyond the confines of language. 
 
The term “post-tragic” describes the hero that features in the violent action-adventure narratives 
that lead the thesis. The thesis claims that the “post-tragic” subject actually acknowledges the 
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tragic without a return to the same tragic discourses. (See Schwarzenegger’s portrayal of Hamlet 
in The Last Action Hero in Chapter One, (47-8)) The “post-tragic” subject does not so much 
overcome the tragic (49) but dismisses it as unhelpful for the task in hand. It is in this spirit of 
unselfconscious choice-making that I take up in the narratives of the “post-tragic” subject. This 
subject can choose between behaving tragically or not, and the very notion of a choice between 
these two concepts is never tragic. It is simple and pragmatic. (See 30-32, where the figure of 
Oedipus and the discourse of unselfconsciousness is claimed as “non-tragic”.)  
 
From the outset, this character is linked to a problematic poststructuralism vis-à-vis a Nietzschean 
active nihilism, the immanence of violence to decision, and the aestheticisation of subjective 
agency. In such a problematic postmodernism, ideological and emancipatory narratives are 
banalised and reduced to the role of an aesthetics of violence, whilst at the same time, this subject 
naturalises violence as the condition for any decision.  
 
The conception of the “post-tragic” does not determine the tragic as either culturally or politically 
non-existent or as not functioning. Rather the thesis asks what value a theory of “the tragic” has 
for politics and culture? As such, a theory of “the tragic” is dealt with here as one of the many 
examinations of the rhetorical force and aesthetico-political product of theories that claim certain 
truths above and beyond language. (For more analyses on the tragic in this index see “Tragedy 
and the Tragic” below.). The work on the “post-tragic” subject is chosen as the focus for the 
thesis as a means to examine the precarious situation of this particular subject, the subject who 
does not acknowledge an “outside” (see “Absolute Finitude”), who embodies the law, and whose 
violence is naturalised as unselfconscious decision (see “Autonomy”.). 
 
By employing the term “post-tragic” the thesis focuses directly upon the relationship between a 
“tragic” subject and one who is not. From this position the thesis also considers whether the 
“post-tragic” subject accurately describes the figure of Fish’s neo-pragmatism, something that 
Berman claims early in the introduction to the thesis (8). By designating the heroic figure of the 
text as “post-tragic” the thesis opens up an analysis of the various problems that critical theory 
has leveled at poststructuralism and neo-pragmatism, which claim different ethical conceptions to 
be at work within this “non-foundational” subject. Such criticisms are taken up in the thesis by 
asking the questions; “is the “post-tragic” essentially tragic?” (Chapter One, 31) and, does the 
“post-tragic” invite and entrench a foundational system of dominance? (See this problem of 
dominance in Nietzsche (61).) These questions also reflex upon the relationship between 
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postmodernism and modernism in as much as the post-tragic subject is seen to expose the (good) 
emancipatory ideals that characterise modernism as simply superficial and violent.  
 
At times in the thesis the subject is referred to as the “postmodern heroic” because in many ways 
the narratives that portray this “post-tragic” subject are self-consciously “postmodern”. Here, as 
seen in the Schwarzenegger example above, narratives of agency pronounce style as content. 
Also, in the films of Steven Segal and Tarrantino’s Pulp Fiction, narratives are non-allegorical 
and there are no grander claims than that of the subjects themselves. (The characters portrayed are 
always self-interested.) The post-tragic subject is tied to postmodernism because it clings to and 
manipulates the varying characteristics of pre-modern, antimodern and modernist subjectivities. 
However, the “post-tragic” subject does not figure postmodernism in a linear or historical sense 
(in as much as postmodernism is understood to be the natural (right) and celebrated conclusion of 
previous “isms”). Rather, the thesis argues that the “post-tragic” subject brings us face to face 
with the problems of such a telos. This potential hierarchy is examined by looking at how the 
“post-tragic” subject naturalises the language of violence as decision on the one hand, inscribing 
violence as the mechanistic and deterministic conclusion of agency and history (16). Whilst, on 
the other hand, the “post-tragic” subject shows that there is room for disagreement because this 
naturalisation is rhetorical. (To see this argument in greater detail see Chapter Four, where the 
critique moves through Heidegger, Jünger and Malick.) The thesis goes on to think through the 
politics of this contradiction by examining the practical applications of language without 
inscribing another linguistic/performative hierarchy.  
 
NOTE ON METHOD: Because the thesis seeks to critique the usefulness of (quasi) 
transcendental discourses within an antiformalist understanding of language, it persists with such 
rhetoric. “Post-tragic” is a concrete part of that rhetoric. The term “post-tragic” preserves the 
transcendental force that overcomes “the tragic”. By employing the term “post-tragic” a 
transcendental and idealistic character is implied that serves to focus the central issue: the critique 





“Violence” is central to the thesis as it straddles an understanding of both theory and practice. 
“Violence” is understood in terms of how it is written - as a narrativised theme of its own 
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“ubiquity” - what Slavoj Zizek terms as the “postmodern” “local epic” (see the opening quote for 
Chapter One, (23)). Consequently, it is also linked to “rhetorical force” and is therefore integral to 
the practice of “decision”. Here, “violence” is the materiality of our decision-making. It is the 
force of our convictions over and against others. The thesis examines how a narrative that 
represents “violence” as aggression, decision, law and power, is relative to the demonstrative 
experience of violence understood as the force of one’s decisions and beliefs. (This question of 
representation and demonstration is the focus of Chapters Three and Four.) 
 
In the opening quote from Derrida, “violence” is a character of all language, and as such 
“violence” quickly becomes necessary for a comprehension of justice (1). In its abstraction, 
“violence” retains an interesting and problematic moral objectivity as regards to what it actually 
means or represents. The thesis asserts that aesthetic identification is key to how we define 
specific practices: “violence” demands a (linguistic) context (10). From here, “violence” is 
integral to the procedures of decision-making, both in the sense that decision-making describes 
the act of theorising and that this behaviour is in itself a practical process.  
 
Following the relationship between “violence” and language, the thesis argues that it is unhelpful 
to think violence in its immanent ubiquitous form (see Hindess in Chapter Three (102-3), and 
Foucault in Chapter Two (89)) and that “violence” is available in neither a “real” and horrific 
sense, nor in the form of an immanent totalitarianism. This is because in the thesis violence 
denotes the forces of contesting beliefs in the social and is not correlative to a foundational or 
metaphysical evil. (In Chapter Four, see the critique around AI directed by Speilberg (168-9), plus 
Fish’s quote about the “fear of a world without order or principle” in Chapter Three, (125)) 
 
The relationship between “violence”, “decision” and “ethics” is taken up in particular regard to 
how ethics as an imperative or locus of “decision” is written and argued. This is discussed, for 
example, in Chapter One, through the “identification of non-identification” in both Cavell’s sci-
fi-nightmarish scepticism and Zupancic’s banal horror in the section “Aesthetics of the Real” (40-
46).  
 
Since the thesis acknowledges that language seeks to persuade from the basis of one’s beliefs – 
since then beliefs are not without their own reason and since we believe our convictions are in the 
right place (see Fish in Chapter Three, 124), it follows that our decisions are implicitly violent 
and forceful. In turn this force is integral to the social and community because it constitutes the 
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process of individuals exercising disagreement and agreement. Here, the question is introduced 
regarding the relationship between our daily decision-making in the social (a rhetorical and 
persuasive force over others), and how an ethic is formulated that acts as the abstract catalyst for 
decisions that exercise such beliefs. (For Fish this is the ethic that resists but also takes on a 
particular form: “the gun at you head is your head” (128).) The thesis claims that both an ethic 
that acts as the catalyst for decision and the circumstantial notion of decision can be mutually 
comprehended because the former makes itself available as a specific political argument. 
 
Consequently, the thesis examines decision-making and violence in two key ways: i) the violence 
of the political, and ii) the violence of politics: the former, a theory of practice, the originary 
thought for political practice; the latter, a practice of theory. By privileging theorising as a 
performative practice the thesis positions violence as integral to the expression of one’s belief 
and reason and as being at work in circumstantial debate and argument. 
 
Through Hobbes in Chapter Three, it is argued that the languages of representation or 
symbolisation and demonstration or practice are hinged upon each other in rhetorical and forceful 
performances. Here, the relationship between the violence of rhetoric and the rhetoric of violence 
is made inextricable. However, violence is always contingent to specific practices. Consequently, 
although different notions of a ubiquitous, transcendental, foundational, natural, timeless, and 
non-spatial violence are discussed at length in the thesis, it is important to recognise that these 
universals are discussed as rhetorical performances. This is focussed on throughout the thesis in 
as much as the “post-tragic” subject is discussed as a non-natural yet effective rhetorical tool. 
However, this argument is played particularly in Chapter Four, through the discussion of 
Heidegger’s metaphysics, Jünger’s heroic realism and Malick’s omnipresent violence. In all 
cases, the thesis drives the discussion towards the performative force of realism in a consideration 






The thesis claims throughout that “evil” is a rhetorical enterprise. It is also linked to various 
theoretical understandings of “critique”, “decision”, “power”, “autonomy”, “transgression” and 
“disagreement”. The thesis serves to undo various theories that either describe or end up re-
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producing “metaphysical”, “foundational” or “natural” “evil” by arguing that naming and 
identifying a person or persons “evil” is an interested claim.  
 
This is initially argued through a critique of Geddes’ and Shattuck’s theological comprehension 
of a “glamorised evil” in Chapter Two. Here, “evil” is described as arising from a spectacularised 
aesthetics of a “cool” relationship to violence (65) and as an affect of an unwarranted faith in 
reason, that becomes evil at the point where an uncritical faith takes over and disguises itself as 
“good” reason (67). This problematic overconfidence, for Shattuck, warrants a revitalised 
vigilance regarding thought and our production of stories that seem to naturalise (and so justify) 
violence against others (68). In response, the thesis argues that this vigilance is paradoxical and 
unworkable as it calls upon the same rationale that it seeks to be sceptical of. (see “The Limits of 
a Rationalising Self-government” (73-4)) 
 
Contra Shattuck, the thesis claims that just because violence is represented as “cool” this by no 
means reflects an “uncritical” or “blind” acceptance in the violent killing of others as a morally 
good thing, resulting in evil. At this point the thesis contends that “coolness” is not passivity, nor 
is agreement unthoughtful (72). By hinging the faculties of agreement and disagreement upon 
each other, the thesis establishes a critique of interpretative theory in order to think through the 
circumstances of contestation within relativism. (For this analysis, see Chapter Four, in particular, 
Malick’s ‘complicit” authorship (173) and the section, Criticism and complicity, in the 
Concluding Chapter, (193).) 
 
Chapter Three also discusses the politics of naming what is “evil” and what is “good” through 
Hobbes. Hobbes accurately captures the sentiment of the thesis and guides a discussion of claims 
that good and evil actions are generated by and correlative to rhetorical argument. “Good” and 
“evil” are, for Hobbes, the responsibility of the State and are developed in speaker/audience 
relations. (See the opening quote for Chapter Three: “Good and Evill, are names that signify our 
Appetities and Aversions...” (98))  
 
Finally, these sentiments are re-introduced in the conclusion in order to critique Midgely’s 
problematic critique of the understanding of “evil” actions in her book Wickedness: “To say that 
evil actions are understandable means that we are falling for propaganda, another working of 
power where to understand evil is to excuse it.” (196). Midgely’s understanding is that the 
language by which “evil” is practiced is a superficial, yet opaque rhetoric. The language of evil is 
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persuasive and therefore a violent language in that it hides real personal agendas. In contrast, the 
thesis claims that the use of the language of “evil”, or attempts to understand “evil” as we see it 
do not exonerate it. Rather, the thesis acknowledges that these various attempts to move away 
from “evil” in the name of the “good” only deepen such polemics and re-problematise an 






“Antimodernism” is linked to the conservative politics nihilistic theories familiar to German 
theorists of the early twentieth century. “Anti-modernism” is discussed centrally in Chapter Four 
through Jünger’s political literature. Where it is understood as in active nihilism: a theory of a 
constructed submission and sacrifice to metaphysics that is technology. Jünger’s “anti-
modernism” turns modernism on its head in that transcendence is understood as a theory of being 
“free with” rather than “free from” normative and “everlasting” codes such as spirit, history and 
nature. Of course this doesn’t evacuate the intrinsic notion of freedom in itself, and Jünger’s 
irrationalism likewise, does not forfeit any of the rational and mechanistic structures that augment 
his “heroic realism”. (158) 
 
Reactionary modernism: 
The term “reactionary modernism” (154 (see footnote)) makes reference to the text of the same 
name by Herf who describes “reactionary modernism” as a combination of the rejection of 
(modernist) revolutionary ideologies with an embracing of modern technology. Consequently, 
Jünger’s fascination with technology in general (and warfare in particular) differs from the “anti-
modern” aesthetics of the Volkish and pastoral life that featured in Nazi rhetoric of community 
and liberty.  
 
The thesis does not set out to critique Herf’s definition, rather, it serves to further the examination 
of the relationship between nihilism, metaphysics, power and an aesthetics of violence. Here, the 
thesis analyses the way in which Jünger uses language as a tool in order to experience 
“transcendence” and “freedom” in order to transcend the antinomies of reason and unreason and 
to incorporate a greater and deeper truth in the concrete world. This truth is written as violence 
(153). As such the argument in Chapter Four is concerned with the idea that a ubiquitous violence 
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in the form of modern technology is understood by Jünger as normative - it is available everyday 
in the form of alarm clocks and such like - and also metaphysical - technology offers the violence 
necessary for heroic ordeal (156). From this position the thesis tests the political consequences of 
the writing of metaphysics. (For how this leads to a question of domination see 152 and for the 
analysis of “true” and “false” languages 163-5.) 
 
Postmodernism: 
“Postmodernism” is also significant to the thesis as a corollary to the “antimodern”. Here, the 
violence of a non-metaphysical “antimodern” nihilism is key to the claims leveled against non-
emancipatory postmodern theories. (See Chapter Two for this relation and also an account of 
various texts that discuss this parallel, through Michel Foucault, in particular, Habermas’s 
critique of Foucault as a “young conservative”: Here, Foucault is “at best modern and at worst 
antimodern” (81).) The thesis argues that the problem is not so much whether Foucault is 
“modern”, “antimodern”, or indeed “postmodern”. Rather, the problem the thesis takes up is that 
accusations such as “modern” and “antimodern” highlight the problem of theorising ethics within 
“circumstantial” and “temporal” practices. Namely, a theory that theorises (in some form) 
“foundational duty” also figures domination. This returns to the question of: what place does our 
conception of ethics have in relation to the practices of our convictions, beliefs and ideals? (See 
Chapter Three where the thesis discusses decision within non-emancipatory political theory and 
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